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Abstract 
Homeland security measures and the preparation of local law 
enforcement are reviewed, in light of September 11, 2001, 
to determine their effect on the Constitutional rights of 
citizens, the delivery of law enforcement services, e.g., 
call response and the training methodologies, and the 
fiscal impact to fulfill the new policing mandates. The 
study reviews aggressive measures, normally vested with 
federal law enforcement agencies, to determine if local 
police are also utilizing similar methods for the sake of 
national security and if such measures are undermining 
ethical and legal practices previously exercised by local 
police. This research also examines the distinction 
between accredited and nonaccredited law enforcement 
agencies as it relates to post September llth practices. 
The findings were gained through interviews at 7 local 
police agencies of 8 law enforcement executives, who 
provided rich narrative perspectives showing that their 
agencies: (a) still abided by Constitutional principles by 
not engaging in bias-based policing; (b) the impact on 
calls for services was limited to a few weeks following 
9/11, 6 months later were back to normal, and are currently 
at pre-9/11 levels; (c) training practices have changed; 
and (d) little or no funding was received by the agencies 
from the federal government for training or equipment and 
the fiscal impact was either absorbed by the agency or 
equipment was not obtained. 
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EXAMINING THE POST SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 PRACTICES OF 
ACCREDITED AND NONACCREDITED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN 
THE ASPECTS OF TRAINING, LEGAL AND SERVICE DELIVERY 
CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
"Are you guys ready? Let's rollrr (Breslau, 2001, p. 
5 4 ) !  Todd Beamer, passenger on United Airlines 
Flight 93, September 11, 2001. 
Much the same as it undoubtedly did for Todd Beamer, 
September 11, 2001 started as a regular workday for this 
researcher with a routine Police Department staff meeting 
t 
underway, discussing local crime events of the past 24 
hours. That meeting was abruptly interrupted a few minutes 
before 9:00 a.m. with an announcement by a police 
department employee that a plane had just crashed into one 
of the twin towers in New York City. As the conference 
room TV was switched on and command staff members affixed 
their eyes to live broadcasts, the second tower was hit at 
9:03 a.m., witnessed on live TV by the researcher and his 
command staff, and the millions of people world-wide. The 
magnitude of these events unfolded as reports began to 
filter in about other planes possibly hijacked. Taken 
together, the events of that infamous day left no doubt 
that this was the dawn of a new day and a new era of 
terrorism for the U.S. and its law enforcement community. 
As such, a majority of local level law enforcement agencies 
took up the now famous utterance of Todd Beamer, "Let's 
Roll ! " 
The literature suggests that never before in American 
history have modern law enforcement institutions been taxed 
with the awesome responsibility of protecting its service 
population from terrorism, that is more indicative of the 
Middle East or other foreign countries (Delattre, 2002; 
Moore, 2002; Drug Enforcement Report, 2003; Dale, 2003). 
Police are now faced with the difficult task of how to best 
address terrorism, and law enforcement experts are locked 
in debate on what is the appropriate response. Widely 
recognized expert on police and security, George Kelling, 
chairman of the Police Institute at Rutgers and author of 
the theoretical text, Broken Windows, poses this query to 
American Police Beat, "The question is, what impact is 9/11 
going to have on our community policing and how do we best 
protect our communities? I take the position that 
terrorism is one more urban problem and police are going to 
have to deal with it" (Nichols, 2003, p. 40) . If the 
latter is indeed true and the evidence suggests so (Beary, 
2002; Delattre, 2002; Gibeault, 2002), the writer moves 
Kelling's statement further in this research to determine 
how the police are dealing with 'itN (domestic terrorism), 
or indulging on Beamer's refrain, how did the police 
"roll. " 
Historically, the roles of American police, in the 
modern sense of patrols, are to prevent and detect crime 
and maintain general order. These are carryovers from 
colonial times, where or when there were constables, 
sheriffs and nightwatchmen (Miller, 2000). Beginning in 
the 1950s, there were several paradigm shifts in the 
approaches to policing, when emphasis swept the gamut from 
professionalism, efficiency and crime control, to the 1990s 
t 
with community relations, community policing and a social 
I services model (Goldstein, 1979; Miller, 2000; Delattre, 
2002). 
However, an increase in violent crime became a major 
concern for American police in the 1990s and led by the New 
York City Police Department, law enforcement agencies 
implemented a new process, Compstat. Compstat was based on 
accurate and timely intelligence, rapid deployment, 
I 
effective tactics and relentless follow-up and assessment 
( (Vita, 2000). This process stressed accountability and 
where implemented, has effectively reduced the violent 
crime that police agencies dealt with before September 11, 
2001 (Ibid). 
Nevertheless, despite the success of aggressive 
policing due to initiatives such as Compstat, other issues 
emerged. Racial profiling was one issue that began to 
balloon into a nationally recognized problem, even becoming 
the issue of presidential debates and elections (Lords, 
2000). Thus the police were pressured to change their 
approach through mandated policies, etc., against racial 
profiling or bias-based policing. 
Now the picture has changed, ironically, beginning in 
the City of New York, where the first dose of a new type of 
I domestic terrorism was felt in 1993 at the World Trade 
I Center (Brannan, 2003). From the onset, law enforcement 
and the fire service were the first responders and felt the 
, 
full force of the terrorism blow at the World Trade Center 
and that response has proven to be of paramount importance. 
"Local first responders are the only assets capable of 
meeting the critical interval to intervention time 
necessary to minimize the impact of a terrorist attack" 
(Maniscalco, Denney, Holtermann and Kaniewski, 2002, p. 3). 
That picture has translated into policing methodology 
changes for the majority of law enforcement agencies in the 
U.S. 
This study will take a qualitative look at current 
practices of law enforcement to determine how business is 
being conducted after 9/11 and the findings will be 
discussed. The policy implications regarding bias-based 
policing, merits of accreditation and Constitutional 
adherence will be discussed. The practice implications 
regarding training, call response and the procurement of 
funding will also be discussed. Any future research 
implications will be presented. 
P u z p o s e  of study 
The purpose of this research is to provide a 
descriptive account of how law enforcement agencies have 
reacted to September 11, 2001 through the perspectives of 
1 the participants. The researcher has synthesized and 
% interpreted the data collected and presented it in a 
written format to benefit academia in the pursuit of 
knowledge about law enforcement's response to American 
domestic terrorism. 
Domestic security became increasingly important for 
law enforcement at all levels of government after the 
terrorist events of September 11, 2001 (Delattre, 2002; 
Gilbeault, 2002; Lichtblau, 2002). From a global 
perspective, the aftermath of September 11 underlined how 
differently we have changed our thinking about state 
sovereignty during the last century (Singer, 2002). From a 
national perspective, that fateful date drastically changed 
the way daily operations are carried out, especially in the 
early period following the disasters (Delattre, 2002; New 
Profilees, 2002; Raterman, 2002). 
Although there are numerous areas that directly 
impacted the service delivery of local law enforcement 
agencies, e.g., time of day, type of community, and level 
of staffing (Goldstein, 1979), those of significance in 
this study focus on the legal and ethical practices of law 
enforcement, changes in terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) training, and response to certain service 
calls. The focus of this dissertation is to qualitatively 
capture law enforcement's response immediately following 
the disaster, in the ensuing months after the calamity and 
the current practices. 
The catastrophic events of terrorism also set in 
motion unprecedented action by the U.S. that affected not 
only law enforcement, but also virtually all segments of 
society. John Gibeault (2002) sums up the sense of urgency 
and the impact on law firms, business communities and law 
enforcement: 
Time was when businesses could consider catastrophic 
terrorism about as likely as a rogue asteroid strike 
or a good old-fashioned plague of locusts or frogs. 
No longer. As businesses come to grips with terrorism 
as a real and long-term menace, they must consider 
massive assaults foreseeable. Within weeks of the 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
[Bracewell & Patterson] the Houston-based firm 
launched a practice group to address public and 
corporate security, as well as counter-terrorism, 
perhaps the first of its kind, ... Some state and 
local precautions range from dead serious to downright 
silly. Others appeared to do no more than add a 
redundant layer to federal laws and regulations 
already on the books. For example, Chicago has 
adopted a city ordinance forcing high-rise building 
owners to develop evacuation plans. Police there are 
also considering dusting off an old ordinance that 
requires fingerprinting and photographs from reporters 
applying for press cards to allow them to cross police 
lines. (p. 3) 
September llth served as the catalyst for the creation 
of a new mindset, sort of a punctuation mark, and the point 
\ 
of rapid acceleration for priority shifts already begun by 
other forces. The emphasis switched from one of containing 
damage already caused to one of preventing disaster. 
Statement of the problem 
This study seeks to understand the experience of local 
law enforcement agencies amidst the impact of domestic 
terrorism in the U.S. and to investigate their perception 
of that impact. That experience can be best answered by 
asking the following research questions: 
1. What changes did the September 11, 2001 domestic 
terrorism events and weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) have on accredited and nonaccredited law 
enforcement agencies, directly following the 
terrorism attack, 6 months after and currently in 
the following areas: 
A. Funding 
B. Vigilance 
C. Training 
D. Bias-based policing 
E. Call response 
2. What was the distinction, if any, between the 
practices of accredited and nonaccredited law 
enforcement agencies post 9/11? 
Qualitative methods are utilized because the focus of 
the study is exploratory and phenomenological (Patton, 
1990). I surveyed 62 local South Florida law enforcement 
agencies in St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach, Broward and 
Miami-Dade counties, and one in County 6 (N = 63). I 
selected 7 agencies with the most salient themes for in- 
depth open-ended personal interviews. This dissertation 
will discuss the salient points and implications of the 
research. 
Conceptual Underpinning - The 17. S .  Cons ti tut ion 
The U. S. Constitution (see Appendix A) is the 
underlying principle document that establishes the 
conceptual foundation for the governance of the U.S. The 
Constitution is designed to protect the civil rights of 
Americans. From it flows the doctrine that governs what 
law enforcement agencies can legally do to the populace. 
Specifically, this is found in the Bill of Rights in 
Amendments IV, V and VI (U. S. Constitution, 1787) . The 
Fourth Amendment is of paramount importance in this 
research, as it outlines the following civil rights: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
things to be seized. (U.S. Const. amend. IV) 
The ethical decisions of the police must abide by these 
rights. Former U.S. Attorney General, Janet Reno, in a 
foreword to Principles for Promoting Police Integrity 
(January 2001), poignantly points out that law enforcement 
must use ethical principles and practices to promote the 
integrity of civil rights established by the U.S. 
Constitution. 
The basic oath of office or oath of honor for a law 
enforcement officer implies that he/she must uphold the 
U.S. Constitution (see Appendix B). Carol W. Lewis (1991) 
describes the significance of the oath in public service: 
These oaths spell out the foundation of duty in public 
service. By taking the job, office, or position, the 
public servant promises legal compliance. The federal 
ethic code (P.A. 96-303, unanimously passed by 
Congress and signed into law by the president on July 
3, 1980) spells out a simple standard: "Uphold the 
Constitution, laws, and regulations of the United 
States and of all government therein and never be a 
party to their evasion." (p. 35) 
Lewis goes on to explain that public service, which 
includes law enforcement, is both rooted and bound by the 
Constitution's provision and these are the citizen's basis 
for trust. 
James S. Bowman (1991) points out that the ethos for 
how public servants must conduct themselves is grounded in 
the U.S. Constitution. The federalists and the 
antifederalists determined regime values in the early days 
of the U.S. Bowman finds that these values are "those 
manifest in the Constitution of the United States and 
include but are not limited to personal liberty, property, 
and equality. According to Rohr, they represent 'the 
values of the American peopler (1976, p. 399)" (p. 14). 
Nevertheless, Bowman cautions in the same writing that 
most of today's constitutional problems with such a narrow 
interpretation as an administered oath to uphold the 
Constitution cannot be resolved. Bowman writes, "that oath 
can provide little ethical guidance to the practitioner or 
assurance to the public that high standards of ethical 
conduct will be met" (p. 98). Yet the Constitution remains 
the most significant force behind the rights of citizens of 
the U.S. and is intertwined in the language of law 
enforcement (IACP, 2003). 
Researcher bias 
The researcher has a personal interest in the 
proposal, because it relates to a field of study where the 
writer has served as a practitioner over 33 years. I am 
currently the chief of police for a municipal law 
enforcement agency in South Florida (City X) with 115 
authorized sworn positions, and has been in the position 
since 1997. Prior to that, the writer spent 26% years with 
another larger municipal police agency (currently 280 sworn 
position), retiring at the rank of assistant chief of 
police. 
This researcher has dealt firsthand with the impact of 
September 11, 2001 on police operations at his current law 
enforcement agency. City X has faced a budget shortfall 
for the past two years, which resulted in 13 of the 115 
sworn positions remaining unfunded. Thus, staffing 
shortages and an above average attrition rate exacerbate an 
already difficult problem of dealing with the aftermath of 
September 11, 2001. Despite the latter, I have dedicated 
staff to participate in one of the regional law enforcement 
terrorism task forces, handle terrorism planning, training, 
call response and equipment acquisition. 
Funding associated with terrorism and WMD has been 
sparse, but the researcher was able to purchase some 
protective suits, designed to shield against certain 
chemical weapons using money from the Law Enforcement Trust 
Fund (LETF). Other suits were purchased with the 
assistance of grant money received by a larger Central 
Florida law enforcement agency that was the lead agency in 
the region's terrorism task force. I have found it 
difficult to obtain other assistance or reimbursement for 
expenditures related to September 11, 2001 or subsequent 
domestic terrorism. 
Finally, a critical bias was the inclusion of the 
researcher's spouse as a participant. My spouse is an 
African American female, one of a handful of female chiefs 
of police in the U.S. (Horne, 1999). Another study shows 
that women comprise a small percentage, "less than 11.2% of 
all sworn law enforcement personnel in the U.S." 
(Harrington, 2001, ¶ 3). Women comprise an even smaller 
percentage (7.3%) in the top command positions within large 
police agencies (Women fight, 2002). 
Harrington found that African American women account for 
less than one percent (0.3%) of law enforcement personnel 
in the top command. 
This researcher's spouse was the only female police 
chief in the population selected for the survey, and 
subsequently was the only one to respond. She was selected 
for the personal interview to give a female's perspective 
at the top executive level in a law enforcement agency. 
Importance of Study 
This research is important for four primary reasons. 
First, it is important for the researcher and law 
enforcement administrators to develop knowledge in post- 
disaster management and to review the preparations for 
domestic terrorism by law enforcement agencies. The latter 
became quite clear as law enforcement agencies and 
government bodies struggled to come to grips with terrorism 
(Assessing Florida's, 2001; Beary, 2002; Mckinney, 2002). 
Secondly, it demonstrates why law enforcement agencies must 
have the capability to handle catastrophic events by 
developing programs, strategies and obtaining the necessary 
resources to meet a new demand, while not diminishing the 
primary law enforcement function (Delattre, 2002). Third, 
in light of racial profiling isSues, it provides guidelines 
for law enforcement executives to keep them out of the trap 
of stereotyping individuals based on their beliefs, 
practices or ethnicity (Delattre, 2002; Mckinney, 2002; 
Moore, 2002; New Profilees, 2002). Lastly, it is important 
to academia because there is a paucity of academic research 
on local law enforcement and the ability to handle domestic 
or international terrorism in the U.S. 
The evidence suggests that law enforcement agencies 
substantially increased their vigilance, awareness and 
response to WMD calls, and suspicious persons/activity 
immediately following September 11, 2001 (Delattre, 2002; 
Moore, 2002). Domestic Terrorism/WMD training also 
drastically increased and federal and state mandates were 
imposed on police agencies with little or no new funding 
(Beary, 2002; Buisch, 2002; Boyter, 2003; Police Standards, 
2001; PATRIOT Act, 2001). Budget proposals by law 
enforcement agencies have expanded to meet the demand of 
mandated homeland security training, because the promised 
federal funding has not materialized (Modzelewski, 2003) . 
Many operational aspects and certain practices of local law 
enforcement may never return to pre-September 11, 2001 
because of the changing face of current events, e.g., 
guerilla war in Iraq, its rising unrest and piecemeal 
rebuilding, and further terrorist activities. 
Prior to September 11, 2001, model policies were 
developed by major police organizations, i.e., the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), to 
ensure that law enforcement in the U.S. follows a code of 
ethics (see Appendix C). The overwhelming abundance of 
police agencies follow and comply with these canons of 
ethics, which recently incorporated anti-bias based 
policing policies (Delattre, 2002). Delattre finds that no 
ethical exceptions should be made, and as such, law 
enforcement agencies should comply with these principles, 
even when it may seem inconvenient. 
Adding strength to this compliance issue was the 
earlier establishment of law enforcement accreditation in 
the late 1970s. Accreditation programs were consistent 
with the change in the philosophical model of policing from 
traditional policing to community-based policing 
(Goldstein, 1979). The Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) maintains American law 
enforcement accreditation and the following provides a 
brief overview of its development and function: 
In 1979, the Commission was created through the 
combined efforts of four major law enforcement 
organizations: the International Association of Chiefs 
of Police, National Organization of Black Law 
Enforcement Executives, National Sheriffs' 
Association, and the Police Executive Research Forum. 
These organizations continue to serve in an advisory 
capacity to the Commission and are responsible for 
appointing members to the Commission. 
The Commission was formed for two reasons: to 
develop a set of law enforcement standards; and to 
establish and administer an accreditation process 
through which law enforcement agencies could 
demonstrate voluntarily that they meet professionally- 
recognized criteria for excellence in management and 
service delivery. (CALEA Online, 2003, Accreditation 
program, ¶ 1) 
CALEA is a voluntary program, but it provides standards 
developed by law enforcement practitioners, covering a wide 
range of topics, including police ethics. Accreditation 
has international recognition and primary benefits which 
include controlled liability insurance costs, 
administrative improvements, greater accountability from 
supervisors and increased governmental and community 
support (CALEA Online, 2003) . 
The importance of accreditation is implied by the 
rapid growth of smaller accreditation authorities (Sharp, 
2000). Sharp found that a dozen states have their own 
accreditation agencies because local law enforcement must 
reflect local conditions, priorities and needs. The latter 
is indicative of state accreditation agencies, such as the 
Commission for Florida Law Enforcement Accreditation (CFA), 
which was established by Florida law, § 943.125 in 1993 
(Sharp; CFA, 2003). CFA is similar in scope and function 
to CALEA, but the 250 professional standards are designed 
specifically for Florida law enforcement agencies, to 
ensure the public that quality services are being delivered 
in accordance with recognized accepted standards (Sharp; 
CFA) . 
Another fledgling accrediting organization is the 
National Law Enforcement Credentialing Board (NLECB), which 
establishes professional standards of excellence for law 
enforcement officers who have demonstrated a commitment to 
higher education and public service (Hill, 2000). The 
difference between how CALEA evaluates law enforcement 
agencies and how NLECB evaluates is that the subjects of 
these evaluations in NLECB are individual law enforcement 
officers (Hill, 1999). However, only law enforcement 
agencies that are accredited through CALEA or CFA are the 
subjects of this research. 
It is equally important to examine and consider a 
fundamental ethical issue, here described by Peter Singer 
from a global perspective (2002): 
To what extent should political leaders see their role 
narrowly, in terms of promoting the interests of their 
citizens, and to what extent should they be concerned 
with the welfare of people everywhere? There is a 
strong ethical case for saying that it is wrong for 
leaders to give absolute priority to the interests of 
their own citizens. (p. B8) 
Singer believes that, as a nation, the U.S. must extend the 
reach of our criminal law to "the most remote mountain 
valleys of the farthest-flung countries" (p. B8) to have 
the means to bring terrorists to justice. Although Singer 
looked at the ethical issue from a global viewpoint and 
cites the need for a sound global system of criminal 
justice, the writer will look at the effects of post-9/11 
practices on ethical policies from a national standpoint. 
Limitations, assumptions, and design controls 
It became apparent that a major limitation of this 
research was the sensitivity of its topic. This 
sensitivity blossomed early when one previous study had 
been censored and was not available for review, although it 
was listed in the dissertation abstracts as being available 
via UMI Dissertation Services and Digital 
Dissertations/Dissertation Express. That sensitivity was 
again suspect in the failure of many law enforcement 
agencies to respond to the initial survey and the 
reluctance to discuss the issue, even to a fellow 
colleague. My initial assumption was that peers would have 
little reluctance to discuss the issue, after all, "I was 
one of them." However, it was difficult to get willing 
participants from those who responded to the survey. 
Another limitation was this type of research with a 
relatively small sample would be difficult to generalize to 
a larger population (Patton, 1990). Therefore, I sought to 
extrapolate the data and complete a cross-case analysis of 
the participants to determine if there was congruity among 
participants. Design control was in the form of purposeful 
sampling by selecting 'information-rich cases for in-depth 
study" (Patton, 1990, p. 182). 
Definitions of Terms 
The following terms are repeatedly used throughout 
this research and to clarify their meaning and application 
in this text, their definitions are provided. 
Bias-based policing/racial profiling - The sole 
consideration by a law enforcement officer in any 
fashion and to any degree of the race, national, or 
ethnic origin of a person in deciding upon the scope 
or substance of any investigation, enforcement action 
or motor vehicle stop. 
Calls for service - Incidents (i.e, reports of 
burglaries, disturbances, thefts, robberies, etc.) 
that law enforcement officers respond to either 
through self-initiated activity or citizen requests 
for police service. 
Command staff - The executive head of a law 
enforcement organization and his/her leading 
administrators. The executive head carries the title 
of sheriff, chief or director, depending on the type 
of agency. Other command staff members may have a 
variety of titles, i.e., assistant chief, major, 
captain, commanders, etc. 
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement 
Agencies (CALEA) - A national law enforcement 
accreditation body that derives its authority from 
four major law enforcement membership associations, 
comprising 80% of all of the law enforcement 
profession in the U.S. Its purpose is to improve 
delivery of law enforcement service by offering a body 
of standards, developed by law enforcement 
practitioners (CALEA Online, 2003). 
Commission for Florida Law Enforcement Accreditation 
(CFA) - A commission created by Florida Statute 
943.125 to develop a voluntary law enforcement 
accreditation program, comprised of more than 250 
professional standards designed specifically for 
Florida law enforcement agencies. 
General purpose police departments - A municipal level 
governmental department tasked with maintaining order, 
enforcing the law, and preventing and detecting crime. 
In a larger metropolitan area, the department may have 
a countywide responsibility. 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) - 
The IACP is the world's largest and oldest nonprofit 
membership organization of police executives comprised 
of over 19,000 members in over 92 countries. Among 
the goals of the IACP, two that are important to this 
study are; 1) to bring about recruitment and training 
in the police profession of qualified persons; and 2) 
to encourage adherence of all police officers to high 
professional standards of performance and conduct. 
Law enforcement accreditation - Status bestowed or 
credited to a law enforcement agency when it has met 
compliance with applicable standards established by a 
state or national law enforcement commission. 
Law Enforcement Trust Fund (LETF) - A fund that is 
established by federal and state statutes, wherein 
proceeds seized from criminals (by law enforcement 
agencies) that were used in the commission of a crime 
are deposited. Such proceeds may be used to purchase 
items for law enforcement use, youth or community 
sponsored programs or other purposes. 
National Organization of Black Law Enforcement 
Executives (NOBLE) - NOBLE is a multi-purpose 
nonprofit organization of primarily Black police 
executives established in 1976. The objectives of 
NOBLE that relate closely to this study are 
recommending and executing policies, processes and 
procedures that recognize and pursue goals common to 
all segments of the community and law enforcement, 
with a focus on ensuring strict accountability and 
uncompromising integrity. 
Nonsworn - Civilian personnel working at a law 
enforcement agency in a support capacity who are not 
certified, or commissioned by a governing body to 
carry out law enforcement functions and have no arrest 
powers. 
Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) - PERF is a 
national membership organization of progressive police 
executives from the largest city, county and state law 
enforcement agencies, dedicated to improving policing 
and advancing professionalism through research and 
involvement in public policy debate. 
Public safety department - A law enforcement 
department tasked with maintaining order, enforcing 
the law, and preventing and detecting crime, whose 
members are additionally cross-trained in fire 
fighting . 
Service delivery - The method or means in which calls 
for service are handled. There are numerous 
circumstances that impact how calls for service are 
delivered, e.g., type of call and availability of 
police units. 
Sheriff's Office - A county law enforcement 
organization tasked with maintaining order, enforcing 
the law, and preventing and detecting crime, normally 
headed by an elected official (in the state of Florida 
the sheriff is a constitutional officer). The 
sheriff's office must also house prisoners, handle 
civil duties, e. g., warrants, subpoena and civil 
papers, and provide security for the county court 
system. 
Soft target - Any infrastructure or facility that has 
a vulnerability to terrorism due to its accessibility. 
Sworn - Personnel that are certified or commissioned 
by a governing body to carry out law enforcement 
functions and having arrest powers. 
Terrorism - The unlawful use of force or violence 
against persons or property to coerce or intimidate a 
government or society, to further religious, political 
or military ideologies. Terrorism can be domestic or 
international. 'Domestic terrorism involves groups or 
individuals who are based and operate entirely within 
the United States and Puerto Rico without foreign 
direction and whose acts are directed at elements of 
the U.S. Government or populationN (Managing Weapon, 
2003, p. 1-14). "International terrorism is foreign 
based and/or directed by countries or groups outside 
the U.S." (Ibid, p. 1-18). However, for the purposes 
of this study, the terms will be interchangeable. 
Weapon of mass destruction (WMD) - Any explosive, 
incendiary, poison gas, bomb, military ordnance, or 
weapons containing or designed to release disease 
organisms, chemical or explosives. An example would 
be anthrax, which was sent via the mail to expose 
individuals to its effect. 
9/11 - The colloquial designation for September 11, 
2001. 
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This chapter gave a brief chronology of the historical 
antecedents of law enforcement leading up to September 11, 
2001. That trend went from a professional model of 
policing in the 1950s to community policing in the 1980s 
and 1990s and then focused on crime control through 
computer statistics, with an emphasis on police 
accountability. It also pointed out why and how the role 
of the police has drastically changed from the latter to 
roles in domestic security and terrorism response, 
following the terrorist event and how federal organizations 
responded. 
The intent of the study and the main research 
questions are presented. The importance of the U.S. 
Constitution as a foundation for the research was reviewed 
and Amendments IV, V and VI are shown to be the study's 
conceptual underpinning. Legislative initiatives such as 
the PATRIOT Act, Homeland Security and Florida legislations 
were discussed and opinions about their need and legality 
given. 
I also revealed significant personal biases, one of 
which disclosed a professional involvement with 9/11 in the 
field of law enforcement. The purpose of providing an 
accurate descriptive account of law enforcement's response 
was explained. Three important areas for this research 
were determined to be: (a) developing knowledge in post- 
disaster management; (b) determining resource and program 
development; and (c) diminishing bias-based policing 
practices. The development, impact and importance of 
accreditation to law enforcement were also reviewed. 
Finally, I disclosed some limitations regarding the 
sensitivity of the issue of terrorism and law enforcement's 
response, assumptions made based on my professional status, 
and reviewed frequently used terms that are germane to this 
study, but may be unfamiliar to academic readers. 
The remainder of this study will follow a standard 
dissertation format. Chapter 2 will provide a review of 
the literature through academic research and other studies 
or viewpoints, presenting their findings, approaches and 
revealing any gaps. Chapter 3 will describe the 
methodologies used and how the participants were selected 
for personal interviews. Chapter 4 will provide a 
descriptive assessment of the results in the words of the 
participants, and an analysis and interpretation of the 
findings by the researcher. A discussion and explanation 
of the results will be given. Chapter 5 will summarize, 
evaluate and interpret the results, as they relate to the 
original research questions. The predominant findings will 
be listed and any limitations experienced, and direction 
for future research will also be discussed. 
CHAPTER I1 
Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
"To the fanatic, everything is black or white, curse or 
blessing, friend or foe-and nothing in between. He is 
immune to doubt and hesitation. He perceives tolerance 
as weakness" (Wiesel, 2002, p. 5 ) .  Elie Wiesel, Nobel 
laureate and World War I1 Auschwitz and Buchenwald 
concentration camp survivor commenting on the 
individuals who flew planes into buildings on September 
11, 2001. 
This chapter reviews academic dissertations and other 
studies/viewpoints relevant to this research. It also 
ventures outside the academic setting to examine acceptable 
and credible studies, views and thoughts of others 
regarding police practices and related issues (e.g., 
ethics, racial profiling, training and funding), pre/post- 
September 11, 2001. Many of the latter studies are derived 
from private independent think tanks that are underwritten 
by the federal government, universities and law enforcement 
agencies and foundations. The review focuses on the 
direction and scope of this research and its significance. 
The chapter describes what others have to say about 
the application of the U.S. Constitution to police 
operations from several viewpoints. The importance and 
impact of accreditation to law enforcement is examined. 
Methodologies and findings of some Academic studies are 
reviewed and briefly explained. I highlight any gaps found 
in the reviewed studies that might be applicable to this 
research. 
Previous Academic Research 
A computer search was made via OCLC Firstsearch to 
check prior dissertations similar to the writer's research 
proposal from the 1980s to date. There were fewer than a 
dozen dissertation abstracts on the subject of law 
enforcement and terrorism, but only four bore similarities 
to the writer's proposal. Interestingly, all of the 
studies were prior to September 11, 2001, but focused on 
the preparedness of government and law enforcement to deal 
with terrorism. However, I discovered a similar study in- 
progress serendipitously after receiving a survey in the 
mail from Florida International University. 
The earliest research was by Thomas H. Mitchell, 
Carleton University, Canada (1986) and it 'examined the 
incidences of politically-motivated insurgent terrorism in 
North America from 1968 to 1983 and the resultant policy 
and organizational response of the US and Canadian 
governments" ( ¶  1). Mitchell reviewed "publicly-available" 
data collections on the subject of politically motivated 
terrorism and obtained quantitative data that proved there 
had been, at that time, a moderate incidence of domestic 
and transnational terrorism in the U.S. and Canada. 
Mitchell found a number of significant problems and 
deficiencies with both governmentsf response, among them as 
it relates to local law enforcement, were a lack of 
coordination of government and law enforcement resources, 
crisis management planning and police-media relations. The 
latter (dependent variables) was inhibited by several 
independent variables (factors), "including the clandestine 
nature of terrorist activity, the international linkages of 
some terrorist groups, and the necessity of the 
coordination of a vast array of governmental and law 
enforcement resources" ( ¶  4). 
Another early study from City University of New York 
(Barnathan, 1987) sought to determine the interrelationship 
between law enforcement and the media in handling terrorist 
events. Barnathan used a content analysis of the terrorist 
reporting of a major television network news program and 
then contrasted with the information disseminated by the 
Public Information Division of the New York City Police 
Department. Key personnel in both agencies were 
interviewed extensively about their methods of gathering, 
assembling for distribution and evaluating news and crime 
data relating to terrorism. 
The findings in Barnathanrs study suggested that law 
enforcement and media do not accurately transmit 
information about terrorist events and they shape and 
manage information in a number of ways characteristic of 
their respective institutions. Although the setting in 
this study was New York City, it was several years ahead of 
the first World Trade Center terrorism event in 1991. 
John B. Furay, University of La Verne, California 
(1999) conducted a study analyzing "task forcing" used by 
federal, state and local law enforcement agencies as they 
cooperate and interact with each other in response to 
domestic terrorism. Furay, using quantitative and 
qualitative data collection and assessment, found that it 
was better for all three levels of law enforcement to 
centralize their efforts to effectively address domestic 
terrorism. 
I attempted to obtain a copy of the research via the 
Lynn University library system and also from the Wilson 
Library at the University of La Verne, La Verne, 
California. Unfortunately, I was unsuccessful and received 
a notice from the University of La Verne which said: 
Due to apparent sensitive national security issues 
discussed within the dissertation, we were not allowed 
to have a copy nor is UMI able to sell copies of that 
dissertation-your only chance would be to try to 
contact the author of the dissertation to get a copy, 
and we are unaware of how to contact him. Sorry! 
(Wilson Library Reference Desk, personal 
communication, July 24, 2003) 
The communication served as a poignant reminder of how 
things have changed since September 11, 2001. 
Lastly and very closely related to the writer's 
proposal, Jason A. Cote' (2000), of Central Missouri State 
University, completed a quantitative study assessing the 
level of terrorism preparedness of local police and 
sheriff's departments in the state of Missouri and 
determined those department's attitudes about terrorism. 
Cotef sent surveys to every police department in Missouri 
with a population of 30,000 people or more and every 
sheriff's department with a population of 50,000 people or 
more, resulting in 18 city agencies and 16 county agencies 
being surveyed (N = 34). Cote' had a 56% response rate, 
receiving surveys from 10 city agencies and 9 county 
agencies (n = 19). 
Two of the conclusions were that there were (a) no 
general consensus on what type of training was most 
important in combating terrorism, and (b) no agreement on 
where to obtain funding for development of counter 
terrorism training and procedures. 
I was able to obtain a copy of Cote's study through 
UMI Dissertation Services. Cote' (2000) noted that there 
was no set procedure as to who is directly responsible for 
handling the problem of WMD and he found an earlier study 
by Jonathan White (1991) that spoke of the dispute between 
civilian police and the military as to who was responsible 
for WMD. Civilian law enforcement felt it was a military 
problem, wherein the military felt just the opposite. 
Interestingly, Cote' (2000) talked about congressional 
bills that were being considered at that time to expand 
wiretap authority and security at airports. The latter 
have all passed. Cote also discussed the opposition to 
counter terrorism legislation: 
Some groups, however, claim that Congress is rushing 
into things in the heat of the moment, so it will not 
appear soft on terrorism. ... the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) ... claims that Congress is 
attempting to federalize too many crimes, and that it 
is additionally expanding the already far reaching 
federal powers. The ACLU claims that in an attempt to 
combat international terrorism, Congress developed an 
extremely broad definition which overly targeted 
domestic terrorism. It created the danger that 
certain individuals will be selectively prosecuted as 
domestic terrorists based on their political views 
(Strossen, 1997). (pp. 34-35) 
The undermining of civil liberties was a recurrent theme in 
Cote's work and he referenced the ACLU frequently, "The 
ACLU points out the abuses of federal law enforcement 
powers during the sieges in 1992 at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and 
in 1993 near Waco, Texas. ... and the future potential 
abuses of law enforcement power under new counter terrorism 
legislation" (p. 35) . 
Cotef asked a series of 27 questions to respondents 
that were subdivided into three sections. Section 1 
discussed past, present and future terrorism preparation, 
the latter being similar to questions in this PI'S 
research. Section 2 asked for opinions about the present 
and future state of terrorism in the U.S., and the 
obstacles impeding better terrorism preparation. Section 3 
required respondents to rank several areas pertinent to 
counter terrorism, including sources of additional funding. 
Cote' (2000) in his conclusion found what was still 
true at the dawn of September 11, 2001: 
... most agencies surveyed either thought terrorism was 
a problem in the United States now or would be in the 
near future but they did not seem to think that 
terrorism was or would be a problem in their specific 
area. Even though most of the agencies did think 
terrorism was a problem in the United States [sic] 
most were reluctant to implement department wide 
training for anything other than the traditional 
terrorist threat or did not implement training at all. 
(P. 6 7 )  
However, the latter part of Cote's findings regarding 
training has been changed drastically by the events of 
9/11. 
An important finding of Cote's study and significant 
for this study is that less than half of the respondents 
reported receiving additional funding, with the federal 
government being the least contributor. Twelve law 
enforcement agencies identified a lack of available funding 
as the biggest obstacle to their agency developing more 
thorough counter terrorist training procedures and 
policies. Cote' recommended that his study should be 
duplicated in other states to assess various state's levels 
of terrorism preparation. 
There is a current study in progress by Michael W. 
Collier, Ph.D. and Matthew Rollie, MPH of Florida 
International University (2003) to understand the 
preparedness of Florida's public safety agencies regarding 
counter-terrorism efforts. The research is designed to 
identify general trends in Florida terrorism preparedness. 
Although it appears to be a quantitative study, the survey 
instrument asked 27 specific questions that are similar to 
Cote's research and my research, regarding training, call 
preparedness and funding. Some of the similar questions 
asked by Collier and Rollie are the following: 
1. How well prepared is your agency in the area of 
terrorism response training? (p. 2) 
2.Are there any other resources or assistance your 
agency needs in order to improve its training 
level? (p. 2) 
3. How is your agency funded? (p. 5) 
The U.S. Constitution and c i v i l  r i gh t s  
As pointed out in chapter 1, the U.S. Constitution is 
the principle document from which all civil rights are 
bestowed upon American society. Numerous studies point out 
the freedom and liberties that Americans enjoy are far 
above those in many modern-day societies (Lewis, 1991; 
Bandow, 1995; ACLU, 2003). There are those who feel that 
these civil liberties should be protected regardless of the 
consequences of terrorism (Bandow, 1995; Shank, 2001; 
, Raterman, 2002; ACLU, 2003). Nevertheless, there are those 
who would argue that the very nature of the United States, 
e.g., a geographically large democracy with open borders, 
the difficulty in monitoring illegal immigrants, coupled 
with the rights and necessity of individual access to 
government facilities, etc., makes it woefully susceptible 
to terrorism. Prior to September 11, Wright, Ostrow and 
Cimons (1995) published a viewpoint of America's 
vulnerability to terrorism and quoted a former FBI agent's 
caution on giving the police broad discretionary powers, 
"Democracies are by far the most vulnerable to terrorism, 
because freedoms are used by terrorists to victimize us. 
Police don't have the right and shouldn't have for sweeps 
and searches" (p. Al) . 
Subsequently, Wrightf s (et al. ) viewpoint of 
vulnerability in 1995, following the Oklahoma City bombing, 
was consistent with the viewpoint of politicians of both 
major parties who began posturing for new counter-terrorism 
legislation. Such sweeping proposals threaten civil 
liberties according to Doug Bandow (1995): 
These bills would vest the federal government with 
vast new powers to wiretap, investigate, deport, use 
the military, and rely on secret evidence. If people 
don't already have reason to fear government, they 
certainly will if these measures become law. 
( ¶  3 )  
Bandow (1995) believes that Congress should answer four 
questions before acting precipitously: 
Is terrorism so serious a threat that it requires an 
immediate, draconian response? Has government policy 
contributed to violence, like the bombing of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City? 
Do federal agencies require more power to combat 
terrorism? Does the law enforcement interest outweigh 
the rights and liberties of citizens that would be 
sacrificed? ( ¶  5 - 13) 
Categorically, in 1995 according to Bandow, the answers are 
that: (a) Terrorism is not serious enough to cause Congress 
to act without due deliberation; (b) government has already 
abused its power and thus contributed to the level of 
violence; (c) the government has enough authority; and (d) 
law enforcement interests must not outweigh citizens' 
rights, because this circumvents our system of government. 
Amazingly, the answers in 1995 are still applicable today, 
but the federal government made vast changes in federal law 
with the passing of the PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
Representative Cynthia McKinney, representing 
Georgia's Fourth Congressional District, offers her own 
assessment of the danger of allowing government and law 
enforcement to go too far. Appearing before ~ongress, July 
25, 2002, she recalled the civil rights events of 1967 and 
a memo from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to 22 field 
offices to conduct illegal surveillance on Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr.: "The purpose of this new 
counterintelligence endeavor is to expose, disrupt, 
misdirect, or otherwise neutralize black activist leaders 
and organizations" (p. 3). McKinney further warned, 
"Congress and the Administration must be increasingly 
vigilant towards the protection of and adherence to our 
constitutional rights and privileges. For, if we win the 
war on terrorism, but create a police state in the process, 
what have we won" (p. 4) ? 
However, as the evidence suggests, local law 
enforcement will be increasingly called upon to engage in 
overt and covert activity against suspected terrorists and 
it might place the locals at odds with the U.S. 
Constitution, their own code of ethics and other policies 
against bias-based policing. At a recent confidential 
meeting of law enforcement officials (federal, state and 
local levels), the sentiment expressed was to "take them 
out and worry about" consequences later (Anonymous, 
personal communication, February 13, 2003) . 
Despite such sentiments, the review underscores the 
need for law enforcement to adhere to the principles and 
guidelines established and protected by the U.S. 
Constitution. 
Accreditation 
I reviewed several studies on law enforcement 
accreditation and these authors agreed that accreditation 
was the results of combined efforts of several police 
organizations to establish law enforcement as a profession 
(Falzarano, 1999; Sharp, 2000; Bittick, 2003). Falzarano 
examined one police department's experience with national 
accreditation and the findings were that the department was 
able to develop policies and procedures to implement 
operation standards. Accreditation for this department 
resulted in a significant reduction in their insurance 
premiums and improvement in operations, investigations and 
service to the community. 
Falzarano notes that accreditation represented the 
first step in establishing policing as a profession. 
Policing is increasingly complex, as officers routinely 
deal with life and death situations and activities 
impacting the health, safety and welfare of citizens. Yet 
the public has difficulty recognizing law enforcement as a 
profession, according to Falzarano. However, the very 
nature of policing requires "specialized knowledge and 
often long and intense academic preparation" (Falzarano, ¶ 
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Studies on law enforcement accreditation note that 
there are numerous benefits. Falzarano (1999), Hill 
(1999), Sharp (2000) and Bittick (2003) cite the following 
benefits of accreditation: 
1. Controlled liability insurance costs 
2. Fewer lawsuits and citizen complaints 
3. Stricter accountability within the agency 
4. Support from government officials 
5. Increased community advocacy 
6. Recognition for a department's ability to meet 
established standards 
Hill describes the benefit of national accreditation as a 
device for measuring professionalism, which most 
progressive law enforcement executives consider as one of 
the single most important developments in the history of 
policing. Sharp's study found that the strongest virtues 
of accreditation are found in how it establishes 
accountability and how it impacts an agency's overall 
performance. Bittick touts accreditation as a major 
accountability factor because it provides an already 
skeptical public with confidence that the agency is in 
compliance with legislation and court mandates. 
However, despite all the hype about accreditation, 
others regard it as more of a public relations strategy as 
revealed in the following comments: 
Police agency accreditation endures because it 
provides a veneer of professional assurance while 
accepting a wide range in the substance of formal 
policies, most of which have little consequences for 
the day-to-day practices of police. ... Its greatest 
significance is in the symbolic realm, not the 
everyday experience (Mastrofski, 1998, p. 205). 
Cordner and Williams (1998) said that accreditation has an 
emphasis on changes in the process rather than changes in 
the outcome. 
One of the authors who tout the benefits of 
accreditation also admits its weaknesses, or why it is not 
wholeheartedly accepted. Sharp (2000) found that some 
agencies that have tried accreditation discovered that its 
benefits were not worth the effort or the cost. He notes 
that other agency heads believe that accreditation has 
nothing to offer and is expensive, time consuming and 
require additional personnel that could be used for other 
purposes. According to Sharp, the director of CALEA 
admitted that approximately 10% of accredited agencies do 
not seek reaccreditation. 
Sharp (2000) conducted a poll of randomly selected law 
enforcement agencies and found the following five major 
arguments against accreditation: 
1. Too expensive 
2. Too time consuming 
3. Dubious benefits 
4. Hard to justify to community government 
5. Department administration does not believe in 
accreditation 
Geoffrey P. Alpert and John M. MacDonald (2001), in 
another study, conducted an analysis of the organizational 
characteristics of police agencies and used law enforcement 
accreditation as one of five independent variables. The 
dependent variable in their study was the rate of force 
reported by law enforcement agencies. Their national study 
looked at agency characteristics and their relationship to 
police use of force. Alpert and MacDonald believe that law 
enforcement accreditation was an important variable because 
accreditation is premised on the notion that department- 
level policies and procedures can affect police behavior. 
Forty-seven percent (n = 270) of the 571 agencies 
responding divulged their data on force and the surprising 
results found that CALEA or state accredited agencies were 
not associated significantly with the variation in use of 
force. 
However, all of the writers previously mentioned are 
in agreement that accreditation does provide significant 
civil liability reductions and cost-savings in insurance. 
When civil and criminal liability incidents arise, 
accredited agencies are afforded with a more defensible 
legal position if litigation should occur (Hill, 1999). 
The Intergovernmental Risk Management Agency (IRMA) proved 
this point after conducting a study of liability litigation 
and the resulting savings. IRMA found that the number of 
claims per 100 officers is reduced by 17% for CALEA- 
accredited agencies, when doing a comparison of CALEA vs. 
non-CALEA-accredited agencies (Sharp, 2000). 
Racial profiling 
Coming on the heels of serious racial profiling issues 
that modified and established guidelines when police 
officers conduct traffic stops of African Americans, 
American police now face similar issues with individuals of 
Arabic descent or with Islamic beliefs. 
Max T. Raterman (2002) made the following comments 
about racial profiling and post 9/11 America: 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have 
given the national debate on profiling new life while 
at the same time recasting the debate in a new light. 
American law enforcement has had to react to the very 
real threat of terrorism on American soil as well, 
prompting great and meaningful debates over whether or 
not profiling is a useful and necessary technique. Is 
it somehow now a good idea to profile? In a practical 
sense, is profiling a useful concept? Other law 
enforcement subjects such as counter-terrorism 
training, search and seizure, immigration enforcement, 
and monitoring of the Internet are controversial, but 
the issue of profiling is the proverbial "800-pound 
gorilla" in the room. Do we acknowledge him and deal 
with him, or work around him? Profiling remains a 
divisive and problematic issue for the law enforcement 
community, as well as for the public and elected 
officials. (p. 1) 
Raterman indicates that the first order of business for law 
enforcement is to develop coherent and effective approaches 
to objectionable profiling by law enforcement. 
However, there are specific laws in most states that 
prohibit racial profiling. Florida enacted legislation on 
June 19, 2001, which prohibited racial profiling and 
directed all "sheriffs and municipal law enforcement 
agencies to incorporate antiracial or other 
antidiscriminatory profiling policies into their policies 
and practices" (§ 943.1758, Sec. 1, Curriculum revision for 
diverse populations, 2001). The deadline for Florida law 
enforcement agencies to incorporate the policy was January 
1, 2002. 
The caveat for prompting such swift legislative action 
by many states is the federal government's resolve to 
impose the anti-profiling measure on states by their own 
Bill (H.R. 1907) which amended title 23, United States 
Code, "to require States to adopt and enforce standards 
that prohibit the use of racial profiling in the 
enforcement of State laws regulating the use of Federal-aid 
highways" (Racial Profiling Prohibition Act of 2001, ¶ 1). 
The caveat is the withholding of federal funding/aid to 
maintain current or build new federal highways for those 
states that failed to comply with the prohibition. 
Many police agencies have created measures against 
stopping citizens solely on the basis of race, either 
specifically as a policy against racial profiling, bias- 
based policing or referenced in their code of ethics 
(Curriculum Revision for Diverse Population Act, 2001; 
Delattre, 2002; Racial Profiling Prohibition Act, 2001; 
Raterman, 2002). Some agencies have policies against 
racial profiling that were enacted after the events of 
9/11, but were not a result of the terrorists' acts. Most 
policies have been in the works as a result of racial 
profiling cases throughout the U.S. in the mid to late 
1990s (Delattre, 2002). As indicated earlier, many states 
have mandated the revision of policies to include anti-bias 
based policies. 
One of the most notorious cases of racial profiling 
involved the New Jersey State Police, with allegations 
stemming from a shooting incident following a traffic stop 
of minority males (New Jersey v. Hogan & Kenna, 1998) . In 
the spring of 1998, two New Jersey State troopers stopped a 
van on the New Jersey Turnpike, largely because the four 
passengers were African American and non-white males. When 
the vehicle accidentally rolled back, troopers opened fire, 
wounding three of the men. The resulting court case 
prompted policy revisions and data collection by state 
troopers when making traffic stops ("Media Awareness," 
2002). A New Jersey State traffic stop study, released in 
March 2002 and "which concluded that black drivers were 
more likely to speed than whites, created a debate about 
the merits of collecting traffic data" (p. 6). 
Dr. Larry T. Hoover (2002) of the Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF) cites the ethical issue of racial 
profiling as an obstacle to state and local terrorism 
intelligence effectiveness. Dr. Hoover says: 
Many states have enacted anti-profiling legislation, 
prohibiting the use of race, ethnicity, or national 
origin as a criteria for focused police attention, 
even as little attention as a traffic stop. Given the 
clear and present threats of the events of September 
llth, the trend has clearly been to downplay the 
profiling issue in its current intelligence gathering 
effort. A substantial majority of Americans support 
the effort, and recognize it would be absurd to ignore 
national origin in the current terrorism control 
effort. However, when such focused attention is 
engaged in by local law enforcement agencies that must 
also provide a range of services to members of the 
Muslim community, it acquires a different character. 
(P .  8 )  
Dr. Hoover says that police agencies cannot afford to act 
differently toward Muslims or they will take the 'hit" (p. 
8 )  in relations with Muslim communities. 
But a report prepared by Sikh Mediawatch (2002) said 
that many Muslims and other similar community members feel 
they have been targeted by law enforcement and are becoming 
the new "profilees" (p. 23). The impact is further 
described in the following comments from the report: 
The Sikh community in the United States, about 500,000 
strong, has been deeply shaken up by the events of 
9/11. Since the events of 9/11, Sikh Americans have 
scrambled to improve their relations with local and 
national law enforcement agencies. In part, this has 
simply been out of a need for protection: as has been 
widely reported, many Sikhs and Arabs/Muslims have 
been attacked and harassed by some bigoted Americans 
who associate all Middle Eastern-looking minority 
groups with terrorism. But the engagement with law 
enforcement authorities also centers around a very 
pressing issue, that of racial profiling. (p. 24) 
Other areas, such as hate crimes against Sikhs, did 
experience a drop after September 11, but this may be due 
in part to Sikhs being extremely careful not to expose 
themselves to potential attacks. However, the report ("New 
Profilees," 2002), notes that despite the declining 
violence, racial profiling by police has increased: 
In the period immediately following the attacks, many 
Sikhs (as well as Arabs and Muslims) found themselves 
scrutinized by police officers even while engaging in 
normal activities-shopping, eating in restaurants, 
traveling, etc. Some have even been detained or 
arrested for reasons that seem to be manufactured. 
And, a trend that is actually increasing rather than 
declining is harassment at airport security. (p. 24) 
Yet the early days following September 11, 2001 saw 
repeated action by federal authorities to go against law 
enforcement anti-racial profiling policies. The 
Immigration and Naturalization Services immediately passed 
an order increasing the time an immigrant could be held 
without being charged, and the White House supported this 
further by asking Congress for authority to indefinitely 
detain foreign nationals identified by the attorney general 
as terrorist threats. Congress scaled the proposal back to 
seven days, with the enactment of the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, HR 2975, Sec. 
203 (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001. 
Terrorism 
The reasons behind terrorism are varied and as diverse 
as the type of people who commit terrorist acts (World 
Conflict, 2002). Religious and/or political views may 
motivate terrorism or military beliefs, but too often the 
targets are unarmed and/or unsuspecting civilians (Ibid). 
Suicide bombers are not new to the terrorism venue and in 
recent history were used in Lebanon and Israel. 
The term international terrorism was coined almost 4 
decades ago, as leftist guerilla movements clashed with 
rightist regimes in Latin America, and then it spread 
around the world-most notably to the Middle East (Wright, 
Ostrow and Cimons, 1995). However, according to Philip C 
Wilcox, Jr., State Department coordinator for 
counterterrorism, even before September 11, 2001, 
"Terrorists have expanded their global reach and today all 
continents are vulnerable" (Wright et al. p. 4). Yet Wright 
et al. noted that after the Oklahoma City bombing of a 
federal building, terrorism specialists in this country 
argued that the Oklahoma City bombing is unlikely to be a 
catalyst for sweeping change. 
However, immediately after September 11, 2001, federal 
antiterrorism legislation was quick to pass and on October 
26, 2001, President Bush signed into law the USA PATRIOT 
Act. The PATRIOT Act gives federal law enforcement a wide 
range of tools against terrorism covering electronic 
surveillance (Sec. 101), search warrants (Sec. 108), 
detention (Sec. 203) and property confiscation (Sec. 304, 
401, 402, 403 & 404). The Act extends to associates and 
family members of suspected terrorists (Sec. 217 & 306). 
The Act also allows for increasing cooperation and 
information sharing by federal authorities with local law 
enforcement agencies (Sec. 204) . 
Gregory Shank (2001) describes the reaction of many 
police departments to requests made from federal 
authorities: 
Attorney General John Ashcroft ordered interviews of 
some 5,000 Middle Eastern men between the ages of 18 
and 33 who entered the U.S. on nonimmigration visas 
since January 1, 2000. Interestingly, police 
departments in Oregon and California, fearful of 
harming their relationships with minority groups, 
refused to cooperate. (p. 7 )  
This research will inevitably determine if the same may 
hold true for police departments in South Florida. 
Although guidelines established by the Justice 
Department prohibit federal law enforcement officers from 
using race or ethnicity in routine traffic stops, they 
allow officers to consider these factors in preventing 
threats to national security ("Racial Profiling," 2003). 
The FBI tracks the activities of persons who are 
suspected of having connections with terrorism in the U.S. 
and this may be seen as unethical, especially when focused 
on a certain group, as reported by the New York Times. On 
October 6, 2002, reporters Philip Shenon and David Johnston 
pointed out the following skewed concentrated efforts of 
the FBI against Muslim men: 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is trying to make 
an open book of the lives of hundreds of mostly young, 
mostly Muslim men in the United States in the belief 
that A1 Qaeda-trained terrorists remain in this 
country, awaiting instructions to attack. Senior law 
enforcement officials say the surveillance campaign is 
being carried out by every major F.B.I. office in the 
country and involves 24-hour monitoring of the 
suspects' telephone calls, e-mail messages and 
Internet use, as well as scrutiny of their credit-card 
charges, their travel and their visits to neighborhood 
gathering places, including mosques. (p. 1) 
The trend above is indicative of the wide dragnet of the 
FBI, as it is using the law enforcement resources of 
colleges and universities to scrutinize Middle Eastern 
students. The following excerpt from an article in the 
Palm Beach Post highlights this trend: 
Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the FBI 
has strengthened or established working relationships 
with hundreds of campus police departments, in part to 
gain better access to insular communities of Middle 
Eastern students, government officials said. On at 
least a dozen campuses, the FBI has included 
collegiate police officers as members of local Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces, the regional entities that 
oversee counter-terrorism investigations nationwide. 
(Eggen, 2003, p. 18A) 
Florida has also developed its local joint terrorism 
task force and divided it into regional entities, but while 
broadening its scope to be more effective in fighting 
terrorism, it has been careful to develop protocols that 
will not infringe on the rights of citizens and non- 
citizens as well. In assessing Florida's Antiterrorism 
capabilities, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and 
the State Division of Emergency Management (2001) stress 
the need to, "Enhance retrieving, storing and sharing of 
vital intelligence and investigative information" (p. 5) 
with federal terrorism task forces. The plan calls for the 
creation of "Work-Study Group(s) to address new, modified 
or enhanced legislation/administrative rules to allow law 
enforcement to effectively investigate and negatively 
impact those committing terrorist acts" (p. 6 ) .  
As American society becomes more susceptible to 
domestic terrorism, legislation will continue to impact 
local law enforcement. Indicative of the trend is the 
newly created Department of Homeland Security, which was 
signed into law by President Bush on November 25, 2002, and 
is hailed as "the largest government reorganization in half 
a century" (Horne, 2003, p. 10). The department will 
coordinate counterterrorism and emergency programs with 
state and local governments and the private sector. 
Delattre (2002) puts the ethics dilemma in perspective 
in the following: 
Before 9/11, the very best police earned the 
public's trust by respecting the liberty and civil 
rights of the people they serve. Good police 
departments scrupulously trained their personnel in 
the conduct of legitimate and morally sound profiling. 
They taught explicitly what racial and ethnic 
profiling is and prohibited it. Terrorism must not be 
allowed to divert us from these criteria of excellence 
in policing. This is of particular moment now, 
because portions of the public that abhorred racial 
profiling before 9/11 now say they favor it as part of 
the terrorism prevention. 
... We need as a people to face hard questions: 
Which hazards of terrorism must we learn to live with? 
What civic responsibility do we have in the light of 
9/11? Since we cannot prevent the execution of every 
terrorist plot, but we are determined to go on with 
our lives, what form of vigilance most befit us? What 
are the realistic expectations and reasonable hopes 
with respect to terrorist attack? (p. 4) 
Terrorism Training and funding for Police 
Law enforcement agencies, in Florida, have been 
careful to address the 'heightened alert & increased 
vigilance" issues by developing new policies and protocols, 
while leaving their policies or ethical practices against 
racial profiling intact. Training of personnel in weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) is the major emphasis of 
Florida's terrorism response and that of the local law 
enforcement agencies (Lober, 2002; Moore, 2002; Police 
Standards & Training, 2001) . Edwin J. Delattre (2002) 
expressed the importance of training and the ethical 
integrity of the police after September 11, 2001: 
September 11 did not change human nature, any more 
than it changed the need for both virtue and 
accountability in policing and every other walk of 
life where the public trust is at stake. Furthermore, 
because all know-how can be used both ethically and 
unethically, the better the training police receive, 
the more extensively the public interest depends on 
their having good character and their being 
accountable within their departments. (p. 1) 
Training and ethical values are critical to officersf 
behavior in the field. Richard Lober (2002) suggests that 
police chiefs should: "Identify the department's current 
values within the ranks; put core values into daily 
operation; incorporate core values into all training; and 
select field training officers and supervisors carefully 
for strong values" (p. 8). 
The federal government has redirected its funding for 
state and local law enforcement to programs that are 
directly related to terrorism. Joey R. Weedon (2002) 
described the new focus: 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon have had a dramatic impact on federal 
priorities, redirecting them toward efforts to 
strengthen the government's ability to protect 
Americans against terrorism. To accomplish this, the 
Bush administration has proposed shifting federal 
dollars away from programs that are considered 
duplicative, unproven or ineffective concerning 
terrorism preparedness. In light of this, several of 
the nation's federal crime programs ... have become 
candidates for restructuring, consolidation or 
elimination. The law enforcement community needs to 
be proactive in protecting against terrorism and 
federal funding for these efforts must be proactive 
(to prevent future terrorist acts) and reactive (to 
help minimize the damage in the event of future 
terrorist acts). (p. 18) 
Other studies and works (Buisch, 2002; Delattre, 2002; 
Krull, 2002; Mundy, 2002) also point out the drastic shift 
of the country and the sense of urgency and hurry to change 
the federal regulations and mandates to protect the country 
against terrorism. The primary entities impacted are the 
many law enforcement agencies throughout the U.S. 
WMD are clearly a primary target of law enforcement 
agencies, emphasized by the immediate mandates imposed by 
training commissions and various other governmental 
oversight agencies charged with determining standards and 
training for Law Enforcement Agencies. In Florida, 
Governor Jeb Bush and the Director of the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) created Florida 
Regional Domestic Security Task Force Teams, which divided 
the State of Florida into six regions. Within 3 days after 
the September llth terrorist attacks, under the order of 
Governor Bush, the FDLE and the Department of Community 
Affairs' Division of Emergency Management, assembled over 
1000 professional subject matter experts from across the 
State of Florida for the purpose of assessing Florida's 
preparedness. In part, as a result, within 10 days, these 
experts (representing health, law enforcement, fire and 
emergency response, education, agriculture, transportation, 
environment, and businesses) produced 26 recommendations to 
improve Florida's ability to prepare, mitigate, respond, 
and recover in the event of an attack. Immediate training 
mandates (FDLE, 2001) have been imposed that provide that 
all law enforcement agencies must train their personnel in 
WMD to come into compliance within a 60-day time frame. 
Sheriff Kevin Beary describes how Law Enforcement Agencies 
in Central Florida have met the mandates: 
We met all regional goals by 11/15. There is the 
possibility that [omitted for security reasons] could 
be used as the SE Regional Training site for WMD. UWV 
will be asking for help in bringing anthrax testing 
out of the lab and into the field. (Personal 
communication, January 25, 2002) 
Beary is head of the terrorist regional task force in 
Central Florida, based in Orlando and comprised of several 
counties. 
Perhaps a most compelling example of the need for WMD 
training (other than the hijacked planes of September llth) 
was the anthrax mail incidents. Originally begun on 
October 12, 2001 at the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) 
Brentwood Mail Processing and Distribution Center (PDC) in 
Washington, D.C. on October 16, 2001, response activities 
involved local, state and federal authorities (Curtis, 
Stoddard, Kim and Devasundaram, 2002). The response 
demonstrated that police organizations were woefully 
unfamiliar with Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) spores, but 
training was immediately heightened in this WMD area. 
Eric Lichtblau, of The New York Times (2002), 
described the police response to the October 2001 anthrax 
terror as inefficient in this excerpt, "When an unknown 
killer began mailing anthrax to East Coast targets last 
October, the government's slow and disjointed response set 
off recriminations from the White House and finger-pointing 
among investigators" ( ¶  3). As a result of the Montgomery 
County sniper incidents and other sniper killings in the 
Washington, D.C. area, there is a new era of coordination 
and communication among law enforcement agencies. The 
latter can be attributed to major policy shifts and changes 
following September 11, 2001. 
Training is an expensive venture for law enforcement 
agencies, and in a time when budget cutbacks are felt all 
over, WMD and terrorism add another fiscal hurdle for local 
agencies. Although the federal government is making 
funding available, many law enforcement agencies have yet 
to receive federal funds for training. The latter has 
frustrated law enforcement heads, who are passing the cost 
on to their local governments during the budget preparation 
process: 
Sheriff Ken Mascara [St. Lucie County Sheriff's 
Office] on Thursday asked the county for $39.48 
million for the 2003-04 fiscal year, including an 
estimated 10% raise for his employees and money to 
cover the rising cost of homeland security. 
The budget is 8.5% higher than the spending plan the 
County Commission approved for 2002-03. 
More than 4% of the increase would pay for homeland 
security: 
...' This year, there continues to be mandated 
training that they [federal government] keep promising 
us they are going to reimburse, but we haven't seen a 
dime yet," Mascara said. (Modzelewski, 2003, p. C2) 
s-ry 
The literature review reveals that academic research 
on this subject matter is limited. Several similar studies 
have been undertaken prior to September 11, 2001 and the 
salient themes show that agencies faced a lack of 
coordination and planning between agencies, experienced 
inaccuracy in transmitted information about terrorist 
events, no consensus on training needs and no funding 
identified funding source. Other related secondary 
research and literary perspectives on the issues were 
reviewed and the majority found that training and procuring 
funding for training are of paramount importance to law 
enforcement agencies. 
Ethics, civil rights and police conduct in handling 
heightened domestic security are significant sources of 
discussion and consternation with pros and cons. One 
school of thought on ethics and civil rights issues is that 
law enforcement should not change practices that are 
constitutionally founded, for the sake of national 
security. Another school of thought suggests that national 
security must be maintained, even at the expense of a few 
civil rights. However, all sources agree that domestic 
terrorism in the U.S. is here indefinitely, but there is no 
agreement on how law enforcement should respond to it. 
CHAPTER I11 
Research Design and Methodology 
Introduction 
"1 just heard the building rock. It knocked me on the 
floor. It sounded like a big roar, then the building 
started swaying, that's what really scared me" (Crenson, 
2001, p. A3) .  Peter Dicerbo, Trade Center worker. 
This chapter will focus on the design of the study, 
participant selection and information collection. To recap 
the focus of this study, I revisit the problem under 
investigation, which is to determine the direction law 
enforcement agencies took, after the terrorist attacks of 
9/11. The terrorist disasters of September 11, 2001, which 
involved the World Trade Center in New York City and the 
Pentagon and an open field in Pennsylvania, were the 
catalyst for drastic change in the U.S. I pose the 
following questions, discussed in chapter 1, with regards 
to terrorism's impact on law enforcement in the U.S. 
1.What changes did the September 11, 2001 domestic 
terrorism events and WMD have on accredited and 
nonaccredited law enforcement agencies, directly 
following, 6 months later and currently in the areas 
of funding, vigilance, training, bias-based policing 
and call response? 
2. What was the distinction, if any, between the 
practices of accredited and nonaccredited law 
enforcement agencies post 9/11? 
The literature review supports the primary question 
posed, because similar academic studies prior to September 
11, 2001 revealed weaknesses in finding funding sources and 
a need for training. Post September 11, 2001 studies show 
that there are definite changes in the way law enforcement 
agencies respond to terrorism related events. 
The significance of the impact of 9/11 is found in the 
FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program, which notes a 2% 
increase in the nation's Crime Index from the 2000 figure. 
However, the FBI indicates (2002, p. 17), "the figures 
reflecting the offenses from the events of September 11 are 
not included in the trend data because they are statistical 
outliers that will affect current and future crime trends." 
Thus, to determine the extent of the impact of 9/11, for 
the purpose of this research, I sent a letter of 
introduction (see Appendix D) and used a survey instrument 
(see Appendix E), to collect relevant data from law 
enforcement agencies. I then selected 7 chief executives 
from the survey respondents for in depth personal 
interviews. 
Research approach 
The researcher drew analytical data from a survey sent 
to 63 local South-Florida law enforcement agencies 
providing municipal and county services (see Appendix F) . 
The survey asked 13 primary questions of each agency head 
and the data collected were used to explain and gain 
insight and understanding of their past and current 
practices. The researcher acted as instrument or primary 
synthesizing and interpretive agent, which are 
characteristic of qualitative research (Guba & Lincoln, 
1981; Patton, 1990). The methodology used is a 
naturalistic inquiry or a study of real-world situations 
that unfold naturally, without the manipulation of the 
researcher (Patton, 1990). 
Twenty-nine law enforcement agencies responded to the 
survey instrument, representing a 46% response rate (see 
Appendix G). I selected from the respondents a purposeful 
sampling of 7 law enforcement agencies, based on their 
responses, with a special focus on service population 
demographics, type of policing agency (accredited or 
nonaccredited), size and location. "The logic and power of 
purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich 
cases for study in depth" (Patton, 1990, p. 169). The 2000 
U.S. Census was used to assess the population demographics 
of these areas, specifically looking for minority 
populations. Additionally, law enforcement agencies 
reporting a significant Middle-Eastern or Arabic service 
population received preference for the personal interviews 
of informants. 
Based on the methodological strategies used in a 
naturalistic inquiry, data was collected using several 
techniques, including surveys, formal interviews, follow-up 
interviews and document analysis (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
The study was completed through checks of law enforcement 
information system records, which record the calls for 
service. The researcher looked for patterns showing 
increases in calls, such as in WMD calls for service 
(primarily suspected anthrax calls) in the months following 
September 11, 2001. 
Survey instrument 
The survey (see Appendix E) was the initial data 
collection method and used to capture brief information 
about anti bias-based policies in place and the 
department's actions towards fighting terrorism, as it 
relates to before and after 9/11. Important aspects of the 
survey instrument gleaned information about the following 
areas of interest: 
1. Department size 
2. Accreditation status 
3.Bias-based policing or racial profiling policies in 
place pre/post 9/11 
4. Requirements to change how persons of Arabic or 
Islamic are treated or handled post 9/11 
5. Significant Arabic or Islamic population 
6.Training program modifications for terrorism and WMD 
7. Department policies regarding WMD pre/post 9/11 
8 .  Impact of WMD calls and other post 9/11 calls for 
service 
9. Changes in handling persons of Arabic or Islamic 
descent 
10. Available funding 
The method of data collection covers all the key elements 
described in the research questions and were the origin of 
the questionnaire design. The questions are structured to 
provide a reflection on past practices and a look at the 
present situation so that I can determine the direction the 
agency took after September 11, 2001. 
In arriving at the survey instrument, considerable 
information guiding the questions were gained by attended 
notable conferences in the policing circle. First, 
immediately following 9/11, this researcher attended the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 
International Conference in Toronto, Ontario (Canada) in 
October 2001. Sentiments were high regarding terrorism and 
the attendance rate was lower than previous years. 
However, there were more than 7,500 delegates from law 
enforcement agencies throughout the world. These attendees 
also indicated that serious immediate changes regarding WMD 
and terrorist activity had reshaped policy and the policing 
methodologies used by their various agencies. The latter 
was indicative of the heightened sense of urgency inherent 
with law enforcement agencies immediately following the 
disaster. Police chiefs and other high level police 
officials from all over the world discussed terrorism and 
preparation by local police departments. At the top of the 
list were terrorism response and training changes, followed 
by resource, equipment and funding needs. Bias-based 
policing was rarely discussed in the context of the new 
wave of terrorism. Subsequently, this information supports 
the thrust and focus of the survey instrument. 
I spent considerable time in June and July 2002 at two 
other major police conferences, in preparation for this 
study. These conferences were the National Organization of 
Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE) National 
Conference and the Florida Police Chiefs Association (FPCA) 
Summer Conference. Interacting with police chiefs 
nationally, I was able to glean considerable information 
about how police departments had reacted initially to 
September llth and how they were currently operating. The 
subject matter was essentially the same as the 2001 IACP 
conference, but there was additional emphasis on bias-based 
policing and how to remain clear of the practice. Although 
through informal interviews with numerous police officials 
and through the attendance of workshops, the information 
received was consistent with the query design of the survey 
instrument (see Appendix E) 
Finally, in arriving at the instrumentation used, I 
have, \'...some familiarity with the phenomenon and the 
setting under study" and "strong conceptual interests" 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 38). 
I obtained official permission from Lynn University 
IRB to begin the study on June 19, 2003. All surveys were 
sent to the executive officer of each law enforcement 
agency during the last week of June 2003, with a three-week 
turnaround date of July 15, 2003. Due to an initial slow 
response, with only a handful of surveys returned by July 
15th, the deadline for returning the survey was extended to 
July 31, 2003. 
Population 
In determining the focus population, I reviewed the 
types of law enforcement agencies found in the U.S. 
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics Bulletin (2002), there are 17,784 full- 
time law enforcement agencies in the U.S. "The total 
included 12,666 general purpose local police departments 
and 3,070 sheriffsr offices.. ." (Reaves & Hickman, p. 1) . 
The report shows that general purpose local police 
departments were the largest employer with 565,915 full- 
time employees as of June 2000. Reaves and Hickman (2002) 
also found a high concentration of general purpose local 
law enforcement agencies and sheriffrs offices in South 
Florida. There were 58 South Florida general purpose 
police agencies, 4 sheriff's offices and 1 public safety 
department identified through the statistical information 
compiled by Reaves and Hickman. 
All of the law enforcement agencies were in the 
counties of St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach, Broward and 
Miami-Dade, with the exception of one general purpose law 
enforcement agency located in St. Lucie County (see 
Appendix F). The chief of the agency in St. Lucie County 
asked to be included in the survey. 
Secondly, South Florida along the east Atlantic coast 
has a fast-growing, multicultural, high concentration of 
people, according to the U.S. Census (2000). The U.S. 
Census verified that South Florida has the Port St Lucie- 
Fort Pierce, Florida Metropolitan Statistical area (Martin 
and St. Lucie counties), and the Miami-Fort Lauderdale- 
Miami Beach, Florida Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(Broward, Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counties). The U.S. 
Census defines race as 'self-identification by people 
according to the race or races with which they most closely 
identify ... Furthermore, the race categories include both 
racial and national-origin groups" (Redistricting Data, 
2000, see Appendix B-2). 
The 2000 U.S. Census uses six categories of racial 
classification: American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian, 
Black or African American, Native Hawaiian and Other 
Pacific Islander, Some Other Race and White. Adding to the 
confusion, the U.S. Census allows for Hispanics to be of 
any race and permit individuals to report more than one 
race. As such, population categories could be in 
combination with one or more races listed and may add to 
more than the total population and the percentages may add 
to more than loo%, because individuals may report more than 
one race. The 2000 U.S. Census, Definition of Subject 
Characteristics says that persons of Arabic or "Near- 
Easterner" (see Appendix B-3) may be identified in the 
White race category. However for the sake of clarity and 
for the purposes of this research, I will only use two of 
the U.S. Census racial classification, White and Black or 
African American. A third racial classification of 
Hispanic or Latino will be used in this research, whereas 
the 2000 U.S. Census describes this as 'origin" (see 
Appendix B-2) . 
A third consideration use by the researcher was based 
on events prior to 9/11. There was an abundance of 
activity specifically in the South Florida region by at 
least 14 of the 19 terrorists herein described: 
Two years after the deadliest attack on American 
soil, one question has never been answered: What were 
at least 14 of 19 terrorists doing in South Florida - 
at least 12 of them in Palm Beach County - for perhaps 
a year or more before killing some 3000 people on 
Sept. 11, 2001? 
... The black hole of information - or at least 
official information - exists despite the fact that 
many of the terrorists' movements were widely 
reported. Among them: ringleader Mohamed Atta ... 
(Kleinberg, 2003, p. 1B) 
Finally, figures from the U.S. Census (2000), which 
measures ethnicity beyond official race classification, 
show that 1.25 million Americans are of Arab descent. 
However, Arab American watch groups, such as Allied Media 
Corporation, dispute this figure vehemently. Allied Media 
(2003) says, "...the 2000 Census ... captures about one-third 
of the total population that traces its roots to the 
Arabic-speaking world. "Private research by the Arab 
American Institute (AAI) and Zogby International indicate a 
population that exceeds 3 million" (Census Figures, 2000, ¶ 
2). AAI believes there are about 4 million Arab Americans 
in the U.S. (Allied Media, 2003). Florida is identified as 
one of 17 states in the U.S. with the largest Arab American 
population (Allied Media, 2003). Specifically, according 
to Allied Media, South Florida has 4 cities (North Miami 
Beach, Hallandale, Fort Lauderdale and Coral Springs) with 
the largest concentration of Arab Americans. 
Additionally, there are 7 million American Muslims and 
1,209 mosques in the U.S. (Allied Media, 2003). Fifty- 
seven of the mosques are in Florida and a large percentage 
of the Muslim population (Allied Media). African Americans 
account for 30% of Muslims and Arab Americans account for 
25% of all Muslim in the U.S. (Allied Media). 
Therefore, South Florida is an area conducive for a 
study that will look at the general direction of law 
enforcement post 9/11 due to four collective conditions: 
(a) an abundance of all types of law enforcement agencies; 
(b) a high concentration of diverse people; (c) the 
presence of a majority of the terrorists known to be in 
this region in the months preceding 9/11; and (d) the 
presence of a large Arab American population. 
Sample size 
As outlined earlier, from the survey responses 
obtained (see Appendix G), I did a purposeful sampling, by 
specifically selecting 7 departments for in-depth, open- 
ended interviews to collect data consisting of "direct 
quotations from people about their experiences, opinions, 
feelings, and knowledgeN (Patton, 1990, p. 10). The 
selection criteria for these open-ended personal interviews 
follow the purpose of the research, as suggested by Ambert, 
Adler, Adler and Detzner (1995). First, the writer looked 
for a mix of agencies and included accredited and non- 
accredited agencies. Secondly, population demographics 
played an important role in determining who was 
interviewed, especially if an agency identifies a 
significant Arabic or Muslim community in their service 
area. Lastly, I looked for different types of law 
enforcement agencies, large, medium and small to obtain a 
cross section of police executives. Certainly, respondents 
with vastly differing or opposing viewpoints received 
priority for inclusion in those who were personally 
interviewed, 
Although sample size in qualitative research is 
generally small, Patton says, 'it depends ... on what you 
want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what's at stake, 
what will be useful, what will have credibility, and what 
can be done with available time and resources" (1990, p. 
184). Since the purpose of this research is not to 
generalize to a larger population, but to essentially 
provide a description, a sample sizeof 7 police 
departments was more than sufficient. Patton supports the 
latter, "The validity, meaningfulness, and insights 
generated from qualitative inquiry have more to do with the 
information-richness of the cases selected and the 
observational/analytical capabilities of the researcher 
than with the sample size" (p. 185). 
Interview method 
The original research proposal called for the 
selection of at least 6 law enforcement agency heads for 
personal interviews. However, a seventh was added, because 
only one female police chief was included in the 63 surveys 
that were originally sent out, and she was one of the 29 
executives to return the survey. Although the issue of 
researcher bias was discussed in chapter 1, as it relates 
to this female police chief, a female Chief adds to the 
"information-richness" of the research described by Patton 
(1990, p. 181). An eighth participant was added to the 
group at PD2 where 2 executives were interviewed. 
Pre-interviews of potential informants at the selected 
agencies were used to determine the best interviewee, based 
on their receptivity. There were three candidates who did 
not have time in their schedules to permit an interview and 
subsequently declined. Two potential participants thought 
the issues were too sensitive and declined to be 
interviewed, but felt the study would benefit law 
enforcement. One potential candidate for an interview 
could not find time within his schedule to allow the 
researcher an audience and he was excluded, after three 
unsuccessful attempts by the researcher to seek an 
interview. Ironically, his department was undergoing its 
own trial by fire after members of the African American 
community were incensed by what was suspected as a 
suspicious hanging of a Black man, later ruled a suicide by 
an inquest (Brenner, 2003). 
The questions for the interviews are outlined in 
Appendix H. These questions are designed to describe 
experiences/behaviors, obtain opinions/values, and describe 
feelings and knowledge (Patton, 1990). Information 
supplied by the respondents was analyzed, which is the 
initial step in qualitative analysis (Maxwell, 1996, p. 
7 8 ) ,  and patterns, comparisons, trends and paradoxes were 
identified. 
The questions asked are primarily dichotomous 
questions that require "the person making a decision about 
what an important experience is and whether or not an 
important experience has occurred" (Patton, 1990, p. 304). 
Some of the information supplied by the participants was 
verified within each department's activity database and 
through FDLE training records. However, the writer also 
employed participant feedback (member checking) and used 
low inference descriptors, i.e., direct quotations of 
respondents, to ensure interpretive validity (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985; Johnson, 1997). 
The primary personal interviews were of the top 
executives in six of the seven departments. However, due 
to a scheduling conflict in one agency, the chief executive 
delegated the task to his assistant director. The 
assistant director brought his terrorism task force 
commander into the personal interview and both answered my 
questions. 
During the interviews, I took notes for reflexivity 
when transcribing and analyzing the data. As recommended 
by Maxwell (1996) ,  I read all of the interview transcripts, 
field notes and supporting documents that were obtained 
from the participants. I did follow-up telephone 
interviews of each participant and allowed them to review 
their individual and collective transcriptions for 
accuracy. 
All data and information collected will be retained by 
the researcher and used for the purpose of this research, 
without disclosing sources. Specifically, names of persons 
interviewed and the identity of law enforcement agencies 
will remain confidential and other identifiers are used to 
describe the person interviewed and the location. 
Anonymity was maintained in the following manner: (1) 
Participants were given sequential confidential initials; 
(2) cities of the participants were given a letter of the 
alphabet; (3) counties were identified by a number; and (4) 
law enforcement agencies were identified by the acronym PD 
followed by a number. 
Between July 25, 2003 and August 21, 2003, I visited 
each of the seven law enforcement agencies and met with the 
chief executive, or in the one case, an assistant director 
and his bureau chief. I did a pre-site tour of the police 
facility and the surrounding area, noting external and 
internal security measures, type of facility and other 
architectural features. The letter of introduction to the 
interviewee (see Appendix I), informed consent (see 
Appendix J), and informed consent to audio record (see 
Appendix K) were reviewed and the appropriate signatures 
were obtained for the record, according to the University's 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) guidelines. The recorded 
interviews took an average of 40 minutes. 
Trustworthiness 
The researcher used Gubars (1981) model to assess the 
trustworthiness of the research. Guba's model is based on 
the identification of four aspects of trustworthiness: (a) 
truth value, (b) applicability, (c) consistency, and (d) 
neutrality (Krefting, 1991). The researcher used the 
following strategies, identified by Guba and described by 
Krefting, to increase the trustworthiness of the research: 
1. Credibility 
2. Transferability 
3. Dependability 
4. Confirmability 
As noted by Krefting, truth value is obtained from the 
responses of the interviewees to the interview questions. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) used the term credibility to 
describe truth value. To strengthen credibility, the 
findings were shared and checked with other interviewees 
(member checking) to see if they had an immediate 
recognition of the description. Other credibility 
strategies that were used are reflexivity, field notes, 
triangulation of data methods and sources, document 
analysis, peer examination, interview technique, 
establishing authority of researcher and structural 
coherence (Krefting, 1991) . 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) noted that it was not the 
researcher's job to provide an index of transferability, 
but to provide a database. Therefore, in order for 
transferability judgments to be made by others, the 
researcher has provided an adequate database, describing 
the informants, the research context and setting. A rich 
narrative description of the setting includes size of 
agency, type of police facility, service population 
description, and demographics and is, "...sufficiently 
detailed to permit the reader to visualize that setting" 
(Patton, 1990, p. 219). 
I did within case studies of each individual law 
enforcement agency and extrapolated the data obtained in a 
cross-case study. The within case studies were to 
'evaluate individual client outcomes" (Patton, 1990, p. 
99). The cross-case analysis was done to, "[group] 
together answers from different people to common questions 
or [analyze] different perspectives on central issues" 
(Patton, 1990, p. 376). 
s-ry 
The design of the research begins with a survey 
instrument to collect data about 9/11 developed from 
previous studies and research, and information gleaned when 
I attended major police conferences. South Florida was 
selected for the target population, based on reviews of 
2002 U.S. Department of Justice statistics on law 
enforcement agencies, the 2000 U.S. Census data and the 
disclosure that a majority of the terrorists were in the 
area prior to 9/11. I found a specific and purposeful 
sample for in-depth personal interviews from the survey 
respondents. The researcher, using strategies that will 
maintain the trustworthiness of the study, synthesized and 
interpreted the data that were collected from the 
interviews. 
CHAPTER IV 
Results 
"We will find these people, and they will suffer the 
consequences" (Deans, 2001, p. 18A). President George 
Bush, September 11, 2003 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to provide a rich 
narrative descriptive account of how local law enforcement 
agencies responded to the terrorist events of 9/11. The 
problems addressed are defined by accredited and 
nonaccredited law enforcement agencies and how the U.S. 
Constitution and civil rights, call response, terrorism/WMD 
training, and funding impacted each type. To gain the 
requisite information, a survey instrument consisting of 13 
questions about the subject areas was sent to each agency- 
head of 63 South Florida law enforcement agencies, in the 
counties of Indian River, St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach, 
Broward and Miami-Dade. Twenty-nine law enforcement 
organizations responded to the survey instrument (46% 
response rate) and seven agency-heads were selected for 
personal interviews. 
This chapter will review the survey responses and 
provide a descriptive account of the interview setting, 
detailing the type of service community, police facility 
and organizational culture. Using a within-case study 
approach, a rich narrative description of each person 
interviewed will be given in the words of the participant. 
The information gathered in the personal interviews will be 
compared and contrasted with the information gleaned during 
the literature review and through cross-case analysis of 
each participant with the other. An explanation and 
discussion of the results will be given, as it relates to 
a 
the primary research questions. Lastly, the researcher's 
interpretation will be provided. 
Respondents 
I received 29 surveys, of which three were sheriff's 
offices, one a large county general purpose police agency, 
one a public safety department and the remaining 24 were 
general purpose municipal agencies. Table 4.1 provides 
additional information about the respondents as it relates 
to the survey questions and responses, and discussed in the 
following subtopics. The specific questions asked in the 
survey are outlined in Appendix E. The employees of the 
surveyed agencies were either sworn; e.g., employees 
certified to carry out law enforcement duties; or nonsworn, 
e-g., civilian employees who are noncertified and do not 
carry out law enforcement duties. 
Table 4.1 
September 11, 2001 Law Enforcement Survey Responses 
QI SIZE OF AGENCY 
Sworn 1 TO 25 26-50 51-100 101-200 201-300 301-500 501+ NR Total 
3 6 4 1 0  1 3 2 2 9 
Nonsworn 1 to 25 26-50 51-100 101-200 201-300 301+ NR 
10 4 7 3 1 1 3 2 9 
Q2 Accredited Natl State Natl&State in-prog Ntl in-prog St No NR 
1 11 6 2 2 7 0 29 
Q3 Policy Yes no in-progress 
2 7 1 1 2 9 
Q4 If yes ... Yes no NR 
0 2 5 4 2 9 
Q4a List groups NR listed 
29 0 2 9 
Q5 Vigilance yes no NR 
5 2 4 0 29  
Q5a Bywhom notid id NR 
1 4 24 29  
Q5b Comply Yes no NR 
5 0 24 2 9 
Q5c Concerns yes no NR 
5 5 1 9  29  
Q 6 Arabic pop yes no NR 
1 0  18 1 2 9 
Q7 Dept policy yes No NR 
1 0  1 9  29 
Q8 Policy chg yes No NR 
24 3 2 29  
Q 9 WMD train yes No NR 
9 20 0 29 
Q9a After 9 /11  yes No NR 
2 6 1 2 2 9 
Q 9b Continue yes No NR 
25 0 4 2 9 
Q10 WMD calls yes no NR 
2 3 5 1 29 
Q11 Calls today yes. no NR N/A 
1 2 6 0 2 2 9 
Q12 Funding Yes no NR pending 
17  11 0 1 29 
Q13 Comments yes no 
1 5  14 29 
Agency size 
The largest agency to respond to the survey was a 
metropolitan police organization to be identified as PD2, 
and the smallest was a small affluent town to be identified 
as PD8. PD2 is located in County 1 and has 3,178 sworn 
officers and 2,053 nonsworn (civilian) personnel. PD2 is 
located in one of the major metropolitan statistical areas 
(Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, Florida Metropolitan 
Statistical Area, U.S. Census, 2000), whereas PD8 is in 
eastern County 3, but in the same metropolitan statistical 
area as PD2. PD8 has 10 sworn personnel and 5 nonsworn 
personnel. The only public safety department to respond 
was PD4, which was comprised of 16 sworn and 4 nonsworn 
positions. Thirteen of the agencies responding to the 
survey had 100 sworn officers or less, 10 agencies were 
between 101 to 200 sworn officers, four were between 201 
and 500 sworn, and two had over 500 sworn. Twenty-one of 
the agencies had 100 or less nonsworn personnel, four were 
between 101 and 300 nonsworn and only one had over 300 
nonsworn. Two agencies did not provide sworn numbers and 
three did not provide nonsworn numbers. 
Accreditation 
Of the 29 respondents, the Commission on Accreditation 
for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) accredited one; the 
Commission for Florida Law Enforcement Accreditation (CFA) 
accredited 11; CALEA and CFA dual-accredited six; and seven 
were not accredited. Two agencies reported that they were 
in the process ofobtaining CALEA national accreditation 
and two were in the process of obtaining CFA state 
accreditation. 
Policy against racial profiling/bias based policing 
Twenty-seven agencies reported policies against racial 
profiling or bias based policing. One agency reported no 
policy and one agency indicated that a policy was in - 
progress. Twenty-five of the agencies indicated that their 
policies did not address specific minority groups and four 
gave no response to question 4 of the survey. 
Vigilance 
Five agencies reported that they had been asked to 
increase their vigilance toward certain groups (see 
Appendix E, Question 5) such as Muslim, persons of Arabic 
descent or with Islamic beliefs. One of the agencies that 
responded yes, did not identify the entity asking them to 
increase their vigilance (Question 5a), however, the 
remaining four agencies did identify sources. One agency 
said, "Various anti-terrorism organizations." Another 
agency said, "Federal and state intel agencies." A third 
agency identified the 'U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security / 
F.B.I." Most astonishing was the fourth agency's response, 
which provided a different twist by identifying the source 
as the "Muslim Islamic Center." In the latter incident, 
the center had received death threats from other 
communities as a form of retaliation for 9/11. The 5 
agencies that responded with 'yes" to the increased 
vigilance question indicated compliance with the request 
(Question 5b). 
The third subset of the question (see Appendix El 5c), 
asked if there were ethical or legal concerns about bias- 
based policing? Five agencies indicated there were ethical 
or legal concerns; five indicated no concerns, and 19 had 
no response or put N.A. The 5 agencies that said they were 
asked to increase vigilance, replied to question 5c in the 
following manner: 
1.Two said Yes without any comments 
2. One put n/a 
3. "No-it is the right thing to do." 
4. "Not if policies are followed." 
Others responding to question 5c listed the following 
comments of interest: 
1. "It is wrong and illegal." 
2. "Yes, and a policy was implemented on 12/31/01 
based on incidents in other agencies." 
MISSING 
PAGES 
Table 4.2 
PD1 Racial/Gender Demographics 
Race/Sex W M  W F  HM H F BM BE OM OF Total 
Sworn 116 26 17 1 8 1 5 0 174 
9. 66% 15% 10% -5% 4.5% .5% 2.8% 0% 
Nonsworn 42 8 1 2 4 2 9 0 1 141 
% 30% 57% 1.4% 2.8% 1.4% 6.3% 0% 1% 
Total 158 107 19 5 10 10 5 1 315a 
aN = 315 
The mission statement of the department speaks volumes 
about how it interacts with the community, with value on 
integrity by adhering to the highest level of ethics and 
honesty (see Appendix L). Interestingly, the chief's 
opening message in the 2003 annual report had this to say 
about the emerging threat of terrorism: 
Terrorism, which has been so prevalent in many other 
areas of the world, has taken center stage in the 
United States and has compelled local law enforcement 
to its mission and responsibilities of public safety 
and crime prevention. Terrorism mitigation is at the 
forefront of your police department's agenda. (p. 2) 
PD1 is located in the central city business district, 
but the area does not have the hustle and bustle associated 
with an urban site and absent is traffic noise, cement and 
mortar. Instead there is an abundance of greenery, trees 
and shrubbery, which gives it a less institutional 
appearance. City hall is located across from PD1 and other 
city governmental facilities are on either side of PD1. 
PD1 is housed in a two-story facility, designed to 
blend in with the Mediterranean architectural theme of City 
A. The police facility is clean with well-manicured lawns 
and a security gated rear access for police vehicles and 
employees. There are concrete barricades in the front of 
the facility, designed and painted to match the trim of the 
building, and configured to prevent vehicles from 
penetrating the front lobby. 
The lobby of the facility was spacious and open, but 
standard security measures were in place. A volunteer, who 
sat at a desk in the lobby, and a duty officer, who sat 
behind bulletproof glass at the front desk, screened all 
visitors. Security cameras were visible and interior doors 
were locked and could only be accessed electronically by 
the duty officer. All visitors were issued a visitor's 
pass and were required to leave a driver's license at the 
front desk before being allowed admission. The physical 
building security and procedures were indicative of what 
has changed since 9/11, although certain security measure 
were standard for a police facility pre-9/11. 
I was issued a visitor's pass, but did not have to 
leave my driver's license or other identification at the 
front desk. I was escorted to the second floor where the 
chief's office was located, as was the command staff and 
other administrative offices. The office had contemporary 
furnishings, was moderately spacious, and equipped with a 
private shower and toilet, and a private conference room 
(where the interview took place). 
Chief AA has a Master of Science Degree in Management 
from St. Thomas University in Miami, Florida and a Bachelor 
of Arts Degree in PsychoLogy from Florida International 
University. Chief AA is a graduate of the FBI National 
Academy and began his career in law enforcement in 1978. 
He worked for two law enforcement agencies before being 
appointed to chief of police for City A in 1998. Chief AA 
has been recognized nationally for promoting equality for 
women in law enforcement. 
I visited PD1 on July 25, 2003 and Chief AA was the 
first participant to be interviewed. Chief AA was dressed 
casually, as was his staff, indicative of a regular Friday 
dress-down day. Chief A24 and I exchanged pleasantries and 
Chief A24 expressed appreciation that he was selected for an 
interview, the latter indicative of his enthusiasm 
demonstrated throughout the interview. 
Chief AA of PD1 was proud that his agency was dual- 
accredited through both CALEA and CFA and explained its 
importance: 
It provides a nice foundation for which an agency or 
CEO can build the house of professionalism. A lot of 
people want to say that accreditation is 
professionalism; my contention is that accreditation 
is the foundation for professionalism. The CEO builds 
the rest of the house on top of that strong foundation 
and that's why we are accredited and will continue to 
be accredited. (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003) 
The correlation of accreditation with professionalism 
was clearly echoed in Chief AArs comments, as well as 
emphasized in previous works (Falzarano, 1999; Sharp, 2000; 
Bittick, 2003). 
Chief AA said that annual training for police 
department personnel served as a reinforcement against 
bias-based policing practices. He explained how the 
department's policy prohibiting such action was initiated 
through the Florida Police Chiefs Association (FPCA) and 
adopted by the County 3 Association of Chiefs of Police. 
There were internal mechanisms to prevent it and 
remediation for those suspected of engaging in bias-based 
policing. However, he emphasized that the organization's 
philosophy vehemently spoke against racial profiling 
saying, 'It won't be tolerated" (Interview transcript; July 
25, 2003). 
Chief AA said that bias-based policing was handled 
much the same prior to 9/11 for the PD1, when it started to 
get some political movement behind it. There was no 
difference prior to or after 9/11 in the way bias-based 
policing violations were handled. Chief AA commented: 
We have really not seen an up-shoot or increase in 
complaints with regards to bias-based profiling, and 
we have a Muslim community in [City A] and within the 
surrounding area. We had a hate crime related to post 
9/11 against a Muslim individual. However, we have 
not received any other complaints related to bias- 
based profiling since 9/11. (Interview transcript; 
July 25, 2003) 
Chief AA of PD1 said that pre-9/11 policies were not 
good, even though PD1 had a pervasive and extensive unusual 
occurrence policy that focused on civil disturbances, 
manmade disasters and hurricanes. Chief AA found that 
after 9/11, it was clear that policies did not address WMD 
and the anthrax incident shortly after 9/11 revealed their 
inadequacies. However, shortly after 9/11, policies were 
clearly developed addressing WMD, terrorism and terrorism 
mitigation. Chief AA expressed that cooperation with 
federal agencies became a standard policy on all terrorism 
related issues and he personally recognized the importance 
of a policy change: 
... It was a naXvet6 on our part that terrorism only 
occurred elsewhere, and perhaps the Oklahoma bombing 
was a blip on the radar screen of an isolated 
incident. Obviously, that's all changed and we 
clearly recognize that the threat to this country both 
domestically and internationally are real and 
pervasive, and will be around for a long time and so 
this is a policy or philosophy, if you will, of 
allocating personnel, the resources and time to this 
topic, of paramount-and has to be done, and it's going 
to be an intricate part of the organization. 
(Interview transcript; July 25, 2003) 
Chief AA went explained that in the new policies the 
national color alert was added and followed, often 
requiring bringing in additional personnel. Chief AArs 
seriousness about terrorism is outlined again in these 
comments : 
Our religious facilities are also taken care of and 
I'll leave it at that because this is probably going 
to be a public document somewhere along the line. ... 
That has driven us-cost us a lot of money and a lot of 
time. ... We have taken a hard look at our own 
infrastructure and our own weaknesses and we have 
developed a city-wide security team, of which the 
police department spearheads, to take a look at all of 
the infrastructure within the city to check out our 
vulnerability and then to take steps to mitigate that 
vulnerability. (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003) 
Chief AA emphasized that before 9/11, suspicious packages, 
etc., were taken lightly, but now nothing is taken lightly. 
Policy changes also address inter-departmental 
cooperation. For example, PD1 has worked closely with the 
fire department (FD1) because of the anthrax incident and 
established a protocol wherein PD1 and FD1 respond 
together. PD1 and FD1 are cross-trained in evidence and in 
bio-hazardous material so that multiple police units are 
not tied up, when both components respond to a particular 
site. 
Chief AA of PD1 acknowledged that there were 
significant changes made in training, which included 
topical areas, combined fire and police training, and more 
personnel being sent to specialized school on WMD and bio- 
hazardous material. Chief AA estimated that the total cost 
of training since 9/11 was approximately one-half million 
dollars, expended primarily for terrorism mitigation, WMD, 
and intelligence gathering and dissemination. Chief AA 
relied on some appropriations in the regular 2002/2003 
fiscal year's budget specifically to address the training 
cost, but he also tapped into the department's law 
enforcement trust funds. Chief AA stated that he will be 
purchasing $300,000 worth of EOD [emergency ordinance and 
demolition] equipment and has purchased protective suits 
for officers. The city also purchased barricades that were 
placed around the police facility. Apparently terrorism is 
a critical concern of the City A government as explained by 
Chief AA, 'We hired three additional officers. The city 
council authorized the hire ... because we have created our 
own terrorism mitigation unit. These individuals work 
closely with the law enforcement community, both national 
and statewide" (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003). 
Chief AA specified that the duties of the three new 
officers are solely for the fight against terrorism. 
Chief AA of PD1 was perhaps in a unique situation 
because of his experience with an anthrax case that 
involved his department. "[Robert] Stevens, 63, died Oct. 
5, 2001, after being exposed to anthrax while working as a 
photo editor at American Media Inc. headquarters in [City 
A] " (Cooper, September 25, 2003, p. 1B) . Chief AA recaps 
his agency's response: 
The calls for service-did not increase significantly. 
Although we were on alpha-bravo, 12-hour shift and we 
canceled days off and we canceled vacations, training 
and everything for about 2 weeks after 9/11. Then 
what happened, the anthrax incident occurred in 
October of 2001 and we went back to alpha-bravo [12- 
hour patrol shifts] for a while. Our calls for 
service increased exponentially after the anthrax 
incident, not necessarily after 9/11. After the 
anthrax incident, for at least a month and a half to 
two months, our calls for service skyrocketed for 
suspicious packages, suspicious substances, suspicious 
persons and we were very very busy responding to all 
of those. (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003) 
The anthrax incident at the media center was the only bona 
fide call following the plethora of calls afterward. 
Chief AA finds that the current calls for service are 
back to normal, "pretty much status quo" (Interview 
transcript; July 25, 2003). However, during heightened 
alert states, he places additional officers on the street. 
Chief AA of PD1 had early worries about his city, well 
before 9/11. He described City A as a 'high-end community" 
with "name brand peopleN (Interview transcript; July 25, 
2003) and he was concerned that City A would be the site of 
domestic terrorism at one of the exclusive resorts as early 
as 1998 when he was appointed chief of police for PD1. 
Chief AArs attitude about terrorism prior to 9/11 indicated 
awareness that his community could be targeted, but 
differently and he explains his action in preparing for 
such an event: 
Subsequently, I made every effort to throw legitimate 
dollars and resources to our SWAT team and to expand 
our SWAT team. With the mind set that it was going to 
be domestic terrorism and [PDl] needed to prepare 
ourselves and hopefully mitigate domestic terrorism of 
some type. Well low and behold October 2001, we're 
the subject of a terrorist event [anthrax case at the 
American Media Inc. headquarter], still unknown if it 
is domestic or international ... I was surprised of 
this event that happened in [City A]. I suspected 
more hostage-taking, a building being blown up, maybe, 
or somebody being kidnapped, nothing of this 
magnitude. (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003) 
In an especially profound personally expression, Chief 
AA further describes his attitude and lesson learned since 
9/11, and how his own department's experience with anthrax 
changed him, and the apathy of the U.S. about terrorism: 
I am a believer that anything can happen anywhere, 
anyplace and [City A], like any other city, USA cannot 
sit on its laurels and said it can't happen to us, 
because it can very easily happen to us at anytime and 
anyplace, and I'm talking not [City A], us, in any 
community, anywhere and anyplace in the United States. 
... The nafveti5 and arrogance of this country that we 
could not be subjected to something like this, 
stupefies me, both personally and in a global scale. 
Secondarily, how vulnerable we actually are, a free 
open society, and as a result of that freedom and that 
openness, our greatest strength is our greatest 
weakness, and those individuals that are hell bent on 
creating anarchy in the United States are utilizing 
our greatest strength, because that is our greatest 
weakness. 
Thirdly, although we have seen over the course of 
history zealots who have killed themselves, the 
realities are that now more than ever, is that 
philosophy of killing oneself for a particular cause 
more pervasive than ever. That in fact 9/11 has caused 
us to realize that if you can think it in an evil 
term, you can make it happen. It is easier to destroy 
and do evil than it is to build and do good. That in 
and of itself is an eye opener. ... Those lessons 
learned are going to be our ability to protect 
ourselves and never underestimate the will or desire 
of an individual or a zealot that is hell bent on 
creating a cause. 
Lastly, and this is personally from me, what we are 
seeing today--the Osama bin Ladens, the Sadam Husseins 
and all of these individuals throughout the world that 
claim religious acumen for doing what they're doing in 
attacking the United States are nothing more than what 
Adolf Hitler was, Mussolini, Stalin; it's all about 
control and power and hate. 
Those are the lessons I have or the things that I've 
become acutely aware of. The other thing is the 
resolve to prevent this from spreading further 
throughout the United States and I play just a small 
part, just as you do in protecting the citizens of our 
country. But that small part when you attach it to 
another small part ultimately becomes a huge, huge 
power base of being able to mitigate and or stop this. 
(Interview transcript; July 25, 2003) 
PD2. 
PD2 serves County 1, the center of the region's 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (U.S. Census, 2000). County 
1 has a very diverse population with a large Hispanic 
population and a significant number of people from the 
Caribbean. The latest U.S. Census (2000) estimate County 
1's population to be 2,332,599, comprised of 1,570,558 
(67.3%) White, 1,291,737 (55.3%) Hispanic or Latino and 
457,214 (19.6%) Black. 
County 1 is a sprawling metropolis that includes two 
world-renowned cities: City G and City HI several other 
noteworthy affluent communities, and lesser-known 
municipalities, e.g., City I and City J. PD2 provides 
police services to all of the unincorporated areas and to 
some of the municipalities. County 1 has a major 
international airport (City G International Airport) and a 
seaport (Port of City G) that service several cruise lines 
and also international shipping. The seaport and the 
airport are policed by PD2 (Assistant Director AB, personal 
communication, July 30, 2003) . There are numerous major 
highways, freeways, interstate systems, the Florida 
Turnpike and a metropolitan rail mass commuter system 
throughout parts of the southeastern metropolitan area of 
County 1. 
County 1 is home to more than a dozen private and 
state colleges and universities, several of whom are 
nationally known and recognized. County 1 is the 
headquarters of multinational corporations and banking 
institutions. However, with its progressive development 
and multiculturalism come significant crime problems (FBI 
Crime Index, 2002) and other growth headaches. 
PD2 is located on a major corridor, west of City G. 
PD2 is housed in a three story, contemporary facility that 
is spread over several blocks and adequately landscaped. 
There are concrete barricades placed strategically to 
prohibit vehicle forced-entry into sensitive interior 
building areas. The facility has electronic surveillance 
equipment externally and internally, and scanning devices 
to detect weapons, etc., for the public making entry into 
the facility. Personnel are stationed in the lobby to 
check identification and packages of all who enter, before 
being allowed passed the common area and into the main 
interior. Electronic locks are in use on doors prohibiting 
access to inner offices. 
PD2 is nationally accredited through CALEA and has an 
authorized strength of 3,072 sworn officers and 1,875 
civilians and is the largest police department in the 
southeastern United States (PD2 2000-2001 Annual Report). 
PD2 has a service area of 2,139 square miles of 
unincorporated county area. The director of the department 
is a Hispanic male and the three assistant directors are an 
African American male, a White female and a White male. 
The subsequent command staff consists of eight other 
members that include: two White males, one White female, 
two Black males and three Hispanic males ([PD2] workforce, 
2003, p. 2). Table 4.3 captures PD2's overall racial and 
gender demographics at the time of this research. 
Table 4.3 
PD2 Racial/Gender Demographics 
Race/Sex WM WF BM B F HM HF OM OF Total 
Sworn 842 242 343 239 1,162 226 23 5 3,082 
% 27.3% 7.8% 11.1% 7.7% 37.7% 7.3% 0.7% .1 
Nonsworn 155 289 156 530 309 533 14 2 3 2,009 
% 7.7% 14.3% 7.7% 26.3% 15.3% 26.5% 0.7% 1.1% 
Total 997 531 499 769 1,471 759 37 2 8 5, 091a 
'N = 5,091 
PD2's mission statement describes its commitment to 
their service community and its desire to provide fair and 
impartial service (see Appendix M) . 
I was wearing civilian clothes, but had a police badge 
affixed to my breast coat pocket. The duty officer in the 
lobby observed the badge and allowed this researcher entry 
without going through the customary screening process. An 
escort came from Assistant Director AB's office and 
escorted the researcher to the third floor where the office 
was located. The office was arrayed with institutional 
furnishing and standard office equipment and appeared to be 
in the midst of several other administrative offices. The 
interview took place in the office of Assistant Director AB 
on July 30, 2003 and PD2 was the second agency that I 
visited. Assistant Director AB and Chief BA were the 
second and third police executives to be interviewed, and 
the only pair that was at one department. 
Assistant Director AB has 27 years of police service 
with PD2, rising through the ranks to his current position. 
He has a Bachelor's Degree in Criminal Justice, prior 
military service with the U.S. Army and is a graduate of 
the FBI National Academy. Assistant Director AB is tasked 
with overseeing police services and is one of three 
assistant chiefs overseeing all operational components of 
the PD2. Chief BA has 22 years of police service with PD2 
and he has a Master's Degree in Public Management and a 
Bachelor's Degree in Public Administration from St. Thomas 
University in Miami. He is commander of the Uniform 
Services Division of PD2, which includes the airport, 
police operations, special patrol and community affairs. 
Assistant Director AB explained that his agency (PD2) 
had been accredited through CALEA for 10 years and its 
importance to the agency was vested in the criteria 
established, which provided direction for enforcement, 
administration and a number of aspects of policing. 
Additional comments by Assistant Director AB indicated that 
accreditation provided a parameter to avoid bias-based 
policing practices. 
PD2 Assistant Director AB revealed that management 
philosophy was the most important means to control racial 
profiling and he provided some profound comments: 
... First, through the management philosophy right down 
to the mission statement [see Appendix MI of providing 
equal unbiased law enforcement that involves 
integrity, respect, fairness and service to everyone. 
... Second, additionally we avoid it through the 
parameters of accreditation, and thirdly, we prevent 
it by being a diverse department with representation 
from all aspects of the community. With that, I think 
we have it [at] levels of the department and the 
verification factor is the fact that the director 
himself is a minority-who is a Hispanic male and at 
the assistant director level, we have myself-who is a 
Black male, we have White male and White female. So 
that is our complete picture of diversity. It is 
first priority for everyone to provide police 
servicing without consideration to race and with a 
special attentiveness to avoid any kind of 
discriminatory practices within our policing, whether 
they be a sworn personnel or civilian. (Interview 
transcript; July 30, 2003) 
Assistant Director AB noted that complaints are 
handled via department guidelines and directives and 
through the Professional Compliance Bureau, which is set up 
to investigate bias-based profiling complaints. September 
11, 2001 did not change how the department handled 
complaints, but Assistant Director AB did point out the 
following: 
... Occasionally we got complaints regarding undue 
focus [inaudible] but from the community on the 
aspects of community that were potentially mistaken 
for people that would be from the regions of the world 
that were associated with the bombings. In other 
words, the occasional complaint that citizens are 
responding to our community or they are responding to 
our mosque and we would like for the police to watch 
that kind of conduct. We did respond to that when we 
had a request to put watch order on a mosque or a 
particular store in the community that was owned by 
individuals who may have been mistakenly associated 
with 9/11 type of--I guess you would call them-Middle 
Eastern citizens; people that would be mistakenly-be 
considered Middle Eastern citizens of race and ethnic 
makeup. We did pay particular attention to making 
sure that they were not discriminated against, and we 
did respond to every call that hinted to that kind of 
correlation or that kind of reason for us responding. 
(Interview transcript; July 30, 2003) 
I asked for clarification on Assistant Director AB's 
response and he added that PD2 received numerous calls from 
the Arabic or Middle Eastern community, who were concerned 
about retaliation against their mosques and businesses. 
Chief BA, who said that similar sentiments came from the 
Jewish community, followed Assistant Director AB's remarks 
with these comments: 
... After 9/11, we went above and beyond and 
developed contact with all the temples, rabbis, all 
the presidents of the temples and assured them that 
they would [be] in [a] safe environment just as the 
Arab community would be. 
The perception was that the incident that occurred 
in the country were [sic] perpetrated by Arabs and 
they had a fear, whether it was legitimate or not, 
that maybe some of the terrorism activity could 
possibly continue in this local community. (Interview 
transcript, July 30, 2003) 
Pre-9/11 terrorism policies, according to Assistant 
Director AB of PD2, were limited toward the occasional 
domestic terrorism incidents that the country had 
experienced, identifying the Oklahoma City bombing and 
Waco, Texas cult standoff. PD2 made significant policy 
changes after the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. 
Chief BA pointed out that PD2 made changes in policy 
regarding certain infrastructure, e-g., water-plant, 
waterway, airport and the seaport and security was also 
enhanced at these locations. 
Assistant Director AB said aspects of Federal Homeland 
Security, the Regional Homeland Security Task Force and 
[County 11 Homeland Security Office were all included in 
revised policy and PD2 worked collaboratively with those 
agencies. One particular change that increased security 
measures has caused is: 
The immediate mandates issued by [County 11 Homeland 
Security Office [and] the Federal Homeland Security 
Office required us to devote additional resources to 
homeland security, but it came without fiscal support. 
It impacted operations to the degree that we would 
provide in terms, for example, patrol service was 
diverted to other security type operations for 
homeland security, thus making people a little less 
available on the street. ... We try to always--do this 
at our expense, with the promise that we would be 
reimbursed from the federal government. Of course as 
you know the reimbursement has not come. ... I will 
give you one example, and this is not a criticism, but 
the immediate implementation of a security detail for 
several government facilities and the major one being 
the county government building, [where] an entire 
squad [was] assigned to security operations within 
that facility. That's a significant drain on 
manpower, without a specific funding application for 
doing that. (Assistant Director AB, interview 
transcript; July 30, 2003) 
I found that current training for PD2 is specialized 
toward homeland security issues and Assistant Director AB 
describes what changed: 
... training has become more specific to homeland 
security types of concerns. Training has been more 
focused and for example the emphasis is placed on 
connecting training with the type of equipment that 
would be associated with [terrorism]. . . .Additionally, 
our Special Response Teams and special operations 
training has become more focused towards responding to 
a terrorist type training, as opposed to the usual 
training for hostage negotiations and things of that 
nature. Our aviation training is becoming more 
focused on aerial surveillances and that type of 
operation is to move forward to that type training. 
So training is being adjusted or planned towards 
terrorism type responses and at the same time the 
other types of standard qualifications such as 
firearms and things of that nature and certifications 
requirement trainings have not been abandoned, they 
have been maintained . . .( Interview transcript; July 30, 
2003) 
Chief BA added that the civilian (nonsworn) personnel 
are trained in terms of terrorism-related issues that are 
essential for building security. On the receptivity of the 
training by civilians, he commented: 
I heard tremendous feedback and very much appreciation 
because it makes them also feel part of the 
organization and it's something they need to know. 
They are in facilities, as lot of these people that 
potentially could be a target so they need to be 
educated as to what to look for. (Interview 
transcript; July 30, 2003) 
Assistant Director AB said to lessen the impact of the 
cost of training, PD2 refocused the training emphasis to 
terrorist-related events and discontinued training that was 
"not so important" (Interview transcript; July 30, 2003). 
However, Assistant Director AB did acknowledge a funding 
problem: 
The second impact is perhaps a normal fiscal year we 
would, over the full year, expend the allocated 
resources. In this case, we end up expending the 
resources within the first six months of the year or a 
majority of the resources except for the things that 
are scheduled and mandatory. Our rushed response to 
train and get prepared for it had a fiscal impact to 
the degree that our expenditures sort of ran out 
before they normally would. (Interview transcript; 
July 30, 2003) 
I asked a follow-up question, "When the funds ran out, 
what happened?" Chief BA answered, "When the funds ran 
out, we did things based on no funding, but we did them 
anyway, which resulted in somewhat of a deficit somewhere 
around $3 million over now. Deficit is the bottom lineN 
(Interview transcript; July 30, 2003). Chief BA said that 
PD2 had a slight deficit the first fiscal year after 9/11, 
but it became an increasing problem into the next fiscal 
year. Carryover expenses were added back into the budget 
at the beginning of the fiscal year and used to handle some 
of that deficit. But it will not cover the shortfall in 
the current fiscal year. 
Chief BA said that several specialized units have 
asked for specific equipment to deal with terrorism. To 
that Assistant Director AB added: 
... We have a division called Special Strategic 
Investigations Division that's now a secret criminal 
intelligence bureau, which has changed to specialize 
in terrorism. ... the majority of the requests for 
additional funding for equipment has come from, as 
[Chief BA] mentioned, Special Operations, Special 
Response Team, Underwater Recovery, the Divers, and 
Critical Incident Management Unit, also equipment such 
as computers, monitoring and detection equipment, 
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Funding that was received from the federal government 
was described by Chief BA as promising but sparse thus far: 
...[ County 11 itself got a very small portion of 
[federal government's] funding. It was something in 
the area of $50,000 or $100,000 of that $2 million. 
The second allocation has just been made and again it 
is among the regions and it's assigned more focally to 
the region of [City GI, surrounding [County 11 and 
that allocation will be $8 million ... we should get a 
fair share of that $8 million. So that's been the 
only federal money that's come back so far. There has 
been much discussion about money that is available for 
purchasing things, such as protective gear, out of a 
fund that the federal government sees as everyone 
needs this; no doubt, so everyone will get this. We 
have not received that funding yet, but we know the 
grant is out there and it is available. We've applied 
in conjunction with the county's Homeland Security 
Office, but have not received it yet. But my 
understanding is that help is on the way. All the 
other funding opportunities are pie in the sky; we 
don't have them yet and have not been assured we would 
get them. (Interview transcript; July 30, 2003) 
The overall outcome of PDZrs funding woes was handled 
through funding adjustments to their regular budgeted 
funds. 
PD2 Assistant Director AB described the call increases 
at his department in the following manner: 
I would say that they increased significantly, 
specifically with regard to white powder type calls. 
We kept track of them for a while and I think we were 
getting in the area of 100 plus a day of white powder 
related calls. Ultimately, it turned into something 
that we coordinated between police and fire in terms 
of how we would respond to those. Of course, other 
less frequent calls had to do with Middle Eastern 
"Arabic" citizens who appeared to be suspicious, that 
type calls and again that ties into our response being 
professional and not being discriminatory and making 
sure that these were handled in a very impartial way. 
(Interview transcript; July 30, 2003) 
Chief BA described the calls as frenzied, with residents 
reporting suspicious mail because there was no return 
address or they did not recognize the address. Added to 
Assistant Director ABrs comments, Chief BA said: 
The anthrax issue was a great concern for a while, but 
[different agencies] actually had to convene and 
develop a protocol as to how we were actually going 
handle these calls. There was tie-in with the police, 
fire and health departments, and crime lab, on how we 
transport this powder, because you had to treat each 
one like it was potentially anthrax. That actually 
increased our calls for service quite a lot; we were 
getting an enormous amount of calls. As [anthrax] 
died out of the limelight on the news then [the calls] 
faded. Also in the districts, there was an increase 
of suspicious package [type] calls; especially at the 
airport there was an increase. Whereas, when someone 
just a left a briefcase at the airport, now it was 
looked at like well maybe there is an explosive device 
in that briefcase. Absolutely, it's [9/11] made 
everyone aware. (Interview transcript; July 30, 2003) 
However, despite the significant increase in anthrax 
type calls or suspicious incidents, according to Assistant 
Director AB and Chief BA, none were proven to be valid. 
Assistant Director AB noted that media reports prompted a 
lot of the erroneous calls. 
Nevertheless, both interviewees agreed that the anthrax 
type and suspicious packages calls have decreased, 
returning to post 9/11 levels. 
PD2 Assistant Director AB thought domestic and 
international terrorism were a reality for the U.S. before 
9/11 describing it akin to an old movie that he had seen 
once : 
... There was a movie I saw maybe 15 years that came 
pretty close to 9/11 and it indicated that there would 
something like this. The movie itself to me was a 
wake up call and I said this could happen in this 
country and it happened. So in my mind international 
or foreign terrorism was a reality. Of course, we had 
never had a real bona fide case other than the 1993 
thing [first World Trade Center bombing] in New York. 
So we had a sense we were above this kind of real harm 
on a large scale. Of course, the Oklahoma City 
bombing was the other reality check that this would 
likely come from within this country, so I knew that 
it was a reality and potentially could happen. But 
you just don't really want to face that until it has 
happened. . . .So you kind of have a sense of managing 
and dealing with what you have to deal with, which is 
everyday police work, until something like this 
happens. It becomes more in important to refocus and 
prepare for this. The shame about [it] is that you 
can't really prepare to a level or degree that you 
could prevent it. I don't care what you do; 
potentially it can happen. (Interview transcript; July 
30, 2003) 
PD2 Chief BA added the following comments, "...The frame of 
mind was that essentially terrorism still occurred in 
foreign lands, the Middle East and even England, and Paris, 
and that was the mindset" (Interview transcript; August 30, 
2003). 
The attitude by members of the command staff at PD2 
shows that since 9/11 terrorism is becoming a major focus 
of law enforcement. Assistant Director AB said, 
You have to do the policing; you cannot forget about 
potential terrorism. You cannot forget about being 
prepared and being aware and omnipresent at the same 
time. So I know that abroad, for example Israel, 
they view terrorism as a thing that is going to 
happen. They look at terrorism like we look at 
murder. (Interview transcript; August 30, 2003) 
Chief BA thought that terrorism was "an annoyance [and] 
something that is going to happen again" (Interview 
transcript; August 30, 2003), so law enforcement must 
prepare for it. Assistant Director AB said: 
... Obviously, [federal] government is not going to 
give 'law enforcement that degree of funding or 
resources that we consider necessary, because they are 
not going to view it as necessary as we view it. So 
beyond that, we must have multi-faceted focus on both 
doing the regular policing, during times of peace; we 
don't want to panic people. We want people to think 
they are secure and at the same time we have to be 
prepared for a response if and when it comes again. 
(Interview transcript; August 30, 2003) 
Chief BA said that 9/11 brought the police closer to 
the community because of terrorism concerns, "We have 
developed relationships with 12 temples in [the Jewish 
community] that we had absolutely not had before. I think 
it has just made us more aware" (Interview transcript; 
August 30, 2003). 
Assistant Director AB identified an obvious lesson 
learned from 9/11, 
... Never take anything for granted and you can start 
with the term like security and expand that or reduce 
that down to include thoughts or ideologies about 
people. What qualifies as secure? What qualifies as 
reasonable? All of that now can be redefined. 
(Interview transcript; August 30, 2003) 
Chief BA, in describing the lessons of 9/11, said: 
... It has made us so aware of vulnerability factor and 
we look at security situations differently than we did 
before. Although I think we had a very good security 
program working at the port, but I think since [9/11] 
we have added a complete dimension out there than we 
may have never done if it wasn't for 9/11. (Interview 
transcript; August 30, 2003) 
Assistant Director AB's and Chief BA's closing 
statements captured how people were now more aware of the 
importance of law enforcement and how better working 
relationship were now established between various levels of 
law enforcement. Assistant Director AB commented: 
I think there was less than enough appreciation of 
what police, fire, and law enforcement and public 
safety individuals did, and the sacrifice of the many 
lives of police and fire fighters on that day changed 
the world's view about law enforcement and the 
significance of what they do. (Interview transcript; 
August 30, 2003) 
Chief BA said, 'I honestly and sincerely feel that the 
relationships between federal agencies, county agencies, 
inter-agency cooperation has increased" (Interview 
transcript; August 30, 2003). 
PD3. 
PD3 is the law enforcement agency for City B, County 
2, which is part of the Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, 
Florida Metropolitan Statistical Area (U.S. Census, 2000). 
City Brs total population is 57,588 with 33,840 (58.8%) 
Black or African American, 19,482 (33.8%) White and 3,995 
(6.9%) Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census, 2000) . There is a 
strong presence of people from the Caribbean and the 
influence is shown in some major city projects, e.g., 
25,000-seat cricket stadium (Chief BC, personal 
communication, August 7, 2003). City B is located near I- 
95 and the Florida Turnpike. 
PD3 has an authorized strength of 98 sworn officers 
and 25 civilian support staff and services a community of 
7.4 square miles (Chief BC, personal communication, August 
7, 2003). The command staff consists of the chief, two 
majors, one captain and one lieutenant. The command staff 
is composed of one Black male and the remainder White 
males. However, Chief BC said that the department has a 
51% minority composition of approximately 33% African 
American, 9% Hispanic and the remainder Asians and females. 
Chief BC later provided me with a Diversity in the 
Workplace report (2003) that indicated 46.4% of the sworn 
workplace consisted of minority police officers (Black and 
White females, Latino males, Black males and Asian males) 
and 92% of the civilian (nonsworn) workplace consisted of 
minority personnel (Black and White females, and Black 
males). Thus the overall minority makeup of the police 
department represented actually 56.4% of the workplace. 
Table 4 provides the racial and gender demographics of PD3 
at the time of this research. Similarly, City B has a 57% 
minority composition, defined as primarily Jamaican, 
Haitian and other Caribbean groups (Chief BC, personal 
communication, August 7, 2003)  . 
Table 4 .4  
PD3 ~acial/~ender Demographics 
Race/Sex WM WF BM B F HM HF OM OF Total 
Sworn 5 1 5 22 8 8 0 1 0 9 5 
3 53.6% 5.3% 23.2% 8 .4% 8.4% 0% 1.1% 0% 
Nonsworn 2 4 3  1 6  0  0  0  0  2  5 
9 8 % 16% 12% 64% 0 % 0% 0% 0 % 
Total 53 9 2 5 2  4 8 0  1 0 120a 
aN = 120 
PD3 was not accredited and did not have an annual 
report, but was in the process of applying for CFA 
accreditation, and completing its first annual report. 
PD3's mission statement reflected the diversity of the 
city, "To promote a sense of community pride and mutual 
respect by enhancing the quality of life in the culturally 
diverse [City Bl, through professional police service in 
partnership with the community" ([City B], 2003, p. 4). 
PD3 is located on a major east-west thoroughfare in 
City B and is housed in a one-story temporary facility 
until a new facility is built. Trailers are in the parking 
lot and used to house some of the support function of PD3. 
The premises are well manicured with a host of foliage and 
tree covering, but there was no visible presence of 
barricades of any type to obstruct vehicle entry into the 
building interior. The parking area was open and 
accessible to public and police department vehicles, but 
marked to indicate the appropriate parking for official 
police vehicles and those of the public. 
The lobby was easily accessible and a duty officer was 
stationed in the lobby behind a windowed partition. The 
interior of the facility beyond the lobby could only be 
accessed after the duty officer released an electronic 
lock. There was considerable pedestrian traffic in and out 
of the facility, mostly employees and the Caribbean culture 
was evident by the accents of the individuals. However, 
there appeared to be no surveillance cameras visible either 
internally or externally. 
I did not show identification to the duty officer, but 
announced that I was scheduled to meet Chief BC. Chief BC 
came to the lobby and took the researcher to a conference 
room located in the central part of the facility, where the 
interview took place. The building was clean and orderly, 
but it was easily discernible that it was not intended for 
use as a police facility due to its basic layout. Chief BC 
was the fourth police executive interviewed, August 7, 2003 
and his agency was the third that I visited. 
Chief BC has only 2% years of experience with PD3, 
however, he spent 27 years at PD1, leaving that agency at 
the rank of deputy chief of police. Chief BC has a 
Master's Degree in Criminal Justice from Nova Southeastern 
University and a Bachelor's Degree in Criminal Justice from 
Florida Atlantic University. He has attended several 
police executive development schools throughout the U.S. 
Chief BC of PD3 said that his department was not 
accredited and when he arrived 2% years ago: 
This department did not even know what accreditation 
even meant and we are in the process of rewriting 
every policy to fit accreditation. ... I am a state 
assessor for accreditation, so I know what it takes to 
get accredited, and the first step is that I felt 
would be to rewrite all the policies. We are about 
three to four policies away from completing that and I 
intend to apply for state accreditation. (Interview 
transcript; August 7, 2003)  
Chief BC of PD3 said that City CIS diversity and the 
police department's diversity assist in preventing bias 
based policing and a policy is being developed to address 
it as well. Chief BC had little knowledge about how bias 
based policing complaints were handled prior to 9/11, but 
noted that currently his department takes any citizen 
complaint "in person, in writing, over the telephone, 
anonymous of any incident, including racial profiling" 
(Interview transcript; August 7, 2 0 0 3 ) .  
Chief BC of PD3 did not have any policies addressing 
domestic terrorism pre-9/11, but have addressed it with the 
implementation of new policies. Extra patrol in certain 
areas is part of that change whenever the country's color 
alert changes and several reasons are described by Chief 
BC : 
For instance, we have two temples in our city, we have 
a rabbinical school here, we have a section in our 
northwest where people are made up of the Israeli 
culture and they are always asking for some type of 
extra patrol. They are highly concerned about 
security these days and what is going on and we have 
built into our daily patrol to do extra patrols in 
these locations. We also have documented some areas 
that we think are critical. For instance, we have a 
gas line that runs from South Florida all the way to 
Texas that exposes our city, which most people don't 
know about and we have to keep an eye on. A situation 
that is strange to me is that there is [a] propane 
tank vendor/business that is right next to the middle 
school that is right along side the Florida Turnpike. 
So if something happens, not only would there be a 
problem with the school, we would have to take care of 
transportation also. (Interview transcript; August 7, 
2003) 
Chief BC explained that the large Jewish population of the 
NW city was 40% and the two temples were also Jewish. 
Chief BC of PD3 trained in conjunction with another 
law enforcement agency to reduced cost. Both agencies put 
all of their personnel through WMD training and incident 
command system training. The biggest expenditure for PD3 
was the overtime cost, which according to Chief BC, was 
absorbed in the budget through salary accounts with unspent 
funds due to vacancies. Chief BC used money from the 
Federal Law Enforcement Block Grant, which is a grant 
received by many law enforcement agencies, not specifically 
for terrorism. Chief BC also received $12,000 from the 
Federal Equipment Grant, which is specifically for the 
purpose of procuring equipment to combat terrorism, i.e., 
protective suits. The two federal grants and funds from 
the law enforcement trust funds were used to purchase 
protective clothing and gas masks for personnel. 
PD3 also had the assistance of the fire department to 
offset the cost of equipment and training: 
I also want to say that our fire department was also 
very helpful in providing some equipment and some of 
the training also. ... They are the first responders 
to those types of incidents that occurred and they put 
on the training for us, as far as what to do when we 
get there. Because we had that nasty situation where 
officers got too close and then they had to be the one 
to say, "Give me all your clothing and everything 
else." They confiscated two police cars, and two 
officers for basically a 24-hour time period because 
they did not know what to do. (Chief BC, Interview 
transcript; July 7, 2003) 
Chief BC of PD3 reported the following about calls for 
service: 
There was a major increase. Everyone was so concerned 
about suspicious people, about seeing any kind of 
white powder. As a matter of fact, we were the first 
agency in County 2, I believe, that made an arrest on 
an anthrax hoax. Some kid had put white powder in an 
envelope and sent it to his girlfriend and we ended up 
arresting him for that hoax. The calls averaged about 
eight additional calls a day because of that. The 
fire department was the first responder and we had to 
back them up. (Interview transcript; August 7, 2003) 
Chief BC said none of their calls were authentic and 
currently, all is back to normal except, "...When they 
raise the Homeland Security rate status that's when I start 
receiving calls again from the temples, from the rabbinical 
school saying would you give us extra patrol" (Interview 
transcript; August 7, 2003)? 
Chief BC of PD3 spoke of his complacency when asked 
about his attitude before 9/11 and said, "...It probably 
would not happen over here. You watch it on TV, on the 
other side of the world and so it's been going on for many 
years, but couldnl t happen over here" (Interview 
transcript; August 7, 2003). 
Chief BC expressed a totally new attitude currently, 
similar to what others have said: 
I didnf t realize how vulnerable the United States was 
and how still vulnerable we are. My attitude today is 
that I have a feeling that something is still going to 
happen, but it's a matter of time and all the chatter 
we hear about threats and [terrorists] have a means to 
do it. Unfortunately, I think it's going to happen. 
(Interview transcript; August 7, 2003) 
The important lessons learned by Chief BC focused on 
communications with other law enforcement agencies and 
being unprepared to deal with terrorism. Chief BC 
explained how 9/11 caused law enforcement to hone and fine- 
tune these critical issues: 
... We now work together a lot better with the FBI 
here, with surrounding agencies, with fire departments 
to the point now we have joined [in a federal radio 
system] grant with all municipal departments in County 
2. That's a sign right there that shows we need 
better communications and we're doing that by trying 
to get that 700 MHz radio system. (Interview 
transcript;.August 7, 2003) 
Chief BC concluded by remarking, 'I think that the 
changes we made are good changes, but the changes are going 
to have to continue. This has changed the way we do 
business forever" (Interview transcript; August 7, 2003). 
PD4 is the public safety department for Town C, which 
is an island with two bridge accesses to the mainland 
(north and south). Town C has 619 residents, but during the 
summer months most of the residence are in other areas of 
the U.S., as most of the homes are used during the winter 
(Director CB, personal communication, August 15, 2003). 
The U.S. Census 2000 report estimates the current 
population to be 620, of which 585 (98.88) are White, 33 
(5.3%)Hispanic or Latino and 8 '(1.3%) are Black. Town C is 
a unique community, semi-private, exclusive and located in 
the midst of golf courses and private docks. One major 
access highway runs north and south along the 10-mile 
length of the island and each home is personalized with a 
private nametag identifying the owner. The homes range in 
price between five million and twenty million dollars and 
the population is overwhelming White, rich and famous, and 
corporate America (Director CB, personal communication, 
August 15, 2003). 
PD4 is located in an older, but quaint, one-story CBS 
white building that serves as the town hall, fire and 
police departments, which are merged as one public safety 
service. The premises of the police facility were 
immaculately landscaped and manicured, and sit squarely in 
the middle of a golf course. One could easily mistake this 
government center for a rather large home, except for not- 
so-obvious signage affixed to the facility. There were no 
barricades or any readily identifiable security measures in 
place outside of the building and the lobby area was open 
with the remainder of the interior accessible to seemingly 
anyone. A duty officer was positioned behind a windowed 
partition and the access door to the duty station/dispatch 
center was electronically locked. 
PD4 is a state accredited agency through CFA and has 
16 sworn, predominately White male, officers and 4 nonsworn 
positions. The sworn personnel, with the exception of the 
director, are dual certified as fire fighters and law 
enforcement officers. The command staff is composed of the 
director (White male) and five sergeants (White males) that 
report directly to him (Director CB, personal 
communication, August 15, 2003). Table 4.5 provides racial 
and gender demographics of PD4 at the time of this 
research. 
Table 4.5 
PD4 Racial/Gender Demographics 
Race/Sex WM W F  BM BF HM HF OM OF Total 
Sworn 14 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 16 
% 87.5% 6.25% 0% 0% 6.25% 0 0 0  
Nonsworn 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
P 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 14 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 20a 
aN = 20 
PD4 is contracted with .the County 4 Fire Rescue for 
fire and EMS service, but officers respond to fire calls 
and have fire outfits and equipment in their vehicles for 
fire situation. PD4 has a service area of 2.5 square miles 
(Director CB, personal communication, August 15, 2003). 
The mission statement of PD4 is outlined in Appendix N. 
I did not have to produce identification and was 
greeted by Director CB, once the duty officer called him. 
Director CBrs office was directly off of the lobby, 
modestly outfitted and small, and the site of the 
interview. During the interview, a daily operational test 
was performed on the town's sole fire engine, which was 
parked just outside and the noise bled over into the 
director's office, emphasizing the smallness of the 
building. The interview of Director CB took place on 
August 15, 2003 and his agency was the fourth that I 
visited and the fifth executive to be interviewed. 
Director CB started his career in law enforcement in 
the Military Police Corps, U.S. Army in 1962. He retired 
from the military and became a Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) 
Trooper in 1962. He left the FHP for the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) in 1968, retiring in 
1997. He taught in the Criminal Justice Master's Program 
at Lynn University, until he became Director of Public 
Safety for PD4 in 1998. Director CB has a Ph.D. in 
Criminal Justice Education from Union Institute, a Master's 
Degree in Sociology from the University of Northern 
Colorado, a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Human Resource 
Management from Pepperdine University and a Bachelor of 
Science Degree in Business Administration from the 
University of Palm Beach. 
On his reasoning for accreditation, Director CB found 
an agency that was woefully lacking in many areas: 
We went for accreditation primarily for the 
professionalism and it certainly upgraded the 
department in every way, and it was the quickest and 
easiest way to rectify a lot of old concepts that 
existed prior to the accreditation. Just by redoing 
the manual, we were able to change so many things. I 
have tried to instill that professionalism in the 
department, in the members and hopefully it is 
working. (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003) 
Director CB of PD4 said that his department has a 
general order for handling complaints and the agency is so 
small that he personally reviews all calls and notes 
anything remotely suspicious. He could not provide 
specifics about prior 9/11 practices saying, 'Of course, 
prior to my tenure, I don't know how it was handled because 
truthfully the policy and procedure manual that we made 
under my watch was the first change to the duty manual in 
about 15 years" (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003). 
Director CB said that nothing changed after 9/11. 
PD4 had no policies pre-9/11 and haven't really implemented 
any new policies. According to Director CB, his department 
watches the government color coded alert system and notify 
town government about changes, through memorandum and other 
written notices. Director CB gives the following picture 
of his town and rationale for decisions regarding 
terrorism: 
We are fortunate here if I can digress, we've got JI, 
under a little thumbnail very quickly. It's truly an 
island, we got a bridge at one end and a bridge at the 
other end and just 10 miles in between and it's a 
quarter-mile wide at its widest point, so its 
relatively small. We've got 20 people in the police 
department, four dispatchers and 15 patrolmen and 
myself, so it's relatively small and it's easy to get 
the word out so to speak. We have a total of 41 
people counting the 20, we've got an additional 21 in 
public works, finance and administration and the other 
departments in town. So many times I'm also, besides 
the Police Chief, the de-facto or chairman of the 
Safety Committee for the town and any safety issues. 
I put out memos or letters to other department heads 
to go to their employees if there is something that 
affects the safety or security of the town. So it's 
kind of easy; it's not like in a large department 
where you have layers and layers of bureaucracy. When 
you see something that needs to be done you put a memo 
out and get it done. (Interview transcript; August 15, 
2003) 
However, Director CB did make some noteworthy security 
changes regarding the town, something indicative of "Big 
Brother," but an acceptable method that is being 
increasingly used by government: 
One thing that we have done and are still in the 
process of upgrading it as much as we can, we have 
cameras at both ends of the Island. Prior to 
September llth the cameras took pictures of all cars 
entering and leaving the island. Since September llth 
we have placed two additional cameras at each end and 
now not only do we get the cars but also we get the 
license tags and it takes a separate kind of camera 
for that and we can do it at night also. So that 
gives a little greater security if we had to identify 
who is on the Island at any given time. (Interview 
transcript; August 15, 2003) 
Director CB described other elaborate vehicle 
detection equipment that the town has used to monitor 
traffic throughout the island for the past 25 years. But 
since 9/11, the system is being tied into a video system 
that can be monitored at the PD4 headquarters. There is a 
need for enhanced security, according to Director CB, 
'because [Town C] is so affluent, the majority of the 
people who live here are CEOs, corporate CEOs of America. 
I mean you name the company and that CEO is here and we 
feel that could be a threat" (Interview transcript; August 
15, 2003). 
Director CB of PD4 described his handling of mandatory 
training by the State of Florida in the following vein. He 
has designating one sergeant to attend, on the average of 
one per month, one and two-day seminars on terrorism issues 
and homeland security. Director CB said that he maintains 
all the information received on terrorism in a simple 
fashion, herein described: 
I have three large notebooks of stuff that have come 
in on terrorism and whenever it comes in, from 
whatever source, the FBI or ATF [Department of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] that stuff is 
synopsized or distributed to everyone and it's 
available for everyone to review. For the town, those 
brochures from the Red Cross on disaster and terrorism 
have been given to every town employee along with 
additional information and we put that out early on. 
We first started by giving it to the town commission 
and a six-page document that explained what all the 
colors were and brought them up to date and then 
shared it with all town employees. It's ongoing 
training; whatever comes in we review and see if it 
should go to all town employees or just the police 
department-should it be put in our terrorism notebook 
for future reference where people can refer to it? So 
that's basically it. (Interview transcript; August 15, 
2003) 
It costs PD4 between $1,000 and $2,000 annually to 
train each officer and most of the WMD training was done 
in-house. Director CB has been creative in procuring 
additional equipment through the fire rescue side of his 
department for EMT purposes and by buying gas masks via the 
federal government military supplies system. However, as 
far as federal assistance, Director CB said, "We have done 
as much as we can for a small department and we've done it 
all ourselves, because this federal help I haven't seen it; 
have you" (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003) ? 
Despite the creativity of Director CB, his agency 
still does not have the protective suits that many agencies 
have. He said that PD4 was to receive six suits from the 
Federal Equipment Grant, which was promised about a year 
ago. PD4 needs about $65,000 more to purchase surveillance 
cameras and other security needs for terrorism and those 
fund were cut from the budget request, because a new town 
hall is being built. 
Town C is a seasonal community and during the month of 
September, most residents are away. This drastically 
affected the calls for service, when they returned to their 
community in October 2001. According to Director CB, 9/11 
was on the minds of town residents when they returned home 
and this is when the calls for service increased, not 
immediately after 9/11: 
The calls for service went up 10% due to the media 
hype. We had people call about strange noises, 
strange smells or things that normally we would not 
have gotten calls on, but people were more aware due 
to the media hype. So our calls probably went up 10% 
the first six months, but after the season then 
everyone leaves to go to their other homes. 
... But when they got here that was their first 
questions, how secure are we? And they wanted to feel 
like they're back in the cocoon. (Interview 
transcript; August 15, 2003) 
Director CB said that none of the calls were valid and he 
described the current state of his department and town as 
back to normal, "It's not a consideration. People get 
complacent and since nothing has happened on the island 
that is terrorism related, I think that people aren't 
thinking about it any more" (Interview transcript; August 
15, 2003). 
In the small Town C, Director CB opined, like others, 
that he never thought about terrorism in the U.S., instead 
he believed terrorism was something that happened in 
'Israel, Lebanon or somewhere else where they're having 
problems" (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003). 
Nevertheless, Director CB's current attitude demonstrated a 
vigilance that was not presence before 9/11. To emphasize 
this, he spoke of the major blackout (August 14, 2003) that 
had just occurred in New York, several other states and 
parts of Canada, and the response (Hirsh and Klaidman, 
2003). Director CB said that joint training with city 
residents was forthcoming and describing his new attitude, 
he said, ... It's on your mind every single day. Today my 
attitude is heightened awareness and especially after we 
have these training sessions. You know people are reminded 
why we are doing this. ... So it's on everyone's mind. 
(Interview transcript; August 15, 2003) 
The important lessons learned by Director CB dealt 
with: 
... an awareness that simple things can be dangerous. 
We're now aware and we took for granted living in this 
area the [nuclear] power plant in your city. Now we 
are aware of what wind currents can do and what would 
happen if that power plant was attacked by someone. 
Things that you took for granted, now you're aware of 
possibilities of the power plant or a train passing 
through or if there was nuclear or radiation hazard, 
how it would affect the Island. We knew it was there 
before but now we are aware of what the possibilities 
are. (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003) 
Director CB said that in recent years law enforcement 
efforts were becoming more organized, but he was impressed 
with the increased cooperation between police and fire 
departments: 
... but more important in all my 35 years, I seldom 
ever dealt with the fire department, but since 
September llth we have joint meetings. I think that's 
important because September llth really showed us how 
all public safety agencies, police and fire, and the 
truth be known the fire department is more prepared 
for disasters through their incident command 
structure, so police are learning from fire and I 
think it's working. My perspective is a little 
different because being from a small agency we have to 
work with everybody. It's not a question of will you 
work, but you have to because you need the joint 
commitment. I think that's the biggest thing I have 
seen. We now have a common goal to defeat terrorism; 
this is our country, etc., etc. and everyone has kind 
of like banded together like that. (Interview 
transcript; August 15, 2003) 
PD5 
PD5 is the law enforcement agency for City Dl which is 
located the northern part of County 1. It borders the 
intra-coastal waterway and extends west of 1-95 and is 
surrounded by several other cities, the largest of which is 
City G to the south. City D has a total population of 
59,880, of which 32,867 (54.9%) are Black or African 
American, 20,842 (34.8%) are White and 13,869 (23.2%) are 
Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census, 2000). City D is a city 
in transition, from a predominately White population to a 
predominately Caribbean African American, primarily Haitian 
or Haitian descent. The Haitian culture has influenced 
many of the businesses and shops in the business area of 
the city. There is a large satellite campus for a major 
university within City D. 
PD5 is a state accredited agency through CFA and has 
130 authorized sworn personnel and 40 authorized nonsworn 
personnel. According to Chief DE (personal communications, 
August 19, 2003), the command staff is comprised of the 
chief of police, who is an African American female (rare in 
law enforcement), two White-male assistant chiefs and four 
majors (one Black male, one White female and two White 
males). Table 4.6 provides the racial demographics of PD5 
at the time of this research. 
Table 4 . 6  
PD5 ~acial/Gender Demographics 
Race/Sex WM WF BM BF HM HF OM OF Total 
Sworn 4  5  11 2  1 5  2  5  4  3  0  114 
9- 39.4% 9.6% 18.4% 4.3% 21.9% 3.5% 2.6% 0% 
Nonsworn 2  1 2  4 1 3  2  1 0  1 3  5  
9- 5 . 7 %  34.2% 11 .4% 37% 5 . 7 %  2 .8% 0  2.8% 
Total 4  7  2  3  2  5 1 8  2  7 5  3  1 14 ga 
aN = 149 
PD5 is responsible for 1 0  square miles of service area 
(Chief DE, personal communications, August 1 9 ,  2 0 0 3 ) .  PD5 
has a mission statement, a vision, values and motto (see 
Appendix 0 ) .  
PD5 is housed in a faded blue, but rather new four- 
story building. The police facility is located behind city 
hall and in the business district of the city, but off the 
main thoroughfare. Police vehicles are kept in the rear of 
the facility and a wall around the rear provide some means 
of security, however, a security gate is missing and 
nothing prevents unauthorized vehicles from entering the 
rear parking lot. Nevertheless there are other security 
measures in place that prevents unauthorized access to the 
interior of the building, e.g., electronic locks on doors 
requiring electronic key cards to gain access, and a 24- 
hour security camera monitors the exterior. The front 
courtyard of the facility has large concrete planters 
constructed in such a manner to prevent vehicular 
penetration of the building. There was some greenery 
around the premises; but overall, it projected an 
institutional appearance. The building's interior was 
clean and still had an apparent newness about it. 
Clerical technicians and sometimes police officers 
staff the front lobby of the police facility. Access 
beyond the lobby by the general public requires clearance 
by duty personnel. Electronic door locks prohibit access 
beyond the lobby and anyone allowed into the building must 
receive a security card/pass, and must be accompanied by 
someone from the section that is being visited. I was not 
subjected to the screening process when I visited PD5, 
because I was with Chief DE. 
Chief DE had a spacious office on the fourth floor 
overlooking the city, with a private bath and conference 
room. The office was modestly furnished and personalized 
with plaques and artwork. Chief DE has a distinguished law 
enforcement career of firsts that began in 1974 at the 
Police Department of City G. She retired from City GIs 
Police Department in 1997 and became the first female 
police chief for a police department in Alabama. She left 
Alabama in 1999 to become the first female police chief in 
City K, Florida. After leaving City K and a year and a 
half stint at a major Florida University as a vice 
president, she became the first female chief of police for 
PD5. Chief DE has a Ph.D. in Adult Education/Human 
Resource Management and a Master's in Public Administration 
Degree from Florida International University; Bachelor's in 
Criminal Justice Degree from the former St. Thomas 
Villanova University, Miami, now Biscayne College; and is a 
graduate of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at 
Harvard University. She has completed a host of other 
executive development courses and seminars, and is a member 
of a plethora of organizations. Chief DE was the sixth 
police executive to be interviewed and it took place on 
August 19, 2003. 
Chief DE of PD5 stressed the importance of 
accreditation because, "It ... signifies that an agency has 
complied with several policies and procedures that shows an 
agency that is striving for excellence in their 
performance, personnel and in their services to the 
citizens" (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003) . 
PD5 Chief DE said that citizen input into policy 
making contributes to how PD5 prevents bias-based policing: 
[The citizens] provided input to the police command 
staff based on the concerns that had been 
demonstrated, not by our department. It was a 
preventative measure; it was trying to be proactive. 
We were trying to make sure that people of certain 
ethnic backgrounds were not targeted just based on 
their race, but on some type of substantive traffic 
violation or real traffic violation instead-justified 
cause, it had to be based on probable cause, not based 
on ones race. (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003) 
However, Chief DE said that her city does not have a 
track record for having those types of practices, either in 
the past or after she became chief. Nevertheless, any 
complaints were handled through internal affairs or through 
a shift supervisor's investigation. Chief DE did identify 
'a policy in place which basically advised officers on how 
to conduct any type of traffic stop or any type of stop" 
(Interview transcript; August 19, 2003). But she pointed 
out that there was not really a difference between before 
9/11 and after 9/11 in the way bias-based policing 
complaints were handled. 
PD5, like most agencies did not have specific policies 
addressing terrorism, only hazardous chemicals. Af ter 
9/11, Chief DE said that a WMD type policy is under 
development, but there is a policy requiring all officers 
to go through WMD training. Chief DE described increased 
security measures since 9/11 as such: 
It made us want to strengthen security at the rear 
gate, the entrance to the police compound. Actually, 
city hall had a security guard stationed there full 
time and that was changed to a police officer after 
9/11 until overtime costs increased. Plus we have 
provided information to the mayor and council members 
because they were concerned about their welfare if 
something should happen. So it was more of an 
educational process to the mayor, council, employees 
and citizens. (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003) 
Chief DE of PD5 said that [sworn personnel and 
nonsworn crime scene investigators] completed WMD training 
and in-house experts were developed to provide annual 
training. According to Chief DE, in conjunction with WMD 
training, civil disturbance training was provided. All 
training was through a larger agency (PD2) and free, but 
the cost to PD5 was the overtime for those attending. 
Additional equipment for personnel at PD5 was limited as 
told by Chief DE: 
Gas masks, actually we replaced some of the equipment 
that officers had and some officers that didn't have 
them-we got gas masks. We got full body suits, only 
about eight of them; they were given to us actually. 
We got some additional equipment for the SWAT team. 
(Interview transcript, August 21, 2003) 
Chief DE said her biggest funding shortfall was 
replacing the rear security gate, which had been broken 
prior to 9/11. A new gate cost approximately $40-50,000 
and Chief DE thought that perhaps with the heightened sense 
of urgency, the federal government might assist with gate 
replacement as a means to enhance security of the police 
facility. Of course, the latter never happened and Chief 
DE said it was taken out of the city's budget and there are 
currently no funds allocated to get the security gate 
replaced. 
On receiving any federal funds, Chief DE said, 
"Absolutely none! They [federal government] say money is 
available, but we're waiting to receive it" (Interview 
transcript; August 19, 2003). The latter caused PD5 to 
fall into 'the red on the overtime costs and assigning 
vehicles at the water plant and the numerous calls for what 
people thought were suspicious packages just increased the 
overtime dollars, and an overtime budget that we had 
already exceeded" (Chief DE, interview transcript; August 
19, 2003). Chief DE explained that currently all positions 
are frozen and the salary savings in those vacant positions 
are being used to offset the overtime deficit. 
Chief DE of PD5 wasn't chief of police at the time of 
9/11, but she said that her information, based on existing 
staff and records indicated no major call for service 
increases after 9/11. There was some increase immediately 
following 9/11 in certain calls, e.g., suspicious packages, 
which all turned out to be invalid, according to Chief DE. 
But 6 months afterward, all was back to normal and remains 
as such currently at PD5. 
PD5 Chief DE felt that terrorism would not affect the 
U.S. She said, "I had never expected anything of that 
happening in this lifetime" (Interview transcript; August 
19, 2003). However, Chief DE' attitude has definitely been 
changed by the events of 9/11 and she stressed her new 
attitude in the following excerpts from the interview: 
We have to be very much aware that the possibility [of 
terrorism] is out there. Not knowing the status of 
Osama bin Laden or not knowing the status of a lot of 
these terrorists or what's happening in Iraq. Yes, 
there is a possibility a threat could happen at any 
point and we are really not that prepared. We still 
don't know if that power outage (blackout of 
Northeastern U.S. & Canada, August 14, 2003) was 
terror-related; they can't say unequivocally what 
caused it. Any city can be attacked at any time and I 
don't think there is a lot that this country can do to 
prevent it, if the terrorist really want to do harm to 
us. (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003) 
Chief DE said that her most important lesson learned 
was, '. . .how ignorant we are" (Interview transcript; August 
19, 2003). Chief DE does not believe that the U.S. has the 
investigative skills or networking in other countries to 
combat terrorism in its own homeland. She opined: 
We are not as sophisticated as I thought the great 
America was. When the crisis happened, everyone went 
into a tailspin and people tend to focus on the major 
companies, the major cities and they forget terrorists 
are shrewd; they can target a small city and 
annihilate that small city of 50,000 people just like 
that. Also, the training that they were trying to 
provide, they have provided for the larger cities and 
not the smaller cities. Forgetting to realize that 
small cities don't have the equipment and you have a 
whole lot of small cities and they are the ones that 
will perish in a situation like that. Because the 
people won't know what to do, the police per se won't 
know what to do, they won't have the equipment to do 
it with and that's where we will have major problems. 
(Interview transcript; August 19, 2003) 
In closing, Chief DE talked about the lack of effective 
communications among police agencies: 
It was a wake call to show us just how unprepared we 
were and how much there is to be gained from this. 
This should be a learning experience and how even 
today we still have to work on communications. We 
need to work on some type of, at least statewide, 
communications frequency that our police agencies can 
operate on. With all our technological advancements 
we should be able to go a statewide system, if 
necessary. (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003) 
PD6 
PD6 is the law enforcement agency for City E, County 3 
and consist of the mainland and an island accessible by 
bridge. City Ets total population is 29,884, with a 20,264 
(67.8%) African American majority, 8,297 (27.8%) White and 
1,348 (4.5%) Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census, 2000). The 
population on the island is predominately White and there 
is a public beach and numerous private beaches. Upscale 
homes, many high-rise condominiums and hotels comprise the 
primary living facilities on the island. However, the 
population on the mainland is predominately poor to middle- 
class Blacks, living in older homes or subsidized 
government housing, and a mix of industry, business and a 
few new home developments. Nevertheless, the city has 
embarked on a major $1.25 billion redevelopment project on 
the mainland "to turn undervalued waterfront property into 
a boating and shopping paradise" (Piloto, 2003, p. 1B). 
The city is expanding its western growth with new homes and 
development. 
City E has a seaport that serves primarily as a 
shipping point for the Caribbean. Two major highway 
systems are located in City E: (a) U.S. #1-north and south 
corridor along the eastern mainland, and (b) I-95-north and 
south corridor along the western mainland. 
Currently, PD6 is not an accredited police agency, but 
is working toward CALEA accreditation. According to a PD6 
demographic report (2003, p. I), the command staff is 
composed of the chief of police (Black male), two assistant 
chiefs (one Black male and one White male) and two Black 
male majors. The department has an authorized strength of 
99 sworn and 68 nonsworn personnel. Table 4.7 provides the 
racial and gender demographics of PD6 at the time of t'his 
research. 
Table 4.7  
PD6 ~acial/~ender Demographics 
Race/Sex WM WE BM BE HM HF OM OF Total 
Sworn 3 5 4 4  8  1 0  2 0  0  0  9  9  
Nonsworn 3 2  12 4 9 0  2 0 0  68 
% 4.4% 2 . 9 %  1 7 . 6 %  72% 0% 2 . 9 %  0% 0% 
Total 3 8  6  6  0  5 9  2  2 0  0  167a 
'N = 1 6 7  
The mission statement of PD6 simply says, "Service is 
job one" ( [PD6] Annual, 2003, inside cover) . PD6 has a 
service area of 9 . 1 9  square miles (U.S. Census, 2 0 0 0 ) .  
PD6 is located in a centralized city complex that 
consists of city hall, library, utilities and fire 
department. The police department is located in the rear 
of the complex and has a chain link fence around the sides 
and rear of the facility. The premises is landscaped and 
well maintained, but there were no visible signs of 
concrete barriers, etc., that would stop a motor vehicle 
from crashing into the police facility, however, the 
location of the facility and the need to negotiate a maze 
of columns and other architectural features appear to serve 
as sufficient barriers. There are standard security 
measures in the main lobby of the police department, e.g., 
electronically locked doors that will not allow access by 
the general public, surveillance camera and a duty station, 
enclosed with bullet-proof glass to protect the police 
personnel stationed there. Although I did not have to 
produce photo-identification or wear a visitor's pass, it 
is the standard procedure at the front desk, which was 
staffed by one employee. 
The police building is somewhat weathered from wear, 
tear and age. The interior walls, floors, doors and almost 
the building's entire internal infrastructure show signs of 
aging. Offices that I viewed en route to the chief's 
second floor office were all cramped and stuffed with 
boxes. Chief ED later explained that the building had 
major problems with roof leaks, etc., and personnel had 
outgrown the facility. The city was in the process of 
relocating its police department to another larger existing 
facility and negotiations with the seller were ongoing. 
An assistant escorted the researcher to the chief's 
office and the interview took place in Chief ED'S office. 
As explained earlier, the chief's office was cramped and 
boxes were in abundance. I explained the interview process 
and collected the necessary informed consent forms. 
Chief ED started his law enforcement career in 1973 at 
a major police department in Ohio. He became chief of 
police for City E in 2002 and at the time of this interview 
had been in the position for 14 months. Chief ED has a 
Juris Doctorate Law Degree from the University of 
Cincinnati and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Criminal 
Justice/Political Science from the University of 
Cincinnati. He has attended several executive development 
institutions and is a member of at least eight professional 
organizations, including NOBLE and the National Bar 
Association. Chief ED was the seventh executive that I 
interviewed and that occurred on August 20, 2003. Similar 
to Chief AA of PD1, Chief ED made this comment about 
terrorism in his department's 2002 annual report: 
Since September 11, 2001, the entire country has had 
to change the way in which we conduct business. We 
can no longer take for granted the freedoms we once 
enjoyed. "Homeland Security" has now become a full- 
time concern. This agency is aware of and committed 
to its responsibility and the role it must play in 
addressing terrorists' threats. ([PD6] Annual, 2003, 
p. 1) 
Chief ED of PD6 said that although funding for 
accreditation has been in place for the past 5 years, it 
has not received the proper executive attention to complete 
the task of obtaining accreditation. Since his arrival, 
that emphasis has shift toward CALEA accreditation with the 
necessary resources now in place. The importance of 
accreditation to Chief ED was evident by his allocation of 
funding, and the assignment of a major, four staff members 
and a consultant to the difficult task. 
Chief ED of PD6 describes training and sound policies 
regarding traffic enforcement as the way to keep racial 
profiling in check. He additionally commented, "We have 
internal checks and balances in terms of identifying and 
flagging police officers that are involved in situations 
that may tend to indicate that, for example, traffic stops, 
enforcement activities, targeted to specific persons in our 
community" (Interview transcript; August 20, 2003). 
Chief ED emphasized that prior to 9/11, although an 
anti-bias based profiling policy was in place, the 
administrative philosophy didn't address it, 'what we 
probably didn't do was the adequate administration on 
complaints. So what we didn't do was analyze the data and 
then make administrative determinations based on the data" 
(Interview transcript; August 20, 2003). Chief ED was not 
the chief of PD6 until February 11, 2002. 
The philosophical change after 9/11 was evident in the 
following comments: 
The policy has not changed, what have changed are our 
review and inspection efforts. So we've stepped up 
those, but the policy is clear in terms of our 
prohibition against biased based enforcement efforts. 
There have not been any adjustments since 9/11. ... 
So now we are analyzing the data and what is involved 
in that is closer inspection and training. (Interview 
transcript; August 20, 2003) 
Chief ED went on to describe the introduction of an 
early warning system to identify problematic officers: 
... One of the technologies that we introduced after 
9/11 was the ability to do automated computerized 
personnel management processes to identify officers 
and track officers who are involved in use of force, 
amount of traffic citations written at a one 
particular location, traffic [citations] written to 
one particular class of persons. So we track those 
kinds of things and try to analyze the data. 
(Interview transcript; August 20, 2003) 
PD6's policies on terrorism were similar to so many 
other agencies prior to 9/11. The basic policies dealt 
with disasters and disruptions to public service, i-e., 
riots, bomb threats, etc. According to Chief ED, the term 
WMD did not exist in any policy. In describing new 
policies, Chief ED said: 
In our new policy, what we've done is identify the 
areas that would be of concern for terrorists in our 
community, soft targets if you will, and woven 
throughout the new policy is this term Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. ... We have...looked at our existing plans 
and expanded them to include the possibilities of 
terrorist attacks and various scenarios. We have had 
table top exercises to deal with, for example, we have 
enforcement responsibility for the Port of [County 31 
and we have had table top exercise[s] with the Port to 
address a bomb going off in the area, what the 
response would be; who is responsible for what areas 
of concern. ... We have expanded on our disaster 
policies and I think the largest enhancement is the 
cooperative effort between various law enforcement 
agencies and the various tabletop exercises. So we 
are now doing quarterly meetings with various law 
enforcement agencies around various scenarios that 
could happen and identifying soft targets. (Interview 
transcript; August 20, 2003) 
Chief ED noted that the day-to-day operations haven't 
changed much, but staff meetings include an update on the 
national alert status. 
Chief ED of PD6 said that the primary training change 
has been joint training with other law enforcement agencies 
on homeland security issues, which additionally saved 
expenditures. Grant funding was used to purchase 
protective clothing for officers and the department 
purchased a bomb dog. In describing the funding 
shortfalls, Chief ED said: 
... The funding shortfall comes in on the personnel 
end. There is simply not enough dollars to hire the 
increased number of persons needed to address the 
identified Homeland Security concerns. For example, 
[City El is responsible for the Port of [County 31 
that is located in our city and we had to provide two 
officers there on a full-time basis and that was never 
considered in the budgeting considerations prior to 
9/11; and of course with the increased activity around 
security of the Port, it became necessary for us to 
identify how we were going to pay for two more 
positions now. We were fortunate that the Port was 
able to secure a grant and we were able to assist 
them. So now there are two officers that are assigned 
there. 
We were only able to increase by two and that is 
just meeting the minimum requirements ... imposed by the 
state. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement who 
oversees the Port security concerns for, of course, 
the State of Florida and there are minimum 
requirements based on the activities in your 
particular terminal. Our terminal had just recently 
started accepting cruise ships and with that the 
security levels escalate and the minimal requirement 
is two officers manning gates, roving patrols, ... the 
debarkation of passengers ... and assisting customs with 
inspections and that does not include the inspections 
[by] the bomb dog every time a cruise ship comes in 
and that is what bomb dogs and trainers do. I have 
probably 4-435 miles of beachfront that we're 
responsible for and ... one of the inlets is from the 
ocean to shore and so we have the immigration issues 
all the time, and there is no way to increase our 
patrol activities around those concerns. So currently 
we have one person assigned to a beachfront area and 
it is just not enough and there are major concerns. 
Personnel and defraying personnel costs to meet just 
the minimum Homeland Security requirements have been 
difficult for smaller agencies. (Interview transcript; 
August 20, 2003) 
Chief ED did receive a small amount of funding 
funneled to him via the Regional Terrorism Task Force. 
However, Chief ED admits that his agency has not been able 
to handle the fiscal impact of 9/11. He said: 
There were a number of mandates that have been imposed 
or suggested ... on local law enforcement without 
sufficient funds to handle it. We have had increased 
Homeland Security responsibilities without the ability 
to increase staff to meet that, so that became an 
unfunded mandate. (Interview transcript; August 20, 
2003) 
Although Chief ED of PD6 was not in office at the time 
of 9/11, he noted that there were a number of issues that 
increased calls for service after 9/11: 
... So our calls for service have increased, but they 
have not increased in the area of concern for 
terrorism or those kinds of issues. We have had an 
increase in the number of immigration issues that I 
think is important and is attached to our ability to 
[be] able to keep our shores safe, and we have gotten 
a great deal of cooperation from immigration officials 
here in the area. Also, we've gotten assistance from 
the Sheriff s department to address those [immigration 
issues]. The city-also being an inlet city [makes it] 
an attractive drop off point. ... We had a spike of 
bio-hazardous types of calls after 9-11, it has been 
reported to me and even here on the city hall complex 
related to anthrax scare. So there was a spike there 
and every package was considered a suspicious package; 
and so we had increase response to packages that we 
received, especially here at the city hall complex. 
That peaked shortly after 9-11 and through the anthrax 
investigations [U.S. Postal Service facility at 
Brentwood, New Jersey and the American Media Inc. 
building in Boca Raton, Florida] and then dropped off. 
To date, no particular increases and trends have been 
identified with that and they are not necessarily 
connected to 9/11 or 9/11 events at current. [There 
is] no increase in persons identified as Middle 
Eastern, raising suspicion or being involved in some 
activity. (Interview transcription; August 20, 2003) 
Chief ED said that none of their calls involving suspicious 
packages, etc., turned out to be valid. 
Chief ED of PD6 said that he did not have a lot of 
concern about terrorism in the U.S. and in his words: 
... I don't know that we paid a lot of attention to 
terrorism, so it was probably not on the radar screen. 
There were a lot of other local law enforcement 
concerns ... 9/11 placed terrorism, WMD on every law 
enforcement executive's radar screen...we were not 
adequately armed to deal with those types of concerns 
and there were a number of soft targets in various 
municipalities that could be the subject of an attack 
and it was a not a heck of a whole lot we could do or 
were prepared to do to prevent that.. .now at least 
[we] have a plan in response to the various threat 
levels that are identified nationally and we 
know.. .how to mobilize to best protect those targets. 
(Interview transcript; August 20, 2003) 
Today, Chief ED says of his attitude and how he has 
responded to 9/11: 
Ever vigilant is the attitude. What we tried to do is 
to raise the risk level for persons who want to do 
harm in our community-to harden the targets as best we 
can. Finally, to keep our communities informed and 
educated about the various things that they can do to 
help keep the area safe. Of course, read all 
intelligence that you get. . . .we have a Homeland 
Security Specialist ... now in the department, so he 
kind of analyzes all of our Homeland Security stuff 
and responds to all the surveys and attends all the 
area meetings as it relates to Homeland Security and 
provides a monthly briefly. (Interview transcript; 
August 20, 2003) 
Chief EDrs most important lesson learned in his words was, 
"Just how vulnerable we are in an open society and how 
difficult it is to prevent an attack and identify a 
potential attacker, without adequate intelligence" 
(Interview transcript; August 20, 2003) . 
Chief ED believes the greatest impact of 9/11 for him: 
... is the increased awareness for local law 
enforcement...and this whole notion of soft targets 
and having an impact on a mass number of people is an 
overwhelming one. It's one we don't think about often 
and I think we are now. To a certain extent, you feel 
vulnerable because here is not a heck of a lot you can 
do to prevent someone from [inaudible] who is hell- 
bent on causing destruction for example. (Interview 
transcript; August 20, 2003) 
PD7 
PD7 is the law enforcement agency for City F located 
in the western farmlands of County 3. SB has a total 
population of 3,859 with 2,583 (66.9%) Black or African 
American, 935 (24.2%) White and 755 (19.6) Hispanic or 
Latino (U.S. Census, 2000). City F is located on east/west 
U.S. Highway #27 and north/south State Road (SR) #80 that 
slice through this farming country of primarily sugarcane. 
City F is situated east of Lake Okeechobee and has a large 
state correctional facility within its corporate limits. 
The correctional facility and the sugarcane fields act as 
the major stimulus to the economy. City F is 1.93 square 
miles (U.S. Census, 2000). The city residents are poor and 
it is evident in the dilapidated buildings, older homes and 
poor infrastructure that is visible as one drives through 
the city. 
PD7 is located in an older white CBS two-story 
facility that also serves as a multi-purpose complex for 
the fire department, city hall and other city services. 
The premises are sparsely landscaped, just off SR 80, and 
at the end of a residential section. There is front 
parking for police, fire, other city vehicles and the 
general public. Additional parking for city vehicles is in 
the rear. The lobby of the police department is small, has 
obvious wear and tear, and open to the public, with a 
civilian behind a small glass enclosed counter assisting 
the public. Access to the interior is controlled by the 
person on duty at the front counter via an electronically 
locked wooden door, which was recently installed according 
to Chief FG (personal communication, August 21, 2003). The 
front door was not locked when I visited the police 
facility and the receptionist did not ask me for 
identification. The receptionist notified Chief FG that I 
was present and he came out to the lobby. No additional 
security measures were observed internally or externally. 
PD7 is not an accredited agency and has 13 authorized 
sworn positions, seven part-time sworn positions and three 
nonsworn positions (Chief FG, personal communication, 
September 23, 2003). The command staff is composed of an 
African American male chief of police and one White male 
lieutenant. Table 4.8 provides the racial and gender 
demographics of PD7 at the time of this research. 
Chief FGrs small office was just inside the door off 
the lobby and was modestly furnished. Chief FG has been in 
law enforcement for 23 years, working at Belle Glade 
(Florida) Police Department from 1980-1999. He was an 
investigator for the state attorney's office between 1999 
and 2000, before becoming a victim advocate at PD7 in 2000. 
He became chief of police for PD7 in April 2003. Chief FG 
has had extensive training in law enforcement and is 
currently working on a Bachelor's Degree. Chief FG was the 
eighth and last police executive that I interviewed. 
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PD7 Racial/Gender Demographics 
Race/Sex WM WE BM BE HM HE OM OF Total 
Sworn 5 1 10 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 
% 25% 5% 50% 0% 20% 0% 0% 0% 
Nonsworn 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 
P 0% 33.3% 0% 33.3% 0% 33.3% 0% 0% 
Total 5 2 10 1 4 1 0 0 2 
aN = 23  
Chief FG of PD7 put his reason for not having 
accreditation "very simple" (Interview transcript; August 
21, 2003), due to lack of funding. When asked if there 
were plans for future accreditation, Chief FG replied, "I 
don't have any immediate plans, but there is a desire to 
want to be accredited and if sometime in the future we can 
secure the funding to make it happen, I certainly plan to 
pursue it" (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003). 
Chief FG of PD7 touted his agency's minority 
composition as a deterrent to bias-based policing 
complaints, 'My agency is mostly comprised of minority 
officers and I guess we have all experienced it [racial 
profiling]. My officers don't want to impress on somebody 
else what something that's been done to them (Interview 
transcript; August 21, 2003). Chief FG said that all but 
two of his 13 officers are minorities, either Hispanic, 
African American or female. However, Chief FG acknowledged 
the existence of a policy that dealt specifically with 
racial profiling. 
Chief FG described how racial profiling was handled 
before 9/11: 
... A formal written complaint was logged and it was 
turned over to the lieutenant for investigation. He 
would then interview the complainant and the officer 
and any other witnesses that were found. If the 
allegation was sustained, the appropriate disciplinary 
action was taken. If not, we would probably just give 
sensitivity training. (Interview transcript; August 
21, 2003) 
Here he describes what changed after 9/11, "Pretty much the 
same way, there is not much you can do. I guess there was 
more education put in place for the officers in regards to 
diversity training" (Interview transcript; August 21, 
2003). 
Chief FG said that prior to 9/11, there was no policy 
in place to handle terrorism or WMD at PD7, but afterwards 
he said, "The only thing we did was add a few components to 
our disaster plan and those components were to deal with 
the aftermath of any WMD" (Interview transcript; August 21, 
2003. He further describes additional changes at his small 
agency: 
... We did not have an ID badge in place, we started to 
require officers [to wear] their identification badges 
and our receptionist that mans the front door was 
instructed that no one enters the building unless they 
are identified and have a badge on. In your case 
today, I just told her to let you in. We also 
installed the buzzer on the door so immediate access 
wouldn't be available. [PI - prior to that you could 
just walk in?] Well, the receptionist stopped you and 
the door was supposed to be locked, but you know how 
that is and it was not locked all the time. So we put 
the electronic buzzer in place. We outfitted city 
employees with IDS also and advised the city manager 
to put in place policies that [made it] a requirement 
at all times. (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003) 
PD7 was having difficulty receiving training, 
according to Chief FG, but his officers received some 
limited training in the proper use of "HAZMAT suitsN 
(Interview transcript; August 21, 2003) , that were obtained 
through a grant. But he related how he adapted a creative 
measure to provide some inexpensive training for his 
agency, 'I accessed a [FDLE] website where they had 
[training information that could be downloaded and it 
provided] 8 hours [of] training for WMD and terrorism. . . . 
The online training was very minimal in costs. I think 
something like $20 per officer" (Interview transcript; 
August 21, 2003) . Although there were funding shortfalls, 
Chief FG said: 
Our increase wasn't very much because those few items 
that we purchased didn't cost that much. There may be 
some things that we need but because we don't have the 
money; we just rely on the Sheriff's office and other 
agencies if the need arises. (Interview transcript; 
August 21, 2003) 
Chief FG was not the chief of police at the time of 
9/11, but he was working for PD7 as the victim advocate. 
However, in recalling events from 9/11 through the current 
date, he said: 
I wasn't the chief, but I was here. I know there 
was a slight increase. We had a couple of specific 
complaints where somebody got some mail [sent via U.S. 
Postal Service] with a white powder substance in it. 
There were about three, but they were not anthrax just 
white powder substance. We don't know if someone was 
just playing pranks on people or what, but there were 
no actual chemical substances. . . .That's an increase 
because we didn't have those kinds of calls before 
[9/111. 
... I don't think we had any calls 6 months after. 
We did an extensive educational program in the 
community; we held seminars explaining to them the 
process. 
[Today] I'd say it's back to normal. I can't recall 
anything that would be associated with terrorism or 
any kind of WMD, anthrax or any other chemicals that 
they used. I don't recall having any in the last 
couple of years. (Interview transcript; August 21, 
2003) 
Chief FG related an unusual event that occurred in his 
community prior to 9/11 in describing the most significant 
impact to his agency. Three of the hijackers were issued 
traffic tickets by police officers at PD7 before 9/11, 
while they traveled through the small rural city (Bhatt, 
Clifton, and Hobbs, 2001). Chief FG recalled: 
I think what it did was make our officers more aware 
of the people they deal with on the streets and being 
more careful on how the deal with them. Because 
during that time we found that several of the 
hijackers traveled, through our community and received 
tickets from our officers. Yes, even Atta. 
We had three of them come through here and that was 
probably because they were going to Naples to do the 
flight training. (Interview transcript; August 21, 
2003) 
I asked a follow-up question after Chief FG disclosed 
the traffic stops of the terrorists and inquired if the 
stop had an impact on his department or him. Chief FG 
answered by saying: 
It caused me to be more aware of our surroundings and 
to think about our infrastructure and the possibility 
of them doing something in our area; in a small 
community [where] you have access to a major 
thoroughfare - 27. It really brought it home to me 
that that we really need to think about security of 
our water plant, our sewer plant and things like 
[that] . (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003) 
Chief FG of PD7 was very straightforward about his 
attitude toward terrorism prior to 9/11 and he exclaimed, 
"I didn't have an attitude, it was just somebody else's 
problem" (Interview transcript; August 2 1, 2003) . However, 
his attitude has changed tremendously: 
I'm very aware and I am not frightened to the extent 
that it causes me not to go about my everyday routine, 
but I pay a little more attention to when you go in 
the grocery store and you see if anything is laying 
around or out of place. Just being a little bit more 
careful how I conduct myself. If I see someone 
carrying something and they put it down, I'm very 
observant now. (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003) 
In relating important lessons learned, Chief FG spoke 
of knowing your surroundings and the importance of 
following the new airline rules. He closed the interview 
with a statement about lost federal funding: 
I think that one of the biggest impacts on law 
enforcement is that amount of funding that we had been 
receiving prior to 9-11 has been severely decreased. 
I think if anything the federal government needs to 
look at that because of the WMD and terrorists that 
are out there. They need to really consider putting 
funding back in place that the communities lose as a 
result of loss of tourism, travel and things like 
that. 
We lost money in our [Federal] Law Enforcement Block 
Grant. That was one of our biggest providers of 
revenue. . . . for us, we probably lost between $6,000- 
$7,000. We didn't get much in the beginning because 
of our population. We only have about 4,000 people in 
the community, but [losing] that little bit hurts. 
(Interview transcript; August 21, 2003) 
Cross Case analysis 
The collective descriptions of 8 law enforcement 
executives interviewed focused on the primary themes of 
I 
this research, dealing with two types of agencies: 
accredited and nonaccredited; and their training, funding, 
policies and practices. However, other prominent themes 
emerged that dealt with interagency cooperation and 
community involvement. The interviewees spoke of working 
with other local law enforcement agencies, especially 
larger agencies, to offset cost and the sharing of 
information by federal agencies with local law enforcement. 
Previous work by Furay (1999) supported the benefit of 
centralizing law enforcement agencies as they interact with 
each other in response to domestic terrorism. The fire 
department became a common denominator in the new aspect of 
interdepartmental cooperation. 
The words (data) of the participants were 
crosschecked, using triangulation to determine if there was 
"agreementN among sources, hence "corroboration" (Johnson, 
1997, p. 161). Cross case analysis is "used to deepen 
understanding and explanation" (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Secondly, I want to know the applicability of my study at 
one department to other similar settings. 
During a two-week period, between September 20-October 
5, 2003, I reviewed the interview transcripts with each 
participant to ensure their accuracy. I wanted to 
determine 'if they are saying what you're understanding and 
saying" (C. Warshaw, personal communication, March 30, 
2002). I also allowed the participants to review the 
transcripts of each other and found that there was 
agreement among the 8 participants regarding the issues 
brought forth in this study. 
Accreditation. 
I did interviews at 3 agencies that were not 
accredited, one that was dual accredited (state and 
national), two that were state accredited and one that was 
national accredited (see Table 4.9). All of the police 
executives interviewed thought that accreditation, either 
national or state, had merit primarily because it 
contributes toward the professionalism and accountability 
of the law enforcement agency. The latter was consistent 
with the review of the literature, which touted 
professionalism and accountability as significant benefits 
of accreditation (Faizarano, 1999; Sharp, 2000; Bittick, 
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Agency Accreditation Status and Their Reasoning 
Agency & Status Reason Attitudea 
Participant 
PDl/Chief AA CALEA/ C FA "...foundation-can + 
build house of 
professionalism ..." 
PD2/Asst. Dir. CALEA " . . .provides 
AB direction for 
enforcement ..." 
PD3/Chief BC Not accredited '...rewrite every 
policy to fit 
accreditation..." 
PD4/Dir. CB CFA "...primarily for 
professionalism ..." 
PD5/Chief DE CFA "...striving for 
excellence in their 
performance. . . " 
PDG/Chief ED Not accredited "...dedicated staff 
toward 
accreditation. .." 
PD7/Chief FG Not accredited "...lack of 
funding ... but there 
is a desire. . ." 
'Attitude toward accreditation: + = positive 
Of the 3 agencies that were not accredited, two were 
in the process of applying for accreditation and one did 
not have the financial means to pursue it. As discussed in 
the literature review, the cost of accreditation was seen 
as a negative factor and hence a weakness (Sharp, 2000). 
Nevertheless, there appeared to be no significant 
difference between accredited or nonaccredited agencies in 
how they responded to 9/11. The study by Alpert and 
MacDonald (2001) supported the latter, because their study 
found no significant differences between accredited and 
nonaccredited agencies in the use of force. The salient 
differences, if any, between accredited and nonaccredited 
agencies were in existing departmental policies (not 
specifically relating to terrorism or WMD) and available 
funding. 
Accredited agencies had well-established policies, 
which addressed a wide variety of issues to meet 
accreditation standards, whereas nonaccredited agencies 
that were applying for accreditation were revising or 
developing policies. Chief BC of PD3 and Chief ED of PD6 
described how their policies were being "revised" or 
"developed" to meet the accreditation standards. Chief ED 
devoted substantial staffing to assist with the 
accreditation process and this was one of the criticisms of 
accreditation by Sharp (2000), the requirement of 
additional personnel. Director CB of PD4, whose department 
is currently state accredited, explained that his entire 
policy manual was redone to comply with accreditation. 
Falzarano (1999) cited policy development as a major 
requirement of accreditation to meet operational standards. 
The one agency that was not accredited (PD7), or 
seeking accreditation, did not have updated policies. 
Additionally, Chief FG of PD7 had neither funding nor 
staffing to handle accreditation. However, Chief AA of 
PD1, whose agency was dual accredited, had the financial 
means to maintain both types of accreditation, but still 
had to make changes to policies to address WMD and 
terrorism. The latter was true of the three other 
accredited agencies, PD2, PD4 and PD5. 
B i a s  based policing practices. 
All seven of the interviewees said that there were 
essentially no changes in the way bias based policing 
incidents were handled or prevented pre-9/11 or post-9/11. 
Policies and procedures were in place, prior to 9/11 or 
developed shortly thereafter due to state mandates that 
were already encroaching law enforcement agencies (5 
943.1758, Sec. 1, Curriculum revision for diverse 
populations, 2001). 
Chief AA of PD1, Assistant Director AB and Chief BA of 
PD2, and Chief ED of PD6 emphasized their organization's 
philosophy, mission statement, training and policies, which 
vehemently spoke against racial profiling. Director CB of 
PD4 spoke of the department's policy and his personal 
scrutiny and review of all calls that are handled by his 
department to prevent or handle any racial profiling 
complaints. Assistant Director AB of PD2, Chief BC of PD3 
and Chief FG of PD7 spoke of the diversity and minority 
composition of their police agencies being a significant 
deterrent to racial profiling complaints. Chief DE spoke 
of her agency not having a prior record of racial 
profiling, but had policies in placed, which were developed 
with feedback from citizens. 
The methods and practices used by the participants to 
prevent bias-based policing were consistent with the 
discussants in the literature review (Delattre, 2002; 
Hoover, 2002; Raterman, 2002). Bias-based policies were 
either implemented or improved according to the 
participants. 
Table 4.10 
Bias-Based Policing Practices 
Agency/ Prevention Pre-9/11 Post-9/11 Attitudee 
participanta methodb complaintsC complaintsd 
PDl/Chief AA "...a variety of "...before [9/11] "There was + 
mechanism ... but we started to really no 
the most initiate difference... 
inportant thing aggressive policy have not seen an 
is the philosophy prohibiting it." up-shoot ... in 
of this [agency], complaints." 
"It won't be 
tolerated. " 
PD2/Asst. (AB) ". . .thru No change in (BA) 
Dir . mgmt. Philosophy, policy. (AB) "...developed 
AI3 & Chief right down to '...made sure contact with all 
B A mission that [Muslims] temples, 
statement.. ." were not rabbis. . . " 
discriminated 
against" 
PD3/Chief BC "...our dept is 'I had just been "We ... take any t 
composed of 51% on a couple type of complaint 
[minority] ." months prior ... . . .in person, in 
did not experience writing, over 
here.. ." the phone ..." 
PD4/Dir. CB "We have a "My reviewing "We just watch + 
general order the daily for it. We have 
... I personally headers ... didn't not had any ..." 
review every have general 
call. " order. . ." 
[minority] . " 
PD5/Chief DE "[...Citizens] "...policy in No different 
provide input to place" City has than pre-9/11 
the police no track record 
command staff" of bias-based 
policing 
Agency/ Prevention Pre-9/11 Post-9/11 Attitudee 
participanta methodb complaintsC complaintsd 
PDG/Chief ED Through training ED/ not the "...changed-- + 
& sound policies. chief, but our review & 
"...internal policy was in inspection 
checks & place, however, efforts." 
balances- no "adequate 
identifying & administration 
flagging on complaints." 
officers" 
PD7/Chief FG Minority " . . . formal " . . .more + 
composition of written complaint education put in 
agency serves as was loggedN place for- 
deterrent officers." 
aPD2 has 2 participants. b~ethod used to prevent bias-based policing. 
"How bias-based policing complaints were handled pre-9/11. d ~ o ~  bias- 
based policing complaints were handled post-9/11. e+ = Participant's 
belief in the value of un-bias-based policing was strong. 
Terrorism po l i c i e s .  
All of the interviewees had to revise or develop 
policies to address terrorism and WMD after 9/11. None of 
the agencies had policies that covered the major issues 
dealing with terrorism prior to 9/11, although the 
participants spoke of previous terrorism events in the U.S. 
e.g., 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Columbine and the 
Oklahoma City bombing of the federal courthouse. All of 
the agencies increased security measures at their police 
facilities or in their service communities in some manner, 
from a simplistic approach which required the wearing of 
identification cards, to more elaborate methods such as 
electronic screening of personnel and packages. The 
following are some of the enhanced security measures used: 
1. Requiring employees to wear identification cards 
2. Screening all non-employees 
3.Basic electronic door lock 
4. Concrete barricades 
5. Building security cameras 
6. Street security cameras 
7. X-ray machines in the front lobby 
Table 4.11 captures the comments of the participants in 
describing terrorism policies and other practice changes. 
Those agencies with seaports, a major airport, 
significant governmental facilities and infrastructures, 
and large waterfronts or beach access (PD1, PD2, and PD6) 
had to deploy additional staffing to provide security. The 
presence of significant Arabic and Jewish communities 
required increased vigilance, primarily to keep potential 
hate crimes from happening at the temples, mosque and 
businesses owned by "Middle-Eastern" citizens (PD2 and 
PD3). Interestingly, members of the former communities 
made appeals to the law enforcement agencies to increase 
their vigilance. Consistent with Shark's (2001) 
observations, the participants did not target Middle 
Eastern communities, in cooperation with federal requests 
to the point of racial profiling. Contrary to concerns 
brought forth by Sikh Media Watch (2002), the participants 
did not target Muslims and other similar minority 
communities as new profilees. Instead, as determined 
through the interviews, the participants reached out to 
Middle Eastern communities in their service areas. 
Table 4.11 
T e r r o r i s m  P o l i c i e s  
Agency/ Pre-9/11 Post-9/11 Other ~ c t i o n ~  
Participanta policy/practice 
changes 
PD1/ "...did not "...developed "...developed + 
Chief AA have a very written city-wide 
good WMD procedures ... to security team-- 
policy or responding to to check out 
terrorism WMD & adding to [city's] 
mitigation our unusual vulnerability ... 
policy. " occurrence ,I 
policy ..." 
PDZ/Asst. (AB) (BA) .. . at (AB) "...county t 
Dir. AB & '. . .oriented [the govt. bldg, an 
Chief BA toward the airport] ... more entire squad 
occasional concerned with assigned to 
domestic security. . . " security 
terrorism (AB) ". . .belong operations. " 
within this to a regional 
country.. ." homeland 
security task 
force.. ." 
PD3/ "We did not "We are part of "We 
Chief BC have any." the domestic have ... Israeli 
terrorism task culture ... we do 
force ... modeled extra patrol in 
[our] policies these 
[with] color locations." 
code alert. .." 
PD4/Dir. CB "None!" " . . .havenn t 'We have cameras t 
implemented on both ends of 
policies per the island." 
se. I put out 
memos. ..if 
Agency/ Pre-9/11 Post-9/11 Other ~ c t i o n ~  
Participanta policy/practice 
changes 
PDI/Dir. CB something 
(continued) affects the 
safety & 
security of 
town. " 
PD5/ "None ...p oli- 
Chief DE cies only 
pertained to 
hazardous 
chemicals ..." 
PD6/ ,, . . .only 
Chief ED policies to 
deal with 
disasters & 
disruption to 
public 
service by 
riots, 
[etc] ..." 
"...we are in 
the process of 
establishing a 
W M D I  
policy ..." 
"...identify-- 
soft targets, & 
woven 
throughout the 
new policy is 
this term WMD." 
"...Strengthen + 
security at the 
rear gate [of 
the police 
dept ] " 
,, 
... cooperative + 
effort between 
various law 
enforcement 
agencies- 
tabletop 
exercises. " 
PD7 / "None. " "...add a few "...require t 
Chief FD componenets to officers to wear 
our disaster their id badges. 
plan--to deal ... installed 
with--WMD. " buzzer on 
[front] door. " 
aPD2 has 2 participants. b+ = Action of all participants was positive. 
Training and funding. 
Training changed in a variety of ways at all agencies 
as the results of state mandates regarding WMD and 
terrorism (see Table 4.12). These state mandates and 
unfamiliarity of agencies with WMD, as described in the 
literature review (FDLE, 2001; Beary, 2002; Curtis, 
Stoddard, Kim and Devasundaram, 2002), directed the course 
of local law enforcement. 
PD1, PD2 and PD3 reported increased joint terrorism- 
related training with fire departments. PD2, PD3, PD4, PD5 
and PD6 trained in conjunction with other law enforcement 
agencies, or sent their personnel to other agencies for 
training. Agencies that trained with other agencies 
reportedly reduced expenditures, but overtime costs 
remained. PD2 and PD5 reported extensive terrorism-related 
training extended to their civilian personnel. Two of the 
agencies (PD4 and PD7) provided training and information on 
terrorism to various members of their city government and 
certain communities. Chief FG of PD7 obtained a WMD 
training disk from an FDLE website and provided that 
information to his personnel. 
Table 4.12 
Ageacy Training and E'mding 
Agency/ Training change Associated cost Funding source 
Participanta 
PD1/ WMD added "...working ". ..$% "Somewhat in 
Chief AA with fire-police million ...j ust FY2002/2003 ... Law 
component." training Enforcement Trust 
alone. . . " Fund-siphoned.. ." 
PDZ/Asst. (AB)". . .more specific (AB) (AB) " . . .some 
Dir. AB & to homeland security- "...expenditures- carryover 
Chief BA concerns." (BA) "We ran out ." (BA) expenses that are 
give civilian support "...but we did added back into 
people an overview [training] [PDZ] budget at 
of ... terrorism." anyway--resulted the end of 
in-deficit [of] [fiscal year] . " 
$3 million ..." 
PD3/ 'We got together with "Lots of "It was absorbed 
Chief BC [PD15] & put officers overtime ..." No in the budget ... I 
thru [WMD] cost given. had 8-9 
training ... Fire dept vacancies...where 
helpful in providing 
training. " 
it was taken 
from.. ." 
PD4 / '...selected one "...it's probably "...we've done it 
Dir. CB sergeant for homeland cost us another all ourselves ..." 
security ... attends $1,000-2,000 per 
monthly seminars..." year." 
PD5 / 'We ensured that "...the training Absorbed through 
Chief DE everyone completed was free, the regular 
WMD training & having but...had to pay budget in "vacant 
in-house experts ..." overtime to some positions." 
officers . . . " No 
cost provided. 
PD6/ "...training with Overtime, but Regular budget 
Chief ED other law enforcement amount not 
Agency / Training change Associated cost Funding source 
Participanta 
PD6/ agencies . . . g  ovt. provided. 
Chief ED agencies responsible 
(continued) for homeland 
security ..." 
PD7 / 3% ... undergone 
Chief EF training in 
"...the online Regular budget. 
training was very "Our increase 
[protective minimal in wasn't very 
suits] ... the handling costs ... $20 per much. .." 
of.. .anthrax, we officer ." 
haven' t had much. " 
'PD2 has 2 participants. 
The cost of extra training ranged from a nominal fee 
of $20 per officer (approximately $300 total) for PD7 to 
approximately $3 million for PD2 (see Table 4.12),  which 
resulted in a budget deficit. Five agencies purchased 
equipment for terrorism and WMD concerns; one was given the 
equipment and one agency was promised equipment through a 
federal grant, but had yet to receive it (see Table 4.13). 
Table 4.13 
Agency Purchase of lir7MD/Terrorism Equipment and Eianding 
Agency/ Equipment Cost Funding source 
Pa r t i c ipan t a  purchased 
PD1/ ". . . p r o t e c t i v e  $300,000 "The c i t y  
Chief AA equipment f o r  manager has  made 
p o l i c e  o f f i c e r s  [ t e r ro r i sm]  a  
& ba r r i cades  p r i o r i t y  ..." 
around t h e  
p o l i c e  dept ."  
PD2/Asst. D i r .  (AA) "They Tota l  c o s t  (AA) 
AB & Chief BA [ p r o t e c t i v e  undetermined. " . . . [budget] 
s u i t s ]  have been (BA) "De f i c i t  i s  needs t o  be 
ordered f o r  a l l  t h e  bottom inc rea sed  say  
[personnel]  . " l i n e .  " 25-308 & we're 
having a  
s t r u g g l e  
reaching 
t h a t . .  . " 
PD3/ 
Chief BC 
" . . . p r o t e c t i v e  '. . .it was ' . . . a l l  t h a t  was 
c lo th ing ,  t h e  $12,000 t h a t  was purchased from 
gas  masks ..." awarded t o  us." f e d e r a l  g r an t s ,  
PD4 / 
D i r .  CB 
d i d  no t  impact 
my budget 
d i r e c t l y . "  
". . . I ' m  wai t ing  N/A "The f e d e r a l  
f o r  those  govt.  i s  
[ p r o t e c t i v e  supposed t o  
s u i t s ]  t o  come f u r n i s h  
i n . .  ." [ p r o t e c t i v e  
s u i t s ]  ." 
Agency/ Equipment Cost Funding source 
Participanta purchased 
PD5/ 'We got full Cost not "They 
Chief DE body suits, only provided [protective 
about 8 of suits] were 
PD6/ 
Chief ED 
them.. ." 
"We used grant Cost not 
money to provided 
purchase 
protective 
equipment ..." 
given to us 
actually. " 
"We have 
received some 
from the federal 
govt . " 
PD7/ "The HAZMAT "...through a No cost 
Chief EF suits were given grant." No cost. 
to us..." 
aPD2 has 2 participants 
The interviews revealed that there were significant 
increases in expenditures for both training and equipment, 
but funding assistance for training and equipment from the 
federal government was slow in coming and sparse whenever 
it was received. The lack of funding from federal sources 
was consistent with information gleaned in the literature 
review (Cote', 2000; Modzelewski, 2003). 
Federal grant funding received by two agencies 
specifically for the purpose of obtaining equipment for 
terrorism were from the Federal Equipment Grant (PD3 and 
PD7) and through a federal grant for homeland security 
needs provided by a regional terrorism task force (PD6). 
The primary item purchased by all of the law enforcement 
agencies, except PD4, was the protective suits for anthrax. 
There were other federal grants not specifically for 
homeland security needs, such as the Federal Law 
Enforcement Block Grant that were diverted and used to 
purchase protective suits and other items needed to combat 
terrorism. 
All of the agencies had funding shortfalls and handled 
them, based on their fiscal capabilities. PD1 obtained 
additional funding from its city government and its law 
enforcement trust fund, hiring three new officers for the 
sole purpose of fighting terrorism. PD2 simply faced a $3 
million deficit and used carryover funds to offset it each 
fiscal year, but increased its budget as well. PD3 and PD5 
used the personnel salary accounts where there were 
vacancies to absorb the costs. PD4 used regular budgeted 
funds and sent one officer to another agency to learn the 
training techniques, and subsequently train the rest of the 
department. PD6 obtained grant funding through FDLE to add 
two new officers for port security. PD6's funding for two 
new officers was a pass through of regional task force 
funding for Homeland Security needs. Lastly, PD7 relied on 
the sheriff's office and other agencies to assist, due to 
lack of funding and personnel. 
Calls for service. 
Although all of the law enforcement agencies reported 
increases in WMD or terrorism related calls for service, 
each had different experiences (see Table 4.14). The calls 
for service at PD1 did not increase significantly until 
after the October 2001 anthrax incident at the American 
Media Inc. building. PD4 was located in a seasonal 
community and its calls did not increase until after the 
winter residents returned to Town C in October 2001. Two 
agencies reported hoax calls (PD3 and PD7), wherein persons 
used white powder to represent anthrax and forwarded it to 
victims via U.S. mail. PD1 was involved in the only 
authentic anthrax call wherein, "11 people were diagnosed 
with inhalation anthrax and six more with non-lethal 
cutaneous, or skin anthrax. ... five died" (Lipman, 2003, 
p. 7A). 
Generally, the primary type of calls for service that 
increased were suspected anthrax or suspicious packages, 
however, PD1, PD2 and PD3 reported suspicious persons calls 
involving Middle Eastern and Arabic citizens also 
increased. 
Table 4.14  
WMD/Terrorism Type Calls For Service 
Agency/ CFS (ia)b CFS bona fideC CFS (cur.)d 
Participanta 
PDl/Chief ". . . CFS did not "Let me be "...back to 
increase quite clear on normal ... during times 
significantly ... in this; none of of heightened alert, 
Oct. 2001...after those calls there are a lot of 
the anthrax. ..CFS turned out to officers on the 
increased be valid." street ." 
exponentially for 
1-2 months. .." 
PD2/Asst. (AB) ". . .increased (BA) "With the (AB) ". . .they have 
Dir significantly, anthrax, I absolutely decreased 
AB & Chief specifically with don't believe as far as the 
regards to white 
powder type calls. 
A lot had to do 
with media putting 
out info. . . " (BA) 
"The anthrax issue 
was a great 
concern for a 
while. . . " 
there was anthrax ... on regular 
[sic] any." basis, not in a panic 
mode, we still go to 
suspicious package 
kind of calls ..." (BA) 
"...That's more than 
[normal], but it's not 
out of hand." 
PD3/Chief "...a major "Zero...made "...gone back to some 
BC increase. Everyone an arrest on normality, but when 
[was] so concerned an anthrax they raise the 
about suspicious hoax. Some kid homeland security 
people, about put white rate...thatrs when we 
seeing any kind of powder in an get increase[s]." 
white powder." envelope & 
sent it to his 
girlfriend ..." 
PD4/Dir. CB " . . .it didn't "None. " "It's not a 
cause an increase consideration ... People 
Agency/ CFS (ialb CFS bona fidec CFS (cur. ) *  
Participanta 
PD4/Dir. CB because of lack of aren't thinking about 
(continued) people here. . .but it anymore." 
when they got here 
[in Oct.]. . .CFS 
went up lO%...due 
to media hype" 
PDS/Chief "...I didn't come "...they "Pretty much 
on until Jan. turned out to forgotten. We don't 
2002 ... from what I be not valid." get any calls along 
was told, there those lines." 
were some calls." 
PDG/Chief "We had a spike of "...we have "To date, no 
ED bio-hazardous type not had any particular increases & 
calls. ..even here confirmed trends have been 
on the city hall calls of that identified ..." 
complex related to nature. None.'' 
anthrax scare." 
PD7/Chief FG "...a slight "...they were "I'd say it's back to 
increase...We not anthrax, normal. I don't recall 
had...3-4 calls just white anything associated 
where somebody got powder ... don't with terrorism. ..WMD, 
some mail with a know if anthrax. . . " 
white powder someone [was] 
substance in it. '' just playing 
pranks on 
people or 
what. . . " 
Note. This table represents only WMD/terrorism related calls for 
service, e.g., suspicious substances, packages & persons. 
'PD2 has 2 participants. 'CFS (i.a.) = Calls for service immediately 
after 9/11. 'CFS (bona fide) = Calls for service that were authentic. 
d~~~ (cur. ) = Current level of calls for service. 
The participants at PD2 and PD4 attributed the increase in 
calls for service in part to media focusing on anthrax and 
terrorism. PD3 reported that calls requesting service 
(extra patrol) increased from the temples and a rabbinical 
school. Based on the information provided by participants, 
less than 6 months after 9/11, the terrorism/WMD type calls 
for service were no longer occurring and things were back 
to normal. Generally, such is the status of current 
WMD/terrorism calls for service. Nevertheless, whenever 
the Homeland Security color-coded alert is raised, PD1 
(Chief AA) increase staff and PD3 (Chief BC) reported that 
there are increased calls for extra patrols from the Jewish 
temples and rabbinical school. 
Personal v iews  and opinions. 
The personal views and opinions of the participants 
were gleaned from questions 18-20 of the interviews. 
Personal views and opinions were divided into two 
categories: (a) prominent themes, where there was a 
majority agreement among the participants; and (b) 
secondary themes, where there was considerable variation 
among participants. The seven prominent themes emerging 
centered on the following areas: 
1. Question 18-Complacency/couldn't happen in U.S. 
2. Question 19-Increased awareness and vigilance 
3.Question 19-Terrorism in the U.S. will happen again 
4. Question 20-Awareness/never take things for granted 
5. Question 20-Vulnerability of U.S. 
6. Question 21-Improved cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies (federal and local) 
7. Question 21-Improved cooperation between police and 
fire departments 
As noted above, three questions (19, 20 and 21) have two 
prominent themes each. Participants and their associated 
prominent themes are described in Tables 15, 16 and 17. 
Table 4.15 reviews the attitude of the participants before 
and after September 11, 2001. Table 4.16 reviews the 
important lessons learned by the participants. Table 4.17 
provided the participants' overall opinions on the impact 
of 9/11 on law enforcement. 
Table 4.15 
P r o m i n e n t  Themes  Depicting P a r t i c i p a n t s  ' A t t i t u d e  P r e / P o s t -  
Agency/ Complacency-couldn't Increased Terrorism in 
Participanta happen in U . S . b  awareness and U.S. will 
vigilanceC happen againd 
PDl/Chief AA N/A "...the heightened 'I am a 
awareness & believer that 
perception of our anything can 
officers being out happen, 
there.. ." anywhere, 
anyplace & 
[City 
A] . . . cannot 
sit on its 
laurels. . . " 
PD2/Asst. (AB) ". . .in my mind, (AB) "Homeland (AB) ". ..it's 
Dir. AB & international/foreign security, both going to 
Chief BA terrorism was a domestic & happen again 
reality ... never had a international...is in [U.S.] 
real bona fide case, become now more an 
other than NY. So we equal 
had a sense we were focus ... Never take 
above this kind of anything for 
real harm..." (BA) granted ..." 
"...the frame of mind 
was ... terrorism still 
occurred in foreign 
lands. . . " 
PD3/Chief BC "You watch it on TV & N/A 
on the other side of 
the world...but [it] 
couldn' t happen over 
here ." 
"I have a 
feeling that 
something is 
still going 
to happen, 
it's a matter 
Agency/ Complacency-couldn't Increased Terrorism in 
Participanta happen in U. S . awareness and U.S. will 
vigilanceC happen againd 
PD3/Chief BC of time.. ." 
(continued) 
PD4/Dir. CB "Never thought about "...it's on your N/A 
it in the U.S., the mind every single 
only time I thought day ... my attitude 
about terrorism was is heightened 
when we saw something awareness..." 
in Israel or 
Lebanon ..." 
PD5/Chief DE "I didn't think it "We have to be "Any city can 
would ever affect very much aware be attacked 
us.. . [not] in this that the at any 
lifetime." possibility is out time ...[ not] 
there. " a lot this 
country can 
do to prevent 
it.. ." 
PD6/Chief ED "...I don't know that "Ever vigilant is N/A 
we paid a lot of the attitude ... try 
attention to to...harden the 
terrorism...not a lot targets as best we 
of concerns..." can. " 
PD7/Chief FG "I didn't have an "I'm very much N/A 
attitude. It was just aware &. . .I'm very 
somebody else's observant now." 
problem. " 
Note. This table is based on responses to the following interview 
questions: (18) What was your attitude about terrorism prior to 9/11; 
and (19) What is your attitude today? 
'PD2 has 2 participants. b~heme 1. 'Theme 2. d~heme 3. 
The prominent themes arising from the questions about 
each participantrs attitude were mainly consistent when 
compared across all of the participants. The literature 
review was congruent with what each participant was saying. 
The idea of complacency and that it would not happen in the 
U.S. (theme 1) was brought forth in work by Wright, Ostrow 
and Cimons (1995), who saw no sweeping changes in law 
enforcement as a results of domestic terrorism. Cote's 
(2000) findings showed an awareness of terrorism, but most 
agencies believing that it would not happen to them, hence 
a lack of preparation. Theme 2 was demonstrated in the 
movement to get local law enforcement prepared for 
terrorism shortly after 9/11 (FDLE, 2001; Horne, 2003; 
Lober, 2002; Moore, 2002). Cote's study found that law 
enforcement agencies thought that terrorism would be a 
problem in the U.S. in the near future (theme 3 ) ,  but these 
agencies took for granted that it would not be in their 
"specific area" (p. 67). The latter is indicative of theme 
4, which is captured in Table 4.16, which provides the 
words of the participants in describing the important 
lessons of 9/11. Delattre (2002) and Wright et al. 
discussed the vulnerability of the U.S. (theme 5) in depth. 
Table 4 . 1 6  
Prominent Themes Depicting Important Lessons o f  9/11 
Agency/ Awareness-never take Vulnerability of U.S.' 
Participanta things for grantedb 
PDl/Chief AA "...never underestimate "...how vulnerable we 
the will or desire of an actually are, a free open 
individual ... hell-bent on society ... our greatest 
creating a cause." weakness..." 
PD2/Asst. Dir AB 
& Chief BA 
(AB) " . . .Never take (BA) ". . .made us so aware 
anything for of our vulnerability 
granted ... like factor & we look at 
security ... thoughts or security situations 
ideologies ..." differently ..." 
" . . .we weren' t 
prepared. . . " 
'...an awareness that "...what would happen if 
simple things can be the power plant was 
dangerous ... we took for attacked by someone...& 
granted ... the power plant nuclear radiation 
in your city." hazard. . . " 
'We are not as 
sophisticated as I 
thought the great America 
was. '' 
"Just how vulnerable we 
are in an open society & 
how difficult it is to 
prevent an attack ..." 
"Just pay attention to N/A 
surroundings ..." 
Note. This table is based on the responses to question 20: Are there 
any important lessons that you have learned as a result of 9/11? 
aPD2 has 2 participants. b~heme 4. 'Theme 5. 
Table 4.17 demonstrates the increased cooperation 
between federal and local law enforcement agencies, and the 
fire departments. Four of the participants noted that 
cooperation between federal and local law enforcement 
agencies had increased; five said the same about fire 
departments. The U.S. PATRIOT Act (2001) has a section to 
improve the information flow and cooperation (theme 6) 
between federal law enforcement agencies and local law 
enforcement. Mitchell's study (1986) and a later report 
(Lichtblau, 2002) found that coordination, cooperation and 
communication between law enforcement agencies were 
woefully deficient and needed significant improvement. 
The literature review spoke only succinctly about fire 
departments, as it relates to an important theme ( # 7 )  that 
emerged. However, fire departments, as an important first 
responder was evident in the 9/11 attacks on the World 
Trade Center. Early in this research, Maniscalco, Denney, 
Holtermann and Kaniewski (2002) emphasized that the fire 
service was a critical asset whose response was of 
paramount importance to minimize the impact of a terrorism 
attack. Fire was included in assessing Florida's 
preparedness for terrorism and the fire services is a part 
of the Central Florida Domestic Security task Force (FDLE, 
2001). 
Table 4 .17  
Prominent Themes Depicting Participants ' Views on the 
Impact o f  9/11 
Agency/ Improved cooperation Improved cooperation 
Participanta btwn. law enf. btwn. police & fire 
Agencies deptsC 
(Federal & locallb 
PDl/Chief AA "This agency is more "The PD has worked 
than willing to share closely with the fire 
its dept because of the 
experiences ... because anthrax incident & 
of the anthrax. ..with established a protocol 
any agency. . . " where [we] respond 
PDB/Asst. Dir AB 
& Chief BA 
together." 
(BA) "I honestly & (AB) "We coordinated 
sincerely feel that btwn. Police & fire in 
the relationships terms of how we would 
btwn. Federal respond to ... white 
agencies, county powder related calls." 
agencies, inter-agency (BA) "There was tie-in 
cooperation has with police, fire & 
increased." health dept.. ." 
"Because of this, we [Ditto] 
now work together a 
lot better with the 
FBI ... surrounding 
agencies, with fire 
depts. . . " 
"You always hear about "...in all my 35 yrs 
organized crime, but in law enforcement, I 
never about organized seldom ever dealt with 
law enforcernent...law the fire dept, but 
enforcement has really since [9/11] we have 
come together. . . " joint 
meetings ...p olice are 
learning from fire & I 
Agency/ Improved cooperation Improved cooperation 
Participanta btwn. law enf. btwn. police & fire 
Agencies deptsC 
(Federal & local)" 
PD4/Chief CB think it's working." 
(continued) 
Note. This table is based on responses to question 21: Are there any 
other statements that you might want to make regarding the impact of 
9/11 on law enforcement? 
'PD2 has 2 participants.  heme 6. 'Theme 7. 
There were secondary themes that emerged as the 
results of the comments and viewpoints from the participant 
police executives. Generally, the following 8 secondary 
themes were shared among 3 or less of the 8 participants: 
1.Question 18-Terrorism could happen in the U.S. 
2. Question 20-learned about the arrogance, ignorance 
and apathy of the U.S. 
3.Question 20-Brought the police and community 
together 
4. Question 20-Law enforcement had ineffective 
communication systems 
5. Question 20-Smaller communities and their law 
enforcement agencies are overlooked 
6.Question 21-Citizens were more appreciative of law 
enforcement 
7.Question 21-Changes in law enforcement are permanent 
8. Question 21-Loss of federal funding made significant 
impact on small departments 
Question 19 (What is your attitude today?) did not 
appear on the above list because the 8 participants shared 
the same prominent sentiment. There were 3 participants 
whose responses were the sole secondary theme, but deserves 
mentioning because of the consistency of their responses 
with the literature review. Only 1 participant (PDl/Chief 
AA) had a strikingly different answer to question 18 (What 
was your attitude about terrorism prior to 9/11?). His 
answer displayed a strong conviction that terrorism could 
indeed happen in the U.S. (theme I), "When I came on board 
in Oct. 1998. ..I had spoken to my staff about [City A] 
being a high-end community ... I was concerned that [City A] 
would be the site of domestic terrorism ..." (Interview 
transcript; Chief AA, July 25, 2003). 
The literature review provided corroboration with 
Chief AArs concern. It was evident by researchers Mitchell 
(1986), Barnathan (1987) and Cote' (2000) that terrorism 
had no boundaries and could happen in the U.S. (theme 1). 
However, the literature review also found that there was 
very little concern from the law enforcement community that 
terrorism, such as seen in the Middle East and other 
countries, could happen in the U.S. The literature 
suggests that Chief AA (at the local level of law 
enforcement) went against the grain in thinking that 
terrorism was a reality in the U.S. and preparing for it. 
Cote' (2000) supports this by finding, "...most [of the 
agencies] were reluctant to implement department wide 
training for anything other than the traditional terrorist 
threat or did not implement training at all" (p. 67). 
Cote' found that most of the agencies surveyed did not seem 
to think that terrorism "would be a problem in their 
specific area" (p. 67) . 
One participant (PD2/Chief BA) identified an important 
lesson learned (question #20, theme 3) as bringing the 
community together, "...it brought us closer to the 
community ... We developed relationships with 12 
temples ... that we had absolutely not had before" (Interview 
Transcript; July 30, 2003). 
The literature review found that local police in some 
areas did seek to minimize damage caused by requests from 
federal law enforcement agencies to increase their 
surveillance, etc., of Middle Eastern communities (Shank, 
2001). Delattre (2002) and Hoover (2002) indicate that 
bias-based policing would undermine any police community 
relation efforts, but adhering to constitutionally based 
practices would improve relationship with the community, as 
indicated by theme 3. 
Although alluded to in previous comments by other 
participants, only 1 participant (PD7/Chief FG) noted the 
impact of decrease federal funding, when asked question 21 
regarding the impact of 9/11 on law enforcement (theme 8). 
Chief FG said, "...the biggest impact on law enforcement is 
that amount of funding that we had been receiving prior to 
9/11 has been severely decreased" (Interview transcript; 
August 21, 2003). 
Federal funding has been taken away from the standard 
law enforcement programs and redirected to programs that 
are directly related to terrorism, i.e., homeland security 
needs (Weedon, 2002). As such, agencies will lose funding 
in some areas, as indicated by theme 8 and must rely on 
alternative sources, or do without as in the case of and 
PD7. 
Ignorance and apathy (theme 2) were discussed in 
Cote's study, wherein local departments felt that terrorism 
would not reach their 'back yards" and it was someone 
elser s problem (see Table 4.18) . 
Table 4.18 
Secondary Tlzeme 2: Arrogance, Ignorance & Apathy of  the 
Agency/ Comment Consistency with  
P a r t i c i p a n t  l i t e r a t u r e a  
PDl/Chief AA "The na lve t6  & t 
arrogance of t h i s  
country t h a t  we could 
no t  be sub j ec t ed  t o  
[ t e r ro r i sm]  s t upe f i ed  
me.. ." 
"Yes, how ignoran t  we + 
a r e  ... being  prepared 
i n  p rov id ing  
informat ion ... our  
f e d e r a l  govt.  i s  no t  
a s  e f f i c i e n t .  . . " 
'. . .how d i f f i c u l t  it 
i s  t o  prevent  an 
a t t a c k  & i d e n t i f y  a  
p o t e n t i a l  a t t a c k e r  
without  adequate 
i n t e l l i g e n c e .  " 
Note. This secondary theme was der ived  from ques t ion  20:  Are t h e r e  any 
important  l e s sons  t h a t  you have l e a rned  a s  a  r e s u l t  of 9/11? 
a+ = c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  what was found i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  review 
Table 4.19 
Secondary !t'beme 4 : Law Enforcement had Ineffective 
Communications System 
Agency/ Comment Consistency with 
Participant literaturea 
PD3/Chief BC "...we need better + 
communications & we're 
doing that right now 
by trying to get ... a 
radio system grant.N 
'We need to work on 
some type 
of ... statewide, 
communications 
frequency that our 
police agencies can 
operate on." 
Note. This secondary theme was derived from question 20: Are there any 
important lessons that you have learned as the result of 9/11? 
a+ = consistent with what was found in the literature review. 
The literature review provided a snapshot about 
communication problems between different law enforcement 
agencies during the Montgomery County sniper incidents 
(Lichtblau, 2002). Currently, the Central Florida Domestic 
Security Task Force is seeking federal funds to procure a 
statewide radio communication system to be shared by law 
enforcement agencies in the region. 
Cote's (2000) research broached theme 5, in that he 
found the problem with smaller agencies was that they did 
not have the resources (personnel and funding) to handle 
terrorism. Coter determined that larger agencies were more 
likely to become involved in terrorism training and 
preparedness. Table 4.20 describes the sentiments of the 
participants in this area. 
One participant (PD2/Asst. Dir. AB) thought that an 
important impact of 9/11 was that citizens were more 
appreciative of law enforcement (theme 6). His comment 
was, 'I think that the exact day changed the world's view 
of law enforcement, not that we were particularly 
villainous...but there was less than enough appreciation 
of ... what law enforcement ... did. .." (Interview transcript; 
Assistant Director AB, July 30, 2003). 
I did not review that aspect in this research. There 
was no information in the literature review that adequately 
covered the communitiesr increased appreciation of the 
police (theme 6), because the latter was not a focus of 
this study. However, the outpouring of community sympathy 
and appreciation for both police and fire services after 
9/11 was evident, and adequately covered in the media and 
Assistant Director ABrs sentiment can conceivably be 
verified. 
Table 4.20 
Secondary l%eme 5: Smaller Communities & Their Law 
Enforcement Agencies are Overlooked 
Agency/ Comment Consistency with 
Participant literaturea 
PD4/Dir. CB "We have done as much t 
as we can for a small 
dept & we've done it 
all ourselves, because 
this federal help I 
haven't seen it." 
" [The feds] have 
provided [training] 
for the larger cities 
& not the smaller 
cities. Forgetting to 
realize that small 
cities don't have the 
equipment & you have a 
whole lot of small 
cities..." 
"We didn't get much in + 
the beginning because 
of our population, we 
only have about 4,000 
people ..." 
Note. This secondary theme was derived from question 20: Are there any 
important lessons that you have learned as a result of 9/11? 
a+ = consistent with what was found in the literature review. 
Table 4.21 
Secondary !t'heme 7: Changes in Law Enforcement are Permanent 
Agency/ Comment Consistency with 
Participanta literatureb 
PD2/Asst. Dir. AB (AB) "...we can never + 
& Chief BA be comfortable again 
from this point 
forward. From now [on] 
we will certainly be 
prepared. " (BA) 
"...we have added a 
completely [new] 
dimension [at the 
port]. . ." 
"...the changes are 
going to have to 
continue. This 
[terrorism] has 
changed the way we do 
business forever." 
Note. This secondary theme was derived from question 21: Are there any 
other statements that you might want to make regarding the impact of 
9/11 on law enforcement? 
'PD2 has 2 participants. b+ = consistent with what was found in the 
literature. 
The literature review found that terrorism in the U.S. 
will have an indefinite impact on law enforcement, but the 
permanency is yet undetermined (theme 7). After the 
Oklahoma City bombing, Pre-9/11 writers (Wright, Ostrow and 
Cimons, 1995) doubted that there would be sweeping changes 
in law enforcement due to terrorism. However, measures by 
the federal government to aid law enforcement in the battle 
against terrorism, such as certain sections in the USA 
PATRIOT ACT are significant, but only temporary. But the 
literature shows that there was a rush to protect the U.S. 
from terrorism and the sense of urgency significantly 
impacted U.S. local law enforcement and continues to do so 
currently (FDLE, 2001; Buisch, 2002; Delattre, 2002; Krull, 
2002; Mundy, 2002; Horne, 2003). 
s-ry 
The participants provided answers to the research 
questions by describing the changes 9/11 had on law 
enforcement. Those answers suggest the following: 
1. Funding was not easily obtained by law enforcement 
agencies from federal authorities. When funding was 
provided to local law enforcement agencies by 
federal authorities, it was insufficient to cover 
the complete cost of training or equipment needs. 
Most agencies absorbed the cost in their budgets or 
used other funding sources or creative means to 
offset the cost of training, vigilance and equipment 
purchases. 
2.Vigilance was increased by all law enforcement 
agencies through enhanced security measures, 
additional personnel and special enforcement 
efforts. 
3. Training approaches changed for all agencies, and 
WMD and terrorism-related training were hastily 
added to regular police training, becoming part of 
mandatory training for all Florida law enforcement 
agencies. 
4. Bias-based policing practices did not increase for 
local law enforcement agencies; in facts all 
participants expressed sensitivity for Arabic or 
Middle Eastern citizens and were careful to ensure 
that bias-based policing did not occur in their 
areas of responsibility. The participants prevented 
bias-based policing through the department's 
philosophy, policies and managerial oversight and 
violators were disciplined accordingly. None of the 
agencies reported any bias-based or racial profiling 
incidents. However, some agencies reported 
increased concerns from Arabic, Middle Eastern and 
Jewish communities about the possibility of hate 
crimes on their temples, mosques and businesses. 
One agency reported a hate-crime against a Middle 
Eastern citizen. 
5. Terrorism related calls for service primarily 
involved suspected anthrax, suspicious packages and 
in some cases, suspicious persons of Arabic or 
Middle Eastern descent. Such calls for service 
increased immediately after 9/11 or shortly 
thereafter (October 2001) in two communities due to 
other circumstances; decreased 6 months later and 
police agencies are primarily dealing with the 
normal calls for service currently. 
6.Although there were distinctions in certain policies 
of accredited and nonaccredited agencies, the 
researcher did not find any distinction between the 
practices of accredited and nonaccredited agencies, 
as it related to 9/11. 
This chapter has provided the answers to the research 
questions in the language of the participants. The 
participants' own words echo those of previous researchers 
and authors in the same subject areas and contribute to 
broadening the knowledge of law enforcement's response to 
terrorism. The participants' descriptions describe why it 
is important to not allow bias-based profiling to erode the 
constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. The next chapter 
will discuss the findings, conclusions and implications. 
Chapter V 
Findings, Conclusions and Implications 
Introduction 
\\On September loth we were dismayed that people did not 
respect or care about what we did. No one cared that 
the ladders we used to climb up from the basements of 
old buildings were dilapidated or rickety. But on 
September 14* we were ashamed to find out that people 
really cared, because the outpouring of love and 
affection was overwhelming and tremendousrr (L. Knowles, 
personal communication, September 2, 2003). As told by 
Knowles at the Women in Policing conference, San 
Francisco, in describing comments of an anonymous New 
York City Fire Department firefighter a few days after 
9/11. 
Chapter 5 will provide a summary of the study, which 
reviews the two primary research questions, subset 
questions, and the data collected and analyzed. Secondly, 
in the conclusions, this chapter will present the 
researcherrs personal evaluation of the results of this 
work and relevant previous work supporting the findings. 
Third, recommendations for further research areas are 
discussed. Fourth, implications of what should be done and 
how it should be done regarding the impact of 9/11 on law 
enforcement practices are outlined. Finally, areas and 
issues that this research briefly visited or does not cover 
will be examined for possible future research. 
Summklry of the study 
This research sought to follow the path that local law 
enforcement agencies took after the terrorist events of 
9/11 and herein described in the following research 
questions: 
1. What changes did the September 11, 2001 domestic 
terrorism events and weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) have on accredited and nonaccredited law 
enforcement agencies, directly following the 
terrorism attack, 6 months after and currently in 
the following areas: 
A. Funding 
B. Vigilance 
C. Training 
D. Bias-based policing 
E. Call response 
2. What was the distinction, if any, between the 
practices of accredited and nonaccredited law 
enforcement agencies post 9/11? 
Although, similar previous academic research was 
limited in this subject area, a review of the literature 
did find that local police departments were not adequately 
prepared to deal with terrorism in the U.S. The 
limitations were in funding and training needed to prepare 
police personnel for terrorism events. The review also 
found that local police were facing federal pressure to 
change certain practices that would lead to bias-based 
policing against Middle Eastern and'Arabic citizens, and 
the pros and cons were delineated. The literature review 
also provided part of the basis for developing the survey 
instrument used for the law enforcement population. The 
survey instrument was consistent with the data sought in 
the research questions (see Appendix E). 
The research population involved 63 local law 
enforcement agencies in the South Florida counties of 
Indian River, St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach, Broward and 
Miami-Dade. Twenty-nine law enforcement agencies responded 
to the survey instrument, which represented a 46% response 
rate. From the respondents, I selected and visited 7 
agencies and interviewed 8 executives (two at one agency). 
The data gleaned from these interviews were supportive of 
six major findings . 
First, funding was not easily obtained by law 
enforcement agencies from federal authorities. When 
funding was provided to local law enforcement agencies by 
federal authorities, it was insufficient to cover the 
complete cost of training or equipment needs. All 7 
agencies absorbed the cost in their budgets or used other 
funding sources or creative means to offset the cost of 
training. Two agencies used federal grants to purchase WMD 
equipments (PD3 and PDT) and one agency was given some 
equipment ( P D 5 ) .  Two agencies used their own funds to 
purchase equipment (PD1 and PD2) and one agency simply did 
without equipment and was awaiting funds promised by the 
federal authorities (PD4) .  One agency (PD6) used a 
combination of their regular budgeted funds and non 
terrorism related grants to obtain equipment. 
Second, vigilance was increased by all law enforcement 
agencies through enhanced security measures, additional 
personnel and special enforcement efforts. Such increases 
included: (1) increased personnel at three agencies (PD1, 
PD2 and PD6); ( 2 )  redirection and reassignment of personnel 
toward homeland security at one agency (PD2) ;  and ( 3 )  
enhanced focus on likely soft targets for terrorism by all 
agencies. Focuses also included Jewish temples, a 
rabbinical school and Mosques, which were done as a 
precautionary measure against hate crimes. 
Third, training approaches changed for all agencies 
and were concentrated on WMD and terrorism-related issues. 
Less emphasis was placed on the standard police training, 
as terrorism related training took its place. Civilian or 
nonsworn personnel were included in the training at two 
agencies (PD2 and PD5).  
Fourth, bias-based policing practices did not increase 
for local law enforcement agencies; in fact all 
participants expressed sensitivity for Arabic or Middle 
Eastern citizens and were careful to ensure that bias-based 
policing did not occur in their areas of responsibility. 
The participants prevented bias-based policing through the 
department's philosophy, policies and managerial oversight 
and violators were disciplined accordingly. None of the 
agencies reported any bias-based or racial profiling 
incidents involving their personnel. However, some 
agencies reported increased concerns from Arabic, Middle 
Eastern and Jewish communities about the possibility of 
hate crimes on their temples, mosques and businesses. One 
agency reported a single hate-crime, which was perpetrated 
against a Muslim. 
Fifth, terrorism related calls for service primarily 
involved suspected anthrax, suspicious packages and in some 
cases suspicious persons of Arabic or Middle Eastern 
descent. Such calls for service did increase immediately 
after 9/11 or shortly thereafter (October 2001) in two 
communities to other circumstances; decreased 6 months 
later and police agencies are primarily dealing with the 
normal calls for service currently. 
Lastly, although there were distinctions in certain 
policies of accredited and nonaccredited agencies, the 
researcher did not find any distinction between the 
practices of accredited and nonaccredited agencies, as it 
relates to 9/11. 
Conclusions 
The research design in this study began with a 
traditional survey instrument used to extract information 
pertaining to 9/11 from local police agencies. I selected 
police executives from the respondents and collected data 
through: (1) in-depth, open-ended interviews; (2) direct 
observation; and (3) written documents. I was able to 
analyze and synthesize the data of the 8 respondents, 
developing important findings that were consistent with 
what others in the literature review had determined. 
I conclude that 9/11 increased WMD/terrorism training 
for law enforcement agencies, but current law enforcement 
training was left intact. Authors that I reviewed 
supported the need for WMD/terrorism training and noted the 
subsequent shift following 9/11 (Cote', 2000; Lober, 2002; 
Moore, 2002; Police Standards, 2001). I experienced a mad 
dash for WMD/terrorism training a few weeks after 9/11 and 
state mandates quickly changed the training requirements. 
Subsequently, police agencies had to rush their personnel 
through mandatory WMD/terrorism training, which has become 
standard for all law enforcement agencies in Florida. I 
participated in the regional terrorism task force, which 
assisted in augmenting training at my own agency. 
However, the major impact of WMD/terrorism training 
was financial and funding was primarily absorbed by the law 
enforcement agencies. Although 17 of the survey 
respondents reported receiving some funding from federal or 
state government for terrorism training or WMD equipment, 
11 did not receive any funding or assistance outside of 
their own budgets or nonterrorism grant funding sources 
(see Table 4.1). I did not receive any monetary assistance 
from the federal or state government for training or WMD 
equipment at my own agency, and it required the expenditure 
of regular budgeted funds and the Law Enforcement Trust 
Fund. During the final writing of this research, I 
received a few WMD suits via the regional task force from 
the federal equipment grant, which was promised to law 
enforcement agencies. Only 2 of the 8 executives 
interviewed received federal funding and they also said 
that it was limited. 
Therefore, I conclude that funding from the federal 
government is promised, but the majority of the agencies 
executives interviewed are in a "wait and see" mode 
(Modzelewski, 2003). Chapters 2 and 3 identify federal 
funding sources, but note how federal funding is scarce and 
being reprioritized to meet WMD/terrorism needs (Weedon, 
2002). Cote' (2000) found that funds were the biggest 
obstacle that local law enforcement agencies faced in 
developing counter terrorism training procedures and 
policies. 
I conclude that vigilance in varying degrees increased 
significantly for all local law enforcement agencies. The 
8 participants expressed how vigilance was increased at 
their agencies, out of necessity due to 9/11 and the 
literature supported their assertions (Wright, Ostrow and 
Cimons, 1995; Delattre, 2002; Horne, 2003). Supportive of 
this conclusion were the physical security changes at the 
law enforcement infrastructure itself, additional security 
measures put in place that I observed. Prior to 9/11, 
"Only the very large agencies have taken the necessary 
steps to respond to terrorist incidents" (Cote', 2000, p. 
68). Of course, I conclude that the latter is no longer 
true. 
Through interviews of the 8 participants, I conclude 
that the impact of 9/11 served to strengthen the resilience 
of law enforcement agencies to provide constitutionally 
based law enforcement practices. The researcher's 
conclusion about bias-based policing is supported and 
augmented by what was discovered during the compilation of 
the research material. Chapter 2 discussed the 
significance of the U.S. Constitution on law enforcement 
practices and the participants. Chapter 4 spoke of the 
importance of abiding by constitutional practices: (1) 
indirectly; by referencing policies, mission statements and 
department philosophy, or (2) directly; by referencing the 
U.S. Constitution. 
The findings suggest that law enforcement executives 
are cognizant of the need to exercise nonbias-based 
policing, even in the face of a changing society and a 
limited number of people intent on disrupting a free 
society through terrorism. The 8 executives have gone to 
great lengths to ensure that their policies against bias- 
based policing are in place and adhered to within their 
various commands. The evidence can be found in the mission 
statements of 6 of the 7 law enforcement agencies, PD7 
being the sole exception. 
Additionally, two agencies, whose executives were 
participants, reported significant populations of Middle 
Eastern citizens (Arabic or Jewish communities) and how 
they (PD2 and PD3) were cementing their relationships with 
their Jewish or Arabic communities, rather than targeting 
them with bias-based policing. Previous work discussed in 
the literature review said the latter is the right thing to 
do (Delattre, 2002; Hooverman, 2002; Raterman, 2002). As 
suggested by previous research that local law enforcement 
had increased racial profiling against Middle Eastern 
individuals (Hoover, 2002; New Profilees, 2002), I conclude 
that the contrary is being observed and practiced. 
It has been my experience, in my 33 years in law 
enforcement, that law enforcement agencies have been 
"browbeaten" by civil liberty organizations and federal 
legislature over the past decade to ensure that bias-based 
practices are eliminated. The result is the emergence of a 
new professional law enforcement executive to carry out 
modern day policing and safeguard the rights of all 
citizens. I share the same conclusions as the researcher 
and notable police expert, George Kelling (Nichols, 2003), 
who concludes that terrorism is just another hurdle in the 
field of law enforcement that must be dealt with. But it 
cannot be at the expense of trampling the civil rights of 
Arabic, Muslim and Middle Eastern citizens, or law 
enforcement will return to the era of "Jim Crow" and the 
civil rights disturbances of the 60s. 
I conclude that WMD/terrorism related calls for 
service did increase significantly during the first few 
weeks after 9/11, 6 months later were essentially back to 
normal levels and remain as such currently. Even in a 
community wherein the general populace was seasonal (Town 
C, PD4, Dir. CB), once the residents returned home in 
October 2001, they began calling law enforcement reporting 
suspicious packages, persons, etc. All of the calls proved 
to be false, with the lone exception of PD1, which had the 
only authentic anthrax call that exacerbated other false 
calls in October 2001. In the words of the participants, 
no department was left unscathed by the calls for service 
increases. 
I conclude that there was no significant fluctuation 
in the changes in training, funding, vigilance and bias- 
based policing practices by law enforcement after 9/11. 
Six months after and currently, what law enforcement 
agencies did in these areas remains constant and are 
included in daily police practices, as a way of doing day- 
to-day business. There was an immediate spike in providing 
WMD/terrorism training and heightened awareness immediately 
after 9/11, but calls for service is the only area that 
fluctuated significantly, with a peak and then a return to 
normal. 
I conclude that accreditation played no significant 
role in how law enforcement agencies reacted to 9/11, and 
as such, did not find any difference between accredited and 
nonaccredited agencies. Three of the agencies were not 
accredited and demonstrated the same reaction to 9/11 as 
the other four accredited agencies. The value of 
accreditation to agencies participating in this study was 
found in its professionalism, accountability and policy 
development, which could provide some leverage against 
racial profiling or bias-based policing. 
I used a diverse group of police executives who were 
of different racial backgrounds and also added a female 
police chief, to determine if there was a difference in the 
their perspectives. The 8 executives interviewed were 4 
White males, 3 Black males and 1 Black female. The 
findings were all consistent, regardless of race or gender. 
Therefore, I concluded that race and gender did not impact 
the responses of the participants. 
This research broached a subject rarely studied, prior 
to 9/11 and the absence of previous academic studies bare 
out this conclusion. This research is contemporary, 
indicative of current world trends and the involvement of 
the U.S., both at home and abroad, in the fight against 
terrorism. 
Implications 
The implications of this research for the practitioner 
suggest that law enforcement agencies must be prudent, 
creative and flexible in finding financial resources to 
provide additional training and equipment needed to face 
the new demands of terrorism. The latter is essential in 
the public sector that already operates amidst shrinking 
public dollars and a reprioritization of federal funding. 
The participants in this study used all of the means 
aforementioned, when faced with no or limited federal 
dollars to offset the cost of terrorism. Prudence is 
demonstrated in common-sense approaches, e.g., coordinating 
with other agencies to reduce expenditures and adopting a 
"train the trainerN approach, wherein once learned by one 
department member, other members of a department are 
trained. Creativity is demonstrated in using alternative 
training sources, e.g., obtaining pertinent terrorism 
training information from a state web site. Flexibility is 
demonstrated in redirecting regular funds, grants and 
forfeiture proceeds for terrorism purposes. The importance 
of collaborated training efforts among area law enforcement 
agencies, as well as fire departments cannot be 
understated, because it has been proven beneficial to local 
police departments in this study. 
A new sense of urgency is clearly upon the U.S. and 
that has been placed squarely on the shoulders of local law 
enforcement agencies to protect its citizens against once 
unimaginable acts of terrorism. As suggested by Moore and 
Duggan (2002), the federal government will exert local 
police departments to take a more active role in homeland 
security. As such, for the practitioner, the implications 
are that increased vigilance is here and is applicable to 
the smallest rural law enforcement agency, and also the 
largest metropolitan agency. However, the magnitude and 
scope of this increased vigilance will be determined by the 
resource capacity (funding and staffing) of the service 
provider and the dictates of its service community. 
Training changes are nothing new in law enforcement 
and have consistently evolved over the years. For example, 
when I began my law enforcement career in 1970, training 
was primarily on the job, in the hands of a season veteran 
who taught you "the ropes." Then, the police academy was 
only six weeks, unlike the current police academy that is 
on the average 4 months. Today, police training in the 
U.S. is determined by the time period, trends and events, 
and new legislation based on constitutional 
interpretations, dictated in part by society. Law 
enforcement executives must adapt to the training needs and 
in the case of terrorism, this adaptation is based on the 
need to have police officers familiar with WMD and 
terrorism. 
The implications of this research suggest that local 
law enforcement must not have a "knee-jerk" reaction to 
events, such as terrorism that would undermine the efforts 
made in the past to maintain ethics and professionalism in 
law enforcement. The latter has important implications to 
legislators and other lawmakers. Constitutional principles 
must be maintained regardless of the actions of a few that 
have resorted to insane terrorism tactics. If law 
enforcement agencies engage in unconstitutional practices, 
it will undermine the democratic system and be tantamount 
to a move closer to becoming a police state. There must be 
a balance between the rights of citizens and right to live 
in a free and safe society. The question arises, "How does 
law enforcement find that balance?" 
Just as many of the participant agencies have done, 
increased dialogue by law enforcement between members of 
the community, especially Middle Eastern, Jewish and Arabic 
communities are important in preventing bias-based 
practices. The implications suggest that community- 
policing practices are still important, as the police must 
still bridge the gap between communities and law. 
enforcement through reach-out efforts. Communities must 
note the latter and maintain open lines of communication 
with law enforcement as well. Policies, organizational 
philosophies and education of police officers against bias- 
based policing practices are equally important in 
preventing unethical practices. The agency head sets the 
standard and the overall tone of the police organization, 
so he/she is a crucial factor in finding a balance that 
ensures civil liberty, while yet maintaining the safety of 
the community. 
Does a police executive say no when asked to violate 
the constitutional rights of citizens by another agency? 
The answer must be unequivocally no, and as learned in this 
study, the reaction of many local agencies have been a 
resounding 'no" to requests to disregard rights guaranteed 
by the U.S. Constitution (Shank, 2001). 
Calls for service are what drive the police agency and 
in time past, the police profession has assured the public 
that it can provide a swift response, which proved to be a 
dismal failure. Nevertheless, as the literature review and 
participants suggests, suspicious WMD/terrorism related 
calls for services did increase significantly after 9/11 
and will likely happen again when the next terrorism event 
occurs in the U.S. As in the aftermath of 9/11 and 
foreseeable in the future, the overwhelming majority of 
such calls will be false. Mitigating the plethora of false 
calls are a must and the implications suggest that to carry 
out the former, WMD/terrorism training in the communities 
and better communication between the police and the media 
in terrorism, as prescribed by Barnathan, (1987) and 
discussed by three of the participants are required. 
This brings the researcher to a major implication, 
which is the independence of law enforcement agencies. 
U.S. local law enyorcement agencies are primarily 
autonomous, and act independently and under the control of 
their respective government. However, as noted by Furay 
(1999) and Cote' (2000), law enforcement agencies must be 
interdependent on other law enforcement agencies in order 
to successfully address the issues of training, funding and 
vigilance. To a lesser degree, this interdependence 
contributes to reducing bias-based policing and handling 
increased call response. Interdependence is not only a 
resource saver, it also puts all parties on the same page, 
so to speak. Similar actions, done together, emerge as 
centralization and consolidation which, as the literature 
review denotes, provides considerable benefits in handling 
terrorism events (Furay, 1999; Cote1, 2000; FDLE, 2001; 
Beary, 2002; Lichtblau, 2002) . 
Implications of accreditation suggest that it is 
worthwhile if the law enforcement agency has the means to 
pursue it. Although all of the participants recognized the 
value and importance of accreditation, staffing and funding 
requirements to implement or revise policies to meet the 
accreditation standard was a drawback. The implications 
suggest that when an executive recognizes the importance of 
accreditation and exercises the values in practices used at 
his/her agency, actual accreditation is not a necessity. 
Accreditation had little significance in this study. 
Finally, although the participants spoke of increased 
security measures in their service areas and their 
facilities, the implications suggest that security remains 
more in name than in actual practice at the police 
agencies. I was able to enter police facilities without 
major challenges and bypass the standard security protocol, 
simply by stating who I was at all 7 of the police 
facilities. I was wearing a badge only on one occasion 
(PD2) and was allowed to bypass the electronic screening 
device. I was never in uniform and did not have any 
personal knowledge of the staff responsible for screening. 
Of course, the only exception would have been at PD5. 
Nevertheless, local police practitioners must exercise 
better security measures in their own back yards before 
seeking to strengthen security in other areas. 
Recommendations for Fcrrther Study and fiture research 
Although this research found answers to the questions 
posed, it also opened doors in other areas associated with 
law enforcement and the aftermath of 9/11. The 
participants spoke of improved and increased cooperation 
between law enforcement agencies at the federal, state and 
local levels as the result of 9/11. In the words of the 
participants, cooperation among different levels of law 
enforcement has improved response to terrorism and 
conserved funding through consolidated training. Cote' 
(2000, p. 68) found, "In a business of limited funds and 
scarce resources. ... Most agencies have now turned to 
mutual aid agreements and coordinated response drills." 
Smaller agencies are able to rely on the larger agencies to 
fill in gaps that are left in the smaller agencies. 
Further research should delve into this new level of 
cooperation among law enforcement agencies to determine if 
it is consistent with the findings of this study and to 
determine its effectiveness in handling terrorist events. 
The second area of cooperation was noted between fire 
departments and law enforcement agencies after 9/11. It 
has been my experience that fire departments are already 
advanced far beyond police departments in the application 
of incident command, which is needed in handling terrorism 
events and those in law enforcement can learn valuable 
lessons from fire departments. Subsequently, as noted in 
this study, fire department are included in Florida's 
regional terrorism task forces and work collaboratively 
with law enforcement. The research could be extended into 
these areas to determine the extent and benefit of such 
cooperation. 
This research could be duplicated in other regions in 
the State of Florida, or expanded to include the entire 
state. It would be important to see if the findings in 
other sections of the state are consistent with the 
findings of this study. Lastly, there is a plethora of 
data collected from the 63 South Florida law enforcement 
agencies that would be valuable in quantitative research on 
the subject of this research. 
This study examined the impact of 9/11 on law 
enforcement practices from September 11, 2001 to the 
current date, October 11, 2003. The time period has been 
slightly over 2 years. Future research should follow with 
a longitudinal study, perhaps over the next 5 years, to see 
if the changes discussed are long lasting. It would be 
important to determine how local government, citizens and 
law enforcement adjusted. 
Another area for future research is funding from the 
federal government to local law enforcement agencies. 
Currently, the U.S. has major financial commitments in 
Iraq, in an effort to rebuild that country, amidst 
terrorism, which has taken its human toll among the U.S. 
military and the populace. A future study should determine 
if federal funding, as suggested by the literature review, 
is still on the path for redirection to local law 
enforcement for terrorism. It would be important to 
determine if there was a change in funding and identify the 
possible cause as the current Iraqi crises. 
This research may have a limitation based on its 
qualitative nature and difficulty in generalizing the 
results to a larger population, due to its small sample 
size (Patton, 1990). Extrapolation of the data of the 
participants was used in this research rather than 
generalization. Therefore, future research might look at a 
larger population or even a quantitative approach, so that 
hard data could provide a statistically precise finding, 
based on generalization. 
Final summary 
The purpose of this study was to determine the impact 
of 9/11 on the practices of local law enforcement agencies. 
The focus areas were training, funding, vigilance, bias- 
based policing, and call response (calls for service). The 
two types of agencies reviewed were accredited and 
nonaccredited. The findings were that local law 
enforcement agencies: (1) did not obtain sufficient funding 
from the federal government to cover the cost of terrorism; 
(2) increased their vigilance; (3) increased their training 
to include WMD and terrorism issues; (4) did not engage in 
bias-based policing; (5) experienced increased calls for 
service primarily involving suspicious packages, incidents, 
etc.; and (6) did not act differently due to their 
accreditation status. The findings revealed that calls for 
services returned to normal level 6 months after 9/11 and 
are currently at pre-9/11 levels. However, the other areas 
of interest remained constant, regardless of any change 
after 9/11. 
Based on the findings, I have concluded that 9/11 
impacted law enforcement financially, and increased 
cooperation and information sharing among all levels of law 
enforcement. Terrorism training for all agencies became 
the standard practice because it was mandated by Florida 
Statutes to incorporate it as part of the law enforcement- 
training curriculum. I have concluded that although the 
federal government promised funding, it was received in 
insufficient amounts by relatively few agencies and was not 
enough to offset the budgetary impact on the agency. I 
concluded that vigilance was increased at all agencies, 
based on their fiscal ability to enhance security at their 
facilities and in their communities. The local law 
enforcement agency executives interviewed did not practice 
bias-based policing and therefore I have concluded that it 
did not occur as suspected by some in the literature 
review. I have concluded that there was an increased in 
calls for service by all agencies, however, currently calls 
for service are back to normal. I have concluded that 
accredited and nonaccredited agencies acted the same after 
9/11. Finally, although the original questions did not 
factor in race or sex of the participants, I used a diverse 
group to determine if the responses would be different, 
based on race and sex. The findings were consistent and I 
have concluded that race and sex did not impact the 
findings of this study. 
The data discovered in this study may not be 
sufficient to generalize to a larger population, but the 
findings and conclusion were extrapolated from the words of 
the participants. The latter provides a rich narrative and 
descriptive account of the direction of local law 
enforcement. Although bias-based policing did not emerge 
as a problem and whether an agency was accredited or not 
accredited did not factor negatively into the findings, 
prevalent themes suggested that local law enforcement 
agencies were inadequately prepared or trained and sorely 
lacking in funding and communication immediately following 
9/11. Remaining challenges suggest that local law 
enforcement in the U.S. may not have the requisite 
experience, funding and communication flow to sufficiently 
deal with terrorism. 
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APPENDIX A 
U.S. Constitution, Bill of Rights 
Amendment I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances. 
Amendment I1 
A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security 
of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear 
arms, shall not be infringed. 
Amendment I11 
No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any 
house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of 
war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual 
service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Amendment VII 
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, 
than according to the rules of the common law. 
Amendment VI I1 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
Amendment IX 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained 
by the people. 
Amendment X 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are 
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. 
APPENDIX B 
Law Enforcement Oath of Honor 
Source: International Association of Chiefs of Police 
On my honor, 
I will never betray my badge, 
my integrity, my character, 
or the public trust. 
I will always have 
the courage to hold myself 
and others accountable for our actions. 
I will always uphold the constitution, 
my community and the agency I serve. 
APPENDIX C 
Law E n f o r c e m e n t  C o d e  of E t h i c s  
Source: International A s s o c i a t i o n  of C h i e f s  of P o l i c e  
As a law enforcement officer, my fundamental duty is 
to serve the community; to safeguard lives and property; to 
protect the innocent against deception, the weak against 
oppression or intimidation and the peaceful against 
violence or disorder; and to respect the constitutional 
rights of all to liberty, equality and justice. 
I will keep my private life unsullied as an example to 
all and will behave in a manner that does not bring 
discredit to me or to my agency. I will maintain 
courageous calm in the face of danger, scorn or ridicule; 
develop self-restraint; and be constantly mindful of the 
welfare of others. Honest in thought and deed both in my 
personal and official life, I will be exemplary in obeying 
the law and the regulations of my department. Whatever I 
see or hear of a confidential nature or that is confided in 
me in my official capacity will be kept ever secret unless 
revelation is necessary in the performance of my duty. 
I will never act officiously or permit personal 
feelings, prejudices, political beliefs, aspirations, 
animosities or friendships to influence me decisions. With 
no compromise for crime and with relentless prosecution of 
criminals, I will enforce the law courteously and 
appropriately without fear or favor, malice or ill will, 
never employing unnecessary force or violence and never 
accepting gratuities. 
I recognize the badge of my office as a symbol of 
public faith, and I accept it as a public trust to be held 
so long as I am true to the ethics of police service. I 
will never engage in acts of corruption or bribery, nor 
will I condone such acts by other police officers. I will 
cooperate with all legally authorized agencies and their 
representatives in the pursuit of justice. 
I know that I alone am responsible for my own standard 
of professional performance and will take every reasonable 
opportunity to enhance and improve my level of knowledge 
and competence. 
I will constantly strive to achieve these objectives 
and ideals, dedicating myself before God to my chosen 
profession . . .law enforcement. 
APPENDIX D 
Letter of Introduction for September ll* Survey 
[Date] 
I am Ph.D. student at Lynn University, Boca Raton, Florida preparing a study on the aftermath of 
the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 and their impact on law enforcement. My dissertation 
is entitled "Examining the Post September 11, 2001 Practices of Accredited and Nonaccredited 
Law Enforcement Agencies in the Aspects of Training, Legal and Service Delivery." I would ask 
that you kindly complete the attached survey and return it to me in the enclosed self-addressed 
stamped envelope by July 15, 2003. 1 will be selecting 6 police executives from the respondents 
for personal interviews. 
Your assistance would contribute toward the completion of my dissertation. Your cooperation 
would be greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely, I am 
Ghiet ot Police 
P.S. If you cannot open the file, please notify me and I will forward the survey via U.S. 
Mail. 
APPENDIX E 
September llth 2001 Survey 
The purpose of this research project is to study the 
aftermath of the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 and 
its impact on your agency in the areas of terrorism/WMD 
training, calls for service, legal issues and funding. The 
survey should take between 20 and 25 minutes of your time. 
Your responses to the questions are confidential and the 
information from the survey will only be assessable to the 
primary investigator. You have the right to stop responding 
to the survey at any time and discontinue your 
participation in this research. 
Please complete the survey and e-mail to  or 
return via mail in the self-addressed prepaid envelope, or 
fax to  by July 15, 2003. 
1. What is the size of your agency? Sworn 
nonsworn 
2. Is your agency accredited? 
National 
State 
National & State 
No 
3. Do you have a policy against racial profiling or bias- 
based policing? 
4. If yes, does your policy address specific minority, 
ethnic or religious groups? 
(a) If yes, please list the group (s) . 
5. Has your department been approached to be more vigilant 
toward certain groups, e.g., Muslim, persons of Arabic 
descent or with Islamic belief? 
(a) If so, by whom? 
(b) Did your 
agency comply with the request? 
(c) Were there any ethical or legal concerns about bias- 
based policing? 
6. Are there a significant number of Muslim, persons of 
Arabic descent or with Islamic beliefs in your service 
community? - 
7. Were there any departmental policies, plans, etc., to 
handle weapons of mass destruction (WMD) prior to 
September 11, 2001? 
8. Were departmental policies or plans changed after 
September 11, 2001? 
9. Were there any terrorism/WMD training requirements prior 
to September 11, 2001? (a) After September 11, 
2001? (b) Do these training components continue 
today? 
10. Was there an increase in the number of WMD calls from 
the public? 
11. Are there a similar number of calls today? 
12. Did your agency receive funding from federal or state 
governments (outside of your own fiscal entity) for 
terrorism/WMD training, related equipment or for 
increased vigilance? 
13.Are there any other statements you might want to make 
regarding the impact of September 1.1, 2001 on law 
enforcement? 
APPENDIX F 
Alphabetical listing of Law Enforcement Agencies Surveyed 
Agency Jurisdiction 
Bal Harbour Police Dept city 
Bay Harbor Island Police Dept city 
Belle Glade Police Dept city 
Boca Raton Police Dept city 
Boynton Beach Police Dept city 
Broward County Sheriff's Office county 
Coconut Creek Police Dept city 
Cooper City Police Dept city 
Coral Gables Police Dept city 
Coral Springs Police Dept city 
Davie Police Dept city 
Delray Beach Police Dept city 
Florida City Police Dept city 
Fort Lauderdale Police Dept city 
Fort Pierce Police Dept city 
Hallandale Police Dept city 
Hialeah Police Dept city 
Hialeah Gardens Police Dept city 
Highland Beach Police Dept city 
Hollywood Police Dept city 
Homestead Police Dept city 
Juno Beach Police Dept city 
Jupiter Police Dept city 
Jupiter Island Public Safety 
Dept city 
Lake Worth Police Dept city 
Lantana Police Dept city 
Lauderhill Police Dept city 
Lighthouse Point Police Dept city 
Margate Police Dept city 
Martin County Sheriff's Office county 
Medley Police Dept city 
Miami Police Dept city 
Miami Beach Police Dept city 
Miami-Dade Police Dept county 
Miami Shores Police Dept city 
Miami Springs Police Dept city 
Miramar Police Dept city 
North Bay Village Police Dept city 
North Miami Police Dept city 
North Miami Beach Police Dept city 
County 
Miami-Dade 
Miami-Dade 
Palm Bch. 
Palm Bch. 
Palm Bch. 
Broward 
Broward 
Broward 
Miami-Dade 
Broward 
Broward 
Palm Bch. 
Miami-Dade 
Broward 
St. Lucie 
Miami-Dade 
Miami-Dade 
Miami-Dade 
Broward 
Broward 
Miami-Dade 
Palm Bch. 
Palm Bch. 
Martin 
Palm Bch. 
Palm Bch. 
Broward 
Broward 
Broward 
Martin 
Miami-Dade 
Miami-Dade 
Miami-Dade 
Miami-Dade 
Miami-Dade 
Miami-Dade 
Broward 
Miami-Dade 
Miami-Dade 
Miami-Dade 
North Palm Beach Police Dept city 
Opa Locka Police Dept city 
Pahokee Police Dept city 
Palm Beach County Sheriff's 
Off ice county 
Palm Beach Police Dept city 
Palm Beach Gardens Police Dept city 
Palm Beach Shores Police Dept city 
Parkland Police Dept city 
Pembroke Pines Police Dept city 
Plantation Police Dept city 
Port St. Lucie Police Dept city 
Riviera Beach Police Dept city 
Royal Palm Beach Police Dept city 
South Bay Police Dept city 
South Miami Police Dept city 
St. Lucie County Sheriff's 
Office county 
Stuart Police Dept city 
Sunrise Police Dept city 
Surfside Police Dept city 
Tequesta Police Dept city 
Vero Beach Police Dept city 
West Palm Beach Police Dept city 
Wilton Manor Police Dept city 
Miami-Dade 
Miami-Dade 
Palm Bch. 
Palm Beach 
Palm Bch. 
Palm Bch. 
Palm Bch. 
Broward 
Broward 
Broward 
St. Lucie 
Palm Bch. 
Palm Bch. 
Palm Bch. 
Miami-Dade 
St. Lucie 
Martin 
Broward 
Miami-Dade 
Palm Bch. 
Indian River 
Palm Bch. 
Broward 
APPENDIX G 
Alphabetical Listing of Survey Respondents 
1. Belle Glade  P o l i c e  Dept 
2 .  Boca Raton P o l i c e  Dept 
3. Boynton Beach P o l i c e  Dept 
4 .  C o r a l  S p r i n g s  P o l i c e  Dept 
5. Davie  P o l i c e  Dept 
6. F o r t  P i e r c e  P o l i c e  Dept 
7 .  Hollywood P o l i c e  Dept 
8.  J u p i t e r  P o l i c e  Dept 
9. J u p i t e r  I s l a n d  P u b l i c  S a f e t y  Dept 
10 .  Lan tana  P o l i c e  Dept 
11. L a u d e r h i l l  P o l i c e  Dept 
12 .  Marga te  P o l i c e  Dept 
13. M a r t i n  County S h e r i f f ' s  O f f i c e  
14 .  Miami-Dade P o l i c e  Dept 
15. Miami S p r i n g s  P o l i c e  Dept 
16.  Nor th  M i a m i  P o l i c e  Dept 
17.  Opa Locka P o l i c e  Dept 
18.  Palm Beach County S h e r i f f ' s  Office 
19 .  Palm Beach P o l i c e  Dept 
20. Palm Beach Gardens P o l i c e  Dept 
21.  Palm Beach S h o r e s  P o l i c e  Dept 
22. P a r k l a n d  P o l i c e  Dept 
23.  R i v i e r a  Beach P o l i c e  Dept 
24. Sou th  Bay P o l i c e  Dept 
25.  Sou th  Miami P o l i c e  Dept 
26.  S t .  L u c i e  County S h e r i f f ' s  Office 
27. S t u a r t  P o l i c e  Dept 
28.  Vero Beach P o l i c e  Dept 
29.  West Palm Beach P o l i c e  Dept 
APPENDIX H 
Personal Interview Questions 
1. Why is your agency [not] accredited through CALEA or 
the State of Florida? 
2. How do you prevent bias-based policing or racial 
profiling in your agency? 
3. How did you handle complaints about bias-based policing 
or racial profiling prior to September 11, 2001? 
4. How were bias-based policing or racial profiling 
complaints handled after September 11, 2001? 
5. What type of policies addressing terrorism or WMD did 
your agency have prior to September 11, 2001? 
6 .  What type of policies have you implemented as a result 
of domestic terrorism and increased homeland security? 
7. How has increased security measures and the ever- 
present threat of domestic terrorism changed any other 
operational policies or practices? 
8. What training methodologies changed? 
9. What was the fiscal impact of training? 
10. What type of additional equipment for WMD or 
terrorism has your agency purchased? 
11. Can you describe the funding shortfalls, as the results 
of equipment and other operational expenses? 
12. What type of additional funding or assistance did you 
receive from the federal government? 
13. If you did not receive funding, how did you handle the 
fiscal impact? 
14. How would you describe the calls-for-service, 
especially WMD or terrorism related calls, immediately 
after September 11, 2001? 
15. How many calls were determined to be bona fide? 
16. How would you describe the current calls-for-service or 
policing, practices? 
17. What was the most significant impact to your department 
as a result of the terroristsf events of September 11, 
2001? 
18. What was your attitude about terrorism prior to 
September 11, 2001? 
19. What is your attitude today? 
20. Are there any important lessons that you have learned 
as a result of 9/11? 
21. Are there any other statements that you might want to 
make regarding the impact of September 11, 2001 on law 
enforcement? 
APPENDIX I 
{Recipient's Address) 
Dear 
I am the Chief of Police for the City of Fort Pierce, Florida and also a doctoral candidate at Lynn 
University in Boca Raton, Florida. The purpose of this letter is to invite you to participate in a research 
project. My dissertation topic is "Examining the Post September 11, 2001 Practices of Accredited and 
Nonaccredited Law Enforcement Agencies in the Aspects of Training, Legal and Service Delivery." I 
would greatly appreciate your participation in this study, which will be beneficial to those of us in the field 
of Law Enforcement. 
This study involves a one-on-one interview and a follow up interview. The one-on-one interview will 
consist of open-ended questions about your professional experience in the aftermath of the terrorist events 
of September 11, 2002 and the impact on your agency. The interview will be tape recorded for a later 
analysis. Once the analysis has been completed, you will be contacted again for a follow up interview to 
review the analysis for accuracy. The total time involved in your participation will be approximately two 
to three hours and the information you provide will be kept strictly confidential! 
The goal of this study is to assess the operational impact of terrorism/WIvD training and call response and 
convey that impact in the form of a description. The description can then be used to help others better 
understand that experience and aid in the planning & preparation process. You have been selected because 
your law enforcement agency meets the criteria needed to make a proper assessment. 
You will find enclosed two copies of the following forms: (1) "Informed Consent" and (2) "Informed 
Consent to Audio-Record." Please review the forms carefully. I would request that you sign and date each 
of the forms, and provide a telephone number in the space provided so I may contact you to set up the 
interview. Please maintain one copy of each form for yourself and return one copy of each form in the 
provided retum envelope. Once I receive the forms, I will contact you to set up a time convenient for you 
to conduct the interview. i look forward to meeting with you. 
If you have any questions about this study, please do not hesitate to contact me at  If you 
have concerns that you do not want to address with me, you may call Dr. Carole Warshaw of Lynn 
University, Dissertation Committee Chairperson, at  
Sincerely, I am 
Eugene G. Savage 
APPENDIX J 
INFORMED CONSENT 
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by 
Eugene G. Savage, a doctoral student in the College of Education program at 
Lynn University, Boca Raton, Florida. The research involves "Examining the 
Post September 11, 2001 Practices of Accredited and Non-Accredited Law 
Enforcement Agencies in Aspects of Training, Legal and Service Delivery." The 
goal of this study is to assess the operational impact of terrorism/WMD 
training and call response and convey that impact in the form of a description. 
The description can then be used to help other law enforcement agencies better 
understand the experience and aid in the planning and preparation process. You 
have been selected because your law enforcement agency meets the criteria 
needed to make a proper assessment. 
The study involves a one-on-one interview and follow-up interview. The 
one-on-one interview will consist of open-ended questions about your agencies 
experience in the aftermath of September llth. The interview will be tape 
recorded for a later analysis. Once the analysis has been completed, you will 
be contacted again for a follow-up interview to review the analysis for 
accuracy. The total time involved in your participation will be approximately 
two to three hours. 
The information you provide will be kept strictly confidential. The 
transcription of the interview will be coded with a number and an alias to 
protect your identity. Reports of this research will not include any 
identifiable data. The overall results of the research will be published in a 
doctoral dissertation as well as other possible venues (e.g. professional 
journal). Lynn University's Institutional Review Board has authorized access 
to all materials related to this research. 
It is hoped that this research will benefit other law enforcement 
agencies to better understand the experience of terrorist events and the 
strategies needed to properly plan and prepare for them. The risk to you is 
considered low on a scale of low, medium, and high. The researcher is 
available by telephone  for contact at any time during this 
research. In addition, you may withdraw from this study at any time without 
negative consequences, for any reason you deem necessary. Should you withdraw, 
your data will be eliminated from the study and destroyed. If you do 
participate, your data will be coded to protect your identity and 
confidentiality, and kept in a locked security box for a period of five years. 
After five years, the date will be destroyed. There is no financial 
remuneration for participating in this study. Although highly unlikely, as a 
requirement of the Lynn University Institutional Review Board, revelation of 
any unethical or illegal behavior is subject to reporting to the appropriate 
authorities. 
, 
Upon request, a copy of the final research analysis will be provided to 
you at the conclusion of the research. If you have any questions about any 
aspect of this study or your involvement, feel free to ask at any time. If you 
have concerns about this project that you do not want to address with Eugene G. 
Savage, you may call Dr. Carole Warshaw Dissertation Committee Chairperson, 
Lynn University, at . 
Two copies of this informed consent have been provided. Please sign both 
indicating you have read, understood, and agree to participate in this 
research. Please return one copy to the researcher and keep the other for your 
files. 
Name of Participant (please print) Telephone Number 
Signature of Participant Date 
Eugene G. Savage, Researcher Date 
APPENDIX K 
INFORMED CONSENT TO AUDIO-RECORD 
1, 1 give 
permission to have this interview recorded by means of an 
audio recording device. I understand the interview will be 
taped for data collection purposes specific to this 
research project only. The recording will be transcribed 
and coded. The recording and transcription will be 
maintained for a period of five years. At that time the 
recording and transcription will be destroyed. I 
understand that these tapes, as well as all written 
materials, are completely confidential. 
Name of Participant (please print) Date 
Signature of Participant Date 
Eugene G. Savage, Researcher Date 
APPENDIX L 
Mission Statement of PD1 
Source: PD1 2003 Annual Report 
The [PDL] will enhance the quality of life in the City of 
[City A] through progressive police service in partnership 
with the community. 
Vision - The finest people providing the best police 
services for our community. 
Values - 
Fairness: Maintaining impartiality and objectivity 
Integrity: Adhering to the highest level of ethics and 
honesty 
Respect: Demonstrating understanding and sensitivity 
to all 
Service: Always putting others before self 
Trust: Belief in the community and each other for the 
common good 
APPENDIX M 
Mission Statement of the PD2 
Source: PD2 2000 - 2001 Annual Report 
The [PD2] will commit its resources in partnership with the 
community to: 
Promote a safe and secure environment, free from crime 
and the fear of crime, 
Maintain order and provide for the safe and 
expeditious flow of traffic, 
Practice our core values of integrity, respect 
service, and fairness. 
Integrity 
Integrity is the hallmark of the [PD2] and we are 
cornrnited [sic] to the highest performance standards, 
ethical conduct, and truthfulness in all relationships. We 
hold ourselves accountable for our actions and take pride 
in a professional level of service and fairness to all. 
Respect 
We treat all people in a dignified and courteous 
manner, and exhibit understanding of ethnic and cultural 
diversity, both in our professional and personal endeavors. 
We guarantee to uphold the principles and values embodied 
in the constitutions of the United State and the State of 
Florida. 
Service 
We provide quality service in a courteous, efficient, 
and accessible manner. We foster community and employee 
involvement through problem-solving partnerships. 
Fairness 
We treat all people impartially, with consideration 
and compassion. We are equally responsive to our employees 
and the community we serve. 
APPENDIX N 
Mission statement of PD4 
Source: [PD4] 2002 Annual Report 
Our Commitment 
The Mission of the [ P D 4 ]  is to provide the highest level of 
professional Law Enforcement, Fire & Emergency Medical 
Services for the unique community of [JI]. 
Our elite department members will accomplish this by 
continuing to ensure trust as responsive members of the 
[JI] family through dedication, integrity, competence, and 
courage. 
APPENDIX 0 
Mission Statement, Vision, Values and Motto of PD5 
Source: [PD5] 2002 Annual Report 
Mission Statement 
The [PD5], in partnership with the community, is committed 
to providing professional, efficient, and courteous public 
service by creating a safe environment and improving the 
quality of life for those we serve in an atmosphere of 
respect, courtesy and integrity. 
"We are indebted to our employees, especially the men and 
women who risk their lives for this cause. We respect 
their dignity and recognize their merit." 
Vision 
The [PD5] will maintain the highest standards of 
professional ethics and integrity. We are committed to the 
philosophy of police and community collaboration. We will 
maintain partnerships and coalitions with the business, 
corporate and residential communities with the goal of 
reducing crime and improving the quality of life. We will 
provide a well-trained workforce, "state-of-the-art" 
technology and other resources to better protect our 
community. It is our continued commitment and honor to 
provide professional service to all. 
Values 
Display honesty, integrity and sincerity in personal 
conduct and interactions. Accept full responsibility and 
1 
accountability for your actions. Judge others by their 
actions, not their race, gender or personal 
characteristics. Do your best, no matter how trivial the 
task. Choose the difficult right over the easy wrong. 
Look out for the group before you look out for yourself. 
Respect the law and the dignity of all human beings. Have 
empathy and compassion for others. Always strive for 
excellence and continuous improvement in everything you do. 
Motto 
"Proudly serving and protecting" 
